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Abstract 
There has been a flurry of legislative action at the international and regional levels to address 
the global problem of trafficking in persons, which victimises epidemic-proportions of 
individuals and generates one of the largest proceeds of organised crime. The harmonisation of 
national legal responses based on minimum standards around prevention, prosecution, and 
protection as espoused by those international and regional instruments is a prerequisite for 
effective and wide cooperation among countries of origin, transit, and destination. However, 
the reluctance of states to lift to the lofty heights of international consensus the contentious 
policy issues surrounding trafficking, including prostitution, has resulted in the adoption of 
rather ambiguous anti-trafficking norms and obligations, which allow states to individually 
determine what constitutes ‘trafficking in persons’ within their own jurisdictions. The 
subsequent divergence in national responses reveals that legal harmonisation has not taken 
place. The mechanisms of enforcement, which attach directly or indirectly to those 
international and regional instruments, therefore, have the formidable task of assisting states in 
the implementation of the substantive content of anti-trafficking norms and obligations through 
their monitoring and reporting mandates. However, their work remains a neglected area of 
academic research, compared to writings on the ambiguity of the international anti-trafficking 
framework. The challenge to international regulation of the trafficking problem, as identified 
in this thesis, relates on a fundamental level to the systemic limitations of the formal processes 
of law based on state consent and respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Through a comparative legal analysis of international and European legal responses 
to sex trafficking in women, this thesis illuminates the main systemic challenges to combating 
trafficking in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, 
and how the work of those enforcement mechanisms remedies some of those challenges.  
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1.1. The Broader Legal and Political Context 
Trafficking in persons1 is one of the most serious transnational crimes and violations of human 
rights in the last two decades. It encompasses the movement or harbouring of persons using 
force or deceit for sexual and labour exploitation, as well as, the removal of organs.2 In 2012, 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that 20.9 million men, women, and 
children worldwide are trapped in transnational and domestic situations of trafficking.3 Most 
transnational trafficking is apparently for sexual exploitation of women in Central and South-
Eastern Europe.4 Even though the current understanding of trafficking is necessarily influenced 
by early anti-sex trafficking efforts based on European political ideologies and idiosyncrasies.5  
The exact nature and scale of trafficking are unknown because most of the victim 
population is ‘hidden’ and traffickers use sophisticated and new technology tools. There is a 
general lack of awareness and capacity among national authorities to respond rapidly to 
existing and emerging forms of trafficking. The identification process of trafficking victims is 
burdensome because victims cannot be easily distinguished from illegal migrants on the 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘trafficking in persons’, ‘trafficking in human beings’, and ‘human trafficking’ are used 
interchangeably in this thesis, and the term ‘sex trafficking’ refers to trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation, 
that is, forced prostitution. According to the global definition, ‘trafficking in persons’ means ‘the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, 
for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs’. Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 December 2003) 2237 UNTS 319 (UN Trafficking Protocol) 
art 3(a).  
2 ibid. 
3 Farhad Mehran and Michaëlle de Cock (eds), ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: Results and Methodology 
(ILO 2012) 13.   
4 ibid 14-16. 
5 Jean Allain, Slavery in International Law: Of Human Exploitation and Trafficking (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 342. 
  11 
 
ground, where there is considerable movement and overlapping between trafficking in persons 
and smuggling of migrants. While both crimes ‘require distinct legal, operational and policy 
responses’,6 there is fear that national officials have an incentive for misidentification tied to 
the fact that trafficking victims are entitled to protection and assistance unlike illegal migrants.7 
In particular, as the fight against trafficking often serves as a veil for restrictive immigration 
policies.8 That international law prohibits only forced prostitution does not prevent states from 
criminalising consensual prostitution in their own jurisdictions. But the fine line between 
forced and consensual prostitution in trafficking cases, based on the growing use of more subtle 
forms of coercion, can lead to misidentification and prosecution of trafficked persons as illegal 
prostitutes.9  
The involvement of organised criminal groups is an important factor in perpetuating 
trafficking to a global scale. It also makes trafficking in persons the third most lucrative 
transnational crime, following drugs and weapons trafficking, generating in 2014 about USD 
36 billion.10 However, unlike those crimes, trafficked persons can be reused and resold with 
relative impunity for traffickers because the implementation of national anti-trafficking 
legislation is inadequate.11 Countries of origin experience a decrease in human capital and 
social networks as large groups of nationals are removed from society. While in countries of 
destination the penetration of organised crime into society and the entrenchment of factors, 
such as poverty, sexism, and racism, that maintain vulnerability and create demand for cheap 
labour thwart the rule of law.12 Thus, trafficking is complex and contested because of the 
underlying policy issues around immigration, prostitution, and organised crime, which, in turn, 
encourage states to adopt different approaches to trafficking around morality, public health and 
                                                 
6 UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime ‘Report 
on the meeting of the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons held in Vienna on 19 October 2010’ (30 March 
2011) UN Doc CTOC/COP/WG.4/2010/7 annex para (a). 
7 Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime ‘Note by the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Children’s Fund and the 
International Organization for Migration on the draft protocols concerning migrant smuggling and trafficking in 
persons’ (8 February 2000) UN Doc A/AC.254/27 para 2. 
8 Jennifer M Chacon, ‘Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of Immigration 
Enforcement’ (2010) 158(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1609, 1619.     
9 Janie Chuang, ‘Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform and Anti-trafficking Law 
and Policy’ (2010) 158(6) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1655, 1669, 1671. 
10 ‘Human Trafficking Has No Place in Modern World, General Assembly President Says’ (UN News Centre, 14 
July 2014) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48271#.VrZiW1iLShc> accessed 8 March 2017. 
11 Louise Shelley, ‘The Relationship of Drug and Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective’ (2012) 18(3) 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 241, 242. 
12 P Lloyd, BA Simmons and BM Stewart, ‘Combating Transnational Crime: The Role of Learning and Norm 
Diffusion in the Current Rule of Law Wave’ in M Zürn, A Nollkaemper and R Peerenboom (eds), Rule of Law 
Dynamics: In an Era of International and Transnational Governance (CUP 2012) 166. 
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order, labour, immigration, crime, and human rights.13 Individually, these approaches can 
address only an element of trafficking but holistically they can effectively suppress the crime. 
In cases of transnational trafficking, state cooperation in matters of confiscation of 
proceeds of crime, extradition, mutual legal assistance, application of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, and assistance to and protection of victims, requires that the crime be common to 
both jurisdictions. Thus, the harmonisation of national anti-trafficking legislation is a 
prerequisite for effective cooperation. States subsequently regulate trafficking in persons 
within the transnational cooperative framework of organised crimes, under the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,14 which stipulates minimum standards for 
the adoption of measures to prevent trafficking, prosecute traffickers, and protect victims, 
manifest in the Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.15 While the contextual understanding of trafficking, in turn, necessitates 
regional responses.  
In Asia, there are no rights-based anti-trafficking instruments. The South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking 
in Women and Children for Prostitution focuses on trafficking in women and children for 
forced prostitution and, to this end, prevents ‘the use of women and children in international 
prostitution networks’.16 This Convention is much narrower in scope than the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children that covers prevention and protection without individual entitlements.17 Both the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa,18 and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication 
of Violence against Women19 focus on trafficking in women as a gender-based violence. The 
Arab Charter on Human Rights prohibits trafficking both in the context of slavery and forced 
labour and mentions in addition to the forms in the UN Trafficking Protocol exploitation of 
children in armed conflict.20 In Europe, trafficking in persons is a key political issue for several 
                                                 
13 Marjan Wijers, ‘Purity, Victimhood and Agency: Fifteen Years of the UN Trafficking Protocol’ (2015) 4 Anti-
Trafficking Review 56, 57-59.   
14 (adopted 15 November 2000, entered into force 29 September 2003) 2225 UNTS 209 (UNCTOC). 
15 UN Trafficking Protocol (n 1). 
16 (adopted 5 January 2002, entered into force 1 December 2005) art 2. 
17 (adopted 21 November 2015).  
18 (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005) (African Protocol) art 4(2)(g). 
19 33 ILM 1534 (1994) (Inter-American Convention) art 2(b). 
20 (adopted 22 May 2004, entered into force 15 March 2008) art 10. 
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organisations, particularly the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (COE), the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),21 and the Council of the Baltic 
Sea States (CBSS).22 However, only the first two organisations have developed legally binding 
anti-trafficking standards, namely the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings,23 and the Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and 
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA24 
respectively.  
 The legislative response to trafficking in persons has been robust and within a decade 
of the UN Trafficking Protocol entering into force the vast majority of states around the globe 
had passed or modified their national anti-trafficking legislation. The strongest push for 
legislative action has come from Central and South-Eastern European states shortly after the 
Protocol was opened for signature.25 That some of these states were already entering into 
bilateral anti-trafficking agreements is an important reason behind the initial push.26 However, 
the criminal justice system response appears to be stagnating at a low level and investigations, 
prosecutions, and convictions are limited, particularly in African, Caribbean, and Middle 
Eastern states with more recently enacted legislation or no legislation.27 Thus, one of the 
internationally more authoritative sources on trafficking, namely the annual report on 
trafficking in persons (TIP Report) focuses most recently on increasing criminal accountability 
of traffickers and addressing challenges in prosecution.28 
 The harmonisation of national anti-trafficking legislation that is necessary for effective 
cooperation in transnational trafficking cases has not taken place. Crimes with a transnational 
dimension fall outside the exclusive competence of states precisely because they cannot 
individually tackle the spoils of today’s globalised world. For European states this means 
subjecting their domestic legal systems to harmonising measures at the EU level and at the 
                                                 
21 Permanent Council ‘OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings’ (24 July 2003) PC.DEC/557.   
22 See generally Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings <http://cbss.idynamic.lv/Civil-Security-and-
the-Human-Dimension/about-the-tf-thb> accessed 10 September 2017. 
23 (adopted 16 May 2005, entered into force 1 February 2008) CETS 197 (COE Trafficking Convention). 
24 [2011] OJ L101/1 (EU Trafficking Directive). 
25 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (UN 2016) 50.   
26 Dimitri Vlassis, ‘The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime’ in Mats Berdal and Monica 
Serrano (eds), Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual? (Lynne Rienner 
2002) 85.   
27 UNODC (2016) (n 25) 51. 
28 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report: June 2017 (US 
Department of State 2017) 1. 
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international level. Thus, scholars increasingly speak of legal pluralism that ‘immediately 
creates (at least) a duality of law across the entire globe’.29 Since trafficking is a 
multidisciplinary and multidimensional crime, international documents tend to dictate a 
holistic approach.30 But on a deep level, the solution to this complicated problem lies, first, in 
understanding the limitations of the international system to develop an appropriate response 
that will vary depending on context. As this thesis argues, an important part of the reason 
behind the inadequacy of current responses, rooted in the UN Trafficking Protocol, is inherent 
in the systemic limitations of international law broadly-speaking to manage the problem of 
trafficking in persons. Thus, international law is part of the problem. A more nuanced solution 
to current inadequacies lies elsewhere, namely at the domestic level with the establishment and 
development of mechanisms capable of gathering and analysing trafficking data to increase 
understanding of the problem, as well as, of monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the 
domestic realities to assess why the law on the books has not translated into the law in action. 
 The next section defines the contours of this research project, in light of the primary 
and secondary research questions directing the study and the three main contributions to the 
field. Within the discussion of the third contribution, the section identifies the methodology.  
1.2. Research Questions and Contribution to the Field 
This thesis is interested in the current progress in the global fight against sex trafficking in 
women. By way of example of the national anti-trafficking responses of Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, it studies the harmonisation of 
international and European anti-trafficking norms and standards, which were developed and 
adopted by states within the formal processes of law, with a view to international cooperation. 
In doing so, it examines the preeminent legal instruments, mechanisms, and procedures in the 
field and assesses their impact on knowledge production and international regulation. The 
primary research question, then, asks: to what extent the anti-trafficking norms and standards 
adopted within the consent-based system of international law actually promote progress in the 
                                                 
29 Margaret Davies, ‘Legal Pluralism’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010) 815.   
30 States note that trafficking in persons as a serious form of organised crime that equally affects countries of 
origin, transit, and/or destination requires ‘a holistic approach that balanced criminal justice aspects with human 
rights’. UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
‘Report of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
on its fifth session, held in Vienna from 18 to 22 October 2010’ (2 December 2010) UN Doc CTOC/COP/2010/17 
para 62. See also EU Trafficking Directive (n 24) preamble para 7. 
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global fight against sex trafficking in women?  The main components of this research question 
relate, in particular, to the design of anti-trafficking instruments and mechanisms, the narrow 
self-interests of states, and the use of unilateralism and soft law to improve the compliance 
behaviour of states. The secondary research questions, then, guiding this study ask: How states 
have chosen to respond to the global challenge of sex trafficking in women at the international 
level, and what their legal choices reveal about the political interests and priorities 
underpinning international regulation? Whether the systemic limitations to enforcement of the 
anti-trafficking norms and standards adopted within the formal processes of international and 
European law warrant more intrusive enforcement by unilateral mechanisms? How the formal 
mechanisms of enforcement developed and adopted by states can work around their systemic 
limitations to increase knowledge production and international regulation? 
There is a saturation of scholarly literature focusing on the shortcomings of the UN 
Trafficking Protocol as the most appropriate response to the global challenge of trafficking in 
persons.31 Most writings examine the definitional and conceptual ambiguities in the Protocol 
as impediments to a successful legal harmonisation of national anti-trafficking legislation so 
that it appears the Protocol does little to enhance international cooperation in matters of 
transnational trafficking.32 Thus, most writings are concerned with the practical effects of the 
Protocol on domestic trafficking situations. An important reason behind this fixation is the lack 
of reliable data in the field to assess progress by measuring the nature and scale of trafficking.33 
Vast amounts of money are being pumped into the field of action to improve knowledge 
production and investors demand tangible results.34 Thus, stakeholders revert to what can be 
measured, namely the number of identified victims, investigations, prosecutions, convictions, 
service providers, ratified legal instruments, and so on. These indicate that the criminal justice 
response of states is inadequate.35 But there is a danger in focusing on, for example, whether a 
                                                 
31 See ‘Anti-Trafficking Review’ Issue 4 (2015). For example, Marjan Wijers’ article on the Protocol’s inadequate 
human rights coverage, Grupo Davida’s article on the Protocol’s impact on Brazil as a signatory, Kathryn Baer’s 
article on the Protocol’s impact on Singapore as a non-signatory. 
32 For example, Jean Allain, ‘No Effective Trafficking Definition Exists: Domestic Implementation of the Palermo 
Protocol’ (2014) 7 Albany Government Law Review 111.   
33 Elżbieta M Goździak, ‘Empirical Vacuum: In Search of Research on Human Trafficking’ in Rosemary Gartner 
and Bill McCarthy (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Gender, Sex, and Crime (OUP 2014) 613.  
34 For an empirical study on the prevalence of anti-trafficking efforts in areas of research, awareness-raising, 
prevention, and rehabilitation, see KA Foot, A Toft and N Cesare, ‘Developments in Anti-Trafficking Efforts: 
2008–2011’ (2015) 1(2) Journal of Human Trafficking 136. 
35 For a discussion of the main impediments to effective evaluations of a criminal justice response, namely the 
lack of clearly defined end-points and an overarching vision, see Anne T Gallagher and Rebecca Surtees, 
‘Measuring the Success of Counter-Trafficking Interventions in the Criminal Justice Sector: Who Decides-and 
How?’ (2012) 1 Anti-Trafficking Review 10. 
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state has consented to become a party to the Protocol, or whether it has established a domestic 
mechanism on trafficking in persons as a definite sign of action.36 Since there is an important 
difference between the law on the books and the law in action. Even if the setting-up of a 
domestic anti-trafficking mechanism is a positive development, that there is little evaluation of 
their actual impact on domestic realities is disconcerting.37 Perhaps the anti-trafficking project 
is just another foreign policy that states are pressured to engage with to avoid criticism, improve 
their international image, and develop useful diplomatic relations.38 In particular, as it competes 
for attention with other equally prevalent global challenges, such as smuggling of migrants and 
trafficking in firearms that are criminalised alongside trafficking in persons within the 
UNCTOC regime.39 Even though the nature, scale, and effects of trafficking on governments 
and societies should be reason enough for genuine (concerted) action.  
This thesis contributes to the debate on international regulation of trafficking in persons 
in three separate but related ways. The first contribution addresses the inadequate focus on 
mechanisms of enforcement at the national, regional, and international levels.40 Often members 
of those mechanisms themselves assess the impact of their work to raise awareness of their 
mandate.41 Also, in the context of awareness-raising, the reports of a number of mechanisms 
identified here are additionally available on the EU’s anti-trafficking website.42 In this specific 
case, the mechanisms to be explored are, at the national level, the national rapporteurs or 
                                                 
36 Dominika B Jansson, Modern Slavery: A Comparative Study of the Definition of Trafficking in Persons 
(Koninklijke Brill 2015) 9. 
37 For a ‘state of play’ assessment of the role and function of national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms on 
trafficking in persons in relation to data collection and analysis at the EU level, see Neil Paterson and Gert 
Vermeulen, The Montrasec Demo: A Bench-mark for Member State and EU Automated Data Collection and 
Reporting on Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual Exploitation of Children (Maklu 2010) 49-61. 
38 Simmons identifies three categories of governments based on the decision to ratify human rights treaties, namely 
‘sincere ratifiers’ that value the treaty content and anticipate compliance, ‘false negatives’ that are committed in 
principle but nonetheless fail to ratify, and ‘strategic ratifiers’ that ratify because of peer pressure and to avoid 
criticism. Beth A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (CUP 2009) 
58. 
39 UNGA Res 55/25 (8 January 2001) UN Doc A/RES/55/25; UNGA Res 55/255 (31 May 2001) UN Doc 
A/RES/55/255. 
40 For a general overview of the mechanisms under the UN Trafficking Protocol, the COE Trafficking Convention, 
and the TVPA, as well as, the SRTIP, see Anne T Gallagher, The International Law of Human Trafficking (CUP 
2010) 466-486. For a general overview of domestic mechanisms in Europe, see Mohamed Y Mattar, ‘Comparative 
Models of Reporting Mechanisms on the Status of Trafficking in Human Beings’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1. 
41 For example, by the SRTIP, see Anne T Gallagher and Joy N Ezeilo, ‘The UN Special Rapporteur on 
Trafficking: A Turbulent Decade in Review’ (2015) 37(4) Human Rights Quarterly 913. By the Dutch NREM, 
see Corinne E Dettmeijer-Vermeulen, ‘Trafficking in Human Beings: Ten Years of Independent Monitoring by 
the Dutch Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings’ (2012) 18(3) European Journal on Criminal Policy and 
Research 283. 
42 See <http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/publications_en?solrsort=ds_field_publication_date%20desc> 
accessed 13 September 2017. 
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equivalent mechanisms (NREMs) on trafficking in persons in Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden.43 At the European level,44 the European 
Commission and the Anti-Trafficking Coordinator (ATC) that are responsible for evaluating 
transposition of the EU Trafficking Directive, as well as, the Group of Experts on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) and the Committee of the Parties that attach 
directly to the COE Trafficking Convention. At the international level, the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) and the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons (WGTIP), the former 
attaching by extension to the UN Trafficking Protocol and the latter attaching directly to the 
Protocol to assist the COP in reviewing the Protocol’s implementation. Two international 
mechanisms of relevance to the promotion of the human rights of trafficking victims, an area 
largely overlooked in multilevel responses, are the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in 
Persons (SRTIP) that attaches indirectly to the UN Trafficking Protocol, and the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) that attaches directly 
to the CEDAW.45 The general provision on trafficking in women in the CEDAW is included 
in this study because the rights and guarantees in the CEDAW when interpreted as a whole 
offer sufficient protection to women’s issues in all spheres of governance. This is important 
because most trafficking-related exploitation is private in nature and benefits from differences 
in the law de jure and de facto.46 The final mechanism of relevance to this study is a domestic 
one in the US, namely the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office) 
that attaches directly to the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.47 In 
particular, the TIP Report published by the TIP Office as part of the US’ foreign anti-trafficking 
policy because of the effects of the TIP Report on knowledge production and international 
regulation in the field. Academic interest in the TIP Report is somewhat comparable to that in 
the practical effects of the UN Trafficking Protocol on domestic trafficking situations as the 
                                                 
43 For a justification of the selection of case studies, see section 1.3. 
44 The OSCE and the CBSS are not included in this study, which is limited to formal legal structures with 
legislative and/or judicial functions. 
45 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, 
entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW). 
46 Mehran and de Cock (n 3) 13. 
47 (Public Law 106-386) (TVPA). See also Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 (Public 
Law 108-193) (TVPRA 2003); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-164) 
(TVPRA 2005); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Public Law 
110-457) (TVPRA 2008); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013 (Title XII of the Violence 
against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013) (Public Law 113-4) (TVPRA 2013). 
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TIP Office claims to be the de facto monitoring mechanism of the UN Trafficking Protocol 
that has not yet established a proper review mechanism.48 
 The second contribution is to situate trafficking in persons within the broader literature 
on enforcement in international relations (IR) to assess whether and to what extent slow 
progress in the field is rooted in the limitations of consent-based systems of European and 
international law to effectively manage the trafficking problem. Of particular relevance is IR 
literature that examines the different stages of enforcement, namely law-making, 
implementation, and compliance.49 In particular, what states’ choices about the design of 
European and international anti-trafficking instruments reveal about the advantages and 
shortcomings of supra-territorial regulation of global challenges.50 Thereby, looking at the 
interplay between hard law and soft law and its practical effects on compliance.51 The anti-
trafficking instruments examined here contain both hard and soft measures in terms of legally-
binding obligations. There is also a growing body of soft instruments, including the Trafficking 
Principles and Guidelines that aspire to a higher standard of human rights protection and 
assistance for victims than espoused by the UN Trafficking Protocol.52 An important reason 
that this document offers a higher level of protection and assistance is that it was designed 
without any state input.53 Thus, bolstering the claim that soft law advantageously addresses the 
limitations of consent-based law-making.54 
 The interplay between hard law and soft law also informs the examination of the design 
of mechanisms developed by states within the formal processes of law-making to afford at least 
                                                 
48 See UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
‘Report of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
on its seventh session, held in Vienna from 6 to 10 October 2014’ (13 November 2014) UN Doc 
CTOC/COP/2014/13 resolution 7/1 para 3 (‘the review of the implementation of the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto is an ongoing and gradual process … it is necessary to explore all options regarding an appropriate and 
effective mechanism to assist the Conference in that review’.  
49 Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and 
International Relations: The State of the Art (CUP 2013). 
50 On the issue of international consensus formation around the most appropriate response to trafficking, see V 
Charnysh, P Lloyd and BA Simmons, ‘Frames and Consensus Formation in International Relations: The Case of 
Trafficking in Persons’ (2015) 21(2) European Journal of International Relations 323. 
51 For an empirical study on the link between states’ primary interests in fighting trafficking and the hard nature 
of prevention obligations, compared to the optional objectives of international cooperation and victim support, 
see Seo-Young Cho and Krishna C Vadlamannati, ‘Compliance with the Anti-trafficking Protocol’ (2011) 28 
European Journal of Political Economy 249. 
52 ECOSOC ‘Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking’ (20 May 2002) 
UN Doc E/2002/68/Add.1 (Trafficking Principles and Guidelines).   
53 Gallagher (2010) (n 40) 140.   
54 On the claim that ‘better outcomes would result from greater use of non-consensual forms of international law’, 
see Andrew T Guzman, ‘Against Consent’ (2012) 52(4) Virginia Journal of International Law 747. 
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a perception of international accountability of states in the trafficking field.55 That those 
mechanisms seek to interpret and apply European and international anti-trafficking law in 
noncoercive, political settings necessarily influences the level of compliance of individual 
states. This is in contrast to coercive, judicial mechanisms, including the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) that seeks to increase the salience of legal interpretation of ambiguous 
trafficking definitions and concepts found in international anti-trafficking instruments.56 The 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not been called upon so far to interpret the 
provisions of the EU Trafficking Directive, which makes it irrelevant in this specific case, 
because all infringement proceedings initiated for delayed or non-communication of 
transposition of the Directive by EU member states, including the Netherlands, were closed at 
an early stage by the European Commission.57  
 The IR literature on general compliance factors provides valuable insights about the 
preferred direction of national responses in the field as these are applied to the specific contexts 
of the case studies examined here.58 The relative divergence in formal and practical compliance 
within and among states leads to two important conclusions. First, that there are certain 
challenges that are experienced by all identified states. Second, that there are challenges that 
are country-specific. Thus, the trafficking problem requires nuanced solutions that will vary 
depending on context. The international community now advocates a holistic response around 
issues of morality, public health and order, labour, immigration, crime, and human rights. Yet, 
states prefer to pick and choose their approaches depending on not only context but also narrow 
self-interests to the detriment of state cooperation.  
 The third contribution tackles the lacuna in comparative research on non-English 
countries by providing a comparative analysis of national responses in Belgium, the Czech 
                                                 
55 The legislation framework proposed by Goldstein et al and the language of hard law advanced by Abbott et al 
provides a framework for examining intrusiveness in relation to mechanisms of enforcement explored here. 
Kenneth W Abbott and others, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization 401. 
56 On the normative implications of conflating slavery and trafficking in persons to bring the latter within the 
jurisdiction of the ECHR, see Jean Allain, ‘Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia: The European Court of Human Rights 
and Trafficking as Slavery’ (2010) 10(3) Human Rights Law Review 546. 
57 See infringements of EU Home Affairs law on trafficking in human beings by Austria (2013/0204), Cyprus 
(2013/0210), Germany (2013/0214), France (2013/0221), Greece (2013/0217), Italy (2013/0228), Ireland 
(2013/0226), Luxembourg (2013/0235), Malta (2013/0240), the Netherlands (2013/0242), Portugal (2013/0244), 
Spain (2013/0218), and Slovakia (2013/0253). 
58 For example, it is argued that compliance with anti-trafficking norms decreases with corruption and increases 
with respect for women’s rights. S-Y Cho, A Dreher and E Neumayer, ‘The Determinants of Anti-Trafficking 
Policies: Evidence from a New Index’ (2014) 116(2) Scandinavian Journal of Economics 429. It is also argued 
that human rights protection efforts are stronger where female parliamentarians and left-wing politicians are 
involved in anti-trafficking policy-making. Johanna Schönhöfer, ‘Political Determinants of Efforts to Protect 
Victims of Human Trafficking’ (2016) Crime, Law and Social Change 1, 20. 
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Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, in the context of their international 
and regional anti-trafficking obligations. Most comparative studies focus on Anglo-Saxon 
countries with common law traditions because those still use English as their (main) official 
language, which can be useful at the informative level.59 Civil law states, especially those with 
less widely spoken languages, such as Czech, Dutch, Finnish, Romanian, and Swedish, are 
somewhat under-researched.60 There is also, to a certain extent, an absence of a culture-
sensitive approach in comparative accounts, even though in this specific case an informed 
inquiry about the cultural ‘otherness’ explicates the relative divergence in national approaches 
to sex trafficking based on different policies on prostitution.61 Function and context are two 
important concepts in comparative methodology and to meaningfully grasp the foreign laws 
requires consideration of both the operating institution and the law in action.62 Functionalism 
is also the most common ‘method’ in comparative law and the one employed here because the 
primary purpose is ‘to look at the way practical problems of solving conflicts of interest are 
dealt with in different societies according to different legal systems’.63 The functional method 
already refers by definition to a context, thus, the law-in-context method is relevant to an 
adequate understanding of the law, and to explain why the law is as it is. This method is 
complementary and cannot be isolated from other comparative methods.64 But this method is 
used here only to point to a generally-known context element, namely the influence of 
prostitution policies on conceptualisations of sex trafficking. Like the law-in-context method, 
the historical method cannot be avoided, since a proper understanding of the function of 
contemporary law requires identifying where it comes from and why it is as it is today.65 Again, 
the historical method is used only to understand the link between sex trafficking and 
prostitution on the national level. The historical method in this specific case reveals that the 
current divergence in conceptualisations of sex trafficking are just differences as to the outcome 
of ongoing tensions between opposite views on prostitution. All case studies at one point in 
time regulated or criminalised prostitution and more recently at least considered legalisation 
                                                 
59 Mark Van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ (2015) Law and Method 1, 3. 
60 For a comparative study of the trafficking definition in Sweden, Poland, and Russia, see Jansson (n 36). 
61 Pierre Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’ (1996) 45(1) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 52, 60. 
62 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Tony Weir tr, 3rd edn, OUP 1998) 34. 
63 There is disagreement over whether comparative law is a method, a new perspective, or a domain of study, 
which has implications for the exact methodology to be followed. As there is no ‘one’ method, any combination 
of the methods, namely functional, structural, analytical, law-in-context, historical, and common-core, can be used 
in the same research. Van Hoecke (n 59) 8-9. 
64 ibid 16. 
65 ibid 18. 
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for tax revenue. In sum, a micro-comparative methodology based on the functional method 
and, more minimally, on the law-in-context and historical methods most appropriately assesses 
legal harmonisation of anti-trafficking norms and standards at the international, European, and 
national levels. In other words, ‘[i]f the aim is to harmonize the law … comparing the legal 
systems involved is already implied by this aim, but also the approach to be followed is partly 
determined by it, as the focus will be on the commonalities, on the common core of the 
compared legal systems and on the possible ways of erasing differences’.66  
 The next section explains the reasons for choosing Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden as the primary case studies, as well as, the 
importance of the European context. The methodological difficulties arising from the selection 
of case studies are also addressed. 
1.3. Research Scope, Selection of Case Studies, and Methodological Difficulties 
Trafficking in persons develops differently in different regional contexts. The specificities of a 
region can facilitate or complicate the trade, thus, making it more or less attractive for 
traffickers. Trafficking typically flows into Europe because of the wealth disparities between 
Western and Central European states belonging to the EU and countries to the east and south 
of the European territory of the EU, which are primarily developing countries.67 The EU states 
are among the wealthiest in the world and there is demand for cheap sexual and labour services 
following the economic crisis.68 A context-specific dimension of EU trafficking is that EU 
states, namely Romania, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Hungary, and Poland, are the most significant 
origins of trafficking.69 Non-EU victims primarily originate in Nigeria, China, Albania, 
Vietnam, and Morocco.70 An important reason behind the dominance of EU victims, also 
known as internal trafficking, is the removal of internal borders in lieu of one external EU 
border. This means that EU citizens can exercise free movement within the EU area and 
traffickers have exploited this right, in the same vein that they exploited the ease of travel in 
                                                 
66 ibid 2-3. 
67 UNODC (n 25) 75. 
68 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Commission Report on the progress made in the fight 
against trafficking in human beings (2016) as required under Article 20 of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing 
and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims SWD(2016)159 final 14. 
69 ibid 12. 
70 Previously, between 2010 and 2012, victims primarily originated in Brazil, China, and Russia. Thus, only the 
citizenship of non-EU victims has changed. ibid. 
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the wake of globalisation.71 Thus, the fight against trafficking often serves as a veil for 
restrictive immigration policies as states have limited options to keep their borders both open 
and secure from crime.72 In particular, the more recent influx of refugees and migrants into the 
EU demonstrates ‘the failure to recreate the means of governing space and persons once 
internal border controls were removed’.73 These groups of persons are particularly susceptible 
to trafficking-related exploitation and the TIP Report documents recruitment attempts by 
traffickers at reception centres in Belgium and the inability of government institutions to 
conduct sufficient screenings of migrants to identify potential trafficking in Sweden.74 
According to intelligence from Europol the refugee influx will result in (more) forced 
marriages of migrant and asylum-seekers for legal residency.75 
 Within the EU, trafficking in women for sexual exploitation is most prevalent and the 
reported level of sex trafficking is among the highest in the world.76 The majority of offenders 
are men from EU states like their victims, as well as, third regions, such as Africa.77 An obvious 
deduction is that trafficking data in the EU is stereotypical in its image of innocent women who 
are sexually exploited by socially deviant men.78 This is cause for reflection about the 
advancement of knowledge in the EU field. Even though the European Commission identifies 
‘a worrying consistency in terms of victims’ countries of origin, countries of destination, the 
forms of exploitation, and the age and gender profile of victims over the five years’.79 An 
important reason behind the stereotypical construction of the nature of trafficking relates to the 
fact that in many European countries the trafficking offence predates the adoption of the UN 
Trafficking Protocol when it covered only sex trafficking. For example, the Netherlands 
introduced sex trafficking into national law in 1911, although it was amended in 2005 to cover 
additional exploitation forms found in the UN Trafficking Protocol.80 Certain presuppositions 
                                                 
71 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L158/77 arts 4-5. 
72 On an area of freedom, security, and justice, policies on border checks, asylum, and immigration, and police 
cooperation in relation to serious forms of organised crime, including trafficking, see Consolidated Version of 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47 (TFEU) arts 67, 77, 87-89. 
73 Agustín José Menéndez, ‘The Refugee Crisis: Between Human Tragedy and Symptom of the Structural Crisis 
of European Integration’ (2016) 22(4) European Law Journal 388, 388-389. 
74 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report: June 2016 (US 
Department of State 2016) 94, 336. 
75 Commission Staff Working Document (2016) (n 68) 19. 
76 UNODC (2016) (n 25) 72-73. 
77 Commission Staff Working Document (2016) (n 68) 12. 
78 See Wijers (2015) (n 13) 73. 
79 Commission Staff Working Document (2016) (n 68) 13. 
80 UNODC (2016) (n 25) 77. 
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and prejudices about the crime and its victims, then, dictate the potential success of the anti-
trafficking framework. Thus, there are international variations of sex trafficking and elements, 
such as internal trafficking and the refugee crisis, are idiosyncratic to European states as 
countries of origin, transit, and/or destination.81 
 The selection of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and 
Sweden as the six case studies in thesis is rooted in five reasons, some necessitated by the 
comparative research undertaken here, others are of a more pragmatic nature. First, it is 
expressed in comparative law that ‘the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil 
the same function’.82 If the basic methodological principle of all comparative law is similarity, 
then, the main similarity among the case studies is that they all follow a civil law tradition. 
However, today, in Europe all legal systems are mixed. For example, in 1804, the Dutch system 
adopted the Code Napoléon, in 1838 it enacted the Burgerlijk Wetboek, and in 1992 it enforced 
a new Burgerlijk Wetboek under the influence of the German legal tradition.83 There is also a 
notable influence of the Anglo-Saxon doctrine on the Dutch system. Broadly-speaking, through 
EU law and ECHR law, concepts of the French and German legal doctrines have entered other 
European systems. In this specific case, the EU Trafficking Directive makes mandatory the 
exercise of the nationality principle under article 10, which reflects the current position of some 
member states, including Austria, Denmark, and Ireland.84 
 Second, it is expressed in comparative law, to the contrary, that ‘a respect for alterity is 
not so much the result of a quest for difference as it is its pre-requisite’.85 If the basic 
methodological principle of all comparative law is difference, then, the main difference among 
the case studies is their trafficking experience as illustrated in the table below. An instinctive 
conclusion is that labour trafficking in men, women, and children is more prevalent than sex 
trafficking in the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden. The former two states are major origin 
countries for sex trafficking, while the increase in labour trafficking reflects the economic crisis 
in the EU. In relation to sex trafficking in women, all six states are origin countries (Belgium, 
Finland, and Sweden to a limited extent), transit countries (Sweden to a limited extent), and 
destination countries. The Netherlands is most affected by sex trafficking. Sex trafficking in 
                                                 
81 Leonard Territo and George Kirkham (eds), International Sex Trafficking of Women & Children: Understanding 
the Global Epidemic (Looseleaf Law Publications Inc 2010) 5. 
82 Zweigert and Kötz (n 62) 34. 
83 Van Hoecke (n 59) 26. 
84 Tom Obokata and Brian Payne, ‘Implementing Action against Trafficking of Human Beings under the TFEU: 
A Preliminary Analysis’ (2012) 3(3-4) New Journal of European Criminal Law 298, 305.   
85 Pierre Legrand, ‘The Same and the Different’ in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (eds), Comparative 
Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (CUP 2003) 272. 
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children appears to be as prevalent in all six states as sex trafficking in women. Only Belgium 
and the Netherlands appear to report on sex trafficking in men as origin (Belgium to a limited 
extent), transit, and destination countries. Also, only Belgium (limited origin country) and the 
Netherlands experience the full realm of sex and labour trafficking. 
 
Table 1. Nature of trafficking in persons for sexual and labour exploitation.86 
 Sex Trafficking Labour Trafficking 
Origin Transit Destination Origin Transit Destination 
M W C M W C M W C M W C M W C M W C 




X X  X X  X X X X  X X  X X 
 
Finland  L L  X X  X X L L  X X  X X  
Netherlands X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Romania  X X  X X  X X X X X X X X X X X 
Sweden  L L  L L  X X X X X X X X X X X 
M = men  W = women C = children X = ‘full’ L = limited 
 
 The different trafficking experiences of the case studies necessarily influence whether 
and to what extent they are involved in the fight against trafficking. More general indicators of 
commitment are the signature and ratification of preeminent anti-trafficking instruments, such 
as the UN Trafficking Protocol and the COE Trafficking Convention, and communication of 
transposition of the EU Trafficking Directive. At the same time, the level of compliance with 
these instruments as measured by mechanisms of enforcement attaching to these very 
instruments or more generally by, for example, the TIP Report can be a good indication of state 
involvement. In particular, in the absence of reliable trafficking data for accurate assessments. 
All six states are parties to the instruments just mentioned and their compliance scores in the 
TIP Report fall into the highest categories of full compliance or incomplete compliance with 
significant efforts to come into compliance.87 Even though compliance in the TIP Report is 
measured not against international anti-trafficking standards to which these states have 
consented but against domestic US anti-trafficking standards that differ in some significant 
ways. The Czech Republic is the most recent state party to ratify the COE Trafficking 
Convention, although it was already involved in the fight against trafficking, at the very least 
as a result of its accession to the EU and the requirement of acquis communautaire. The same 
                                                 
86 Data source: TIP Office (2017) (n 28). 
87 TIP Office (2017) (n 28) 46. 
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point applies to Romanian involvement in the anti-trafficking project. As a result of the acquis 
incorporation, the ‘new’ EU states, in particular, the Czech Republic often outperform the ‘old’ 
EU states in matters of formal compliance with EU law generally.88 A further point related to 
the significant gap between signature and ratification of the UN Trafficking Protocol and the 
COE Trafficking Convention by the Czech Republic is the status of international law in 
individual states. The Czech Republic could not ratify both instruments until and unless 
national law defined criminal liability of legal persons.89 
 Third, and related to the second reason, the conceptualisation of sex trafficking in these 
states differs depending upon their prostitution policies. While some states, such as Finland 
and Sweden draw a direct connection between prostitution and the increase in sexual 
exploitation, other states, such as the Netherlands, distinguish legally between consensual and 
forced prostitution and seek to reduce sexual exploitation in the legalised sex industry by 
improving the working conditions of sex workers that create vulnerability. The specific 
conceptualisation of sex trafficking will influence the priorities of government institutions and 
their ability and the extent to which they cooperate with other states in transnational trafficking 
cases. The prostitution policies of individual states, in turn, depend upon their different cultural 
settings. For example, the Czech Republic and Romania belong to the group of formerly 
communist states that believed the transition from capitalism to communism would end 
prostitution as  ‘depraved capitalism’ and the moral failing, especially of prostitutes 
themselves.90 This labelling resurfaces in current approaches to prostitution-related 
exploitation as just another criminal activity. By contrast, Finland and Sweden are two 
countries with long-standing respect for women’s human rights, as evidenced by the 
formulation of their trafficking policies around gender equality, which is documented to 
increase overall compliance with international anti-trafficking norms and standards.91 The 
stigma attached to prostitution will influence the treatment of persons in prostitution-related 
exploitation, such as the types of assistance available to sex trafficking victims, the potential 
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outcome of trafficking proceedings, and so on. Societal attitudes will influence the judiciary, 
in particular, the reasoning of a judge on a specific matter of anti-trafficking law. 
 Fourth, and related to the second reason, the trafficking experiences of individual states 
associate with economic and political instability, as well as, geographical location. Romania 
and the Czech Republic illustrate how the transitioning of their economies after the fall of 
communism precipitated unemployment and, in turn, transnational trafficking. The wealth 
disparities between neighbouring countries also increase sex trafficking in women, such as 
along the Czech-German border, known as the largest brothel in Europe, and the Finnish-
Russian border.92  
 Fifth, the case studies have set up different NREMs in terms of structural design and 
scope of mandate. The NREMs are found to take one of four structures, namely inter-agency 
coordinating structures, stand-alone institutions, offices within government institutions, and 
institutions that are integrated into a broad-based human rights institution. Only the Belgian 
NREM is bi-structured. Each structure has certain advantages and shortcomings depending 
upon the size of the state, its geographical location, the extent of the domestic trafficking 
situation, and the availability of resources. The structure of the NREM has some influence on 
the impact of its mandate and more free-standing structures, such as the Dutch and Finnish 
ones, appear to exert greater influence on the compliance behaviour of their governments 
because they are sufficiently independent. At a minimum, the NREM carries out assessments 
of trafficking trends, measures the results of anti-trafficking action, gathers statistics, and 
reports to government. A wider mandate will obviously have a greater impact on domestic 
situations but only if there are adequate resources to carry out the identified tasks. A 
governmental structure maximises utilisation of existing human, financial, and material 
resources and can ensure accountability within existing governmental procedures. But at the 
cost of independence of work. 
 When domestic trafficking situations are studied from an international and regional 
perspective, there is a risk of casting the net too wide in terms of the number of case studies 
chosen for a meaningful comparative analysis. Consequently, research can become formalistic 
as there is little scope for analysis. The TIP Report that assess compliance of 188 countries 
illustrates the analytical and methodological problems arising when the net is cast too wide so 
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that the focus becomes the status of compliance rather than its quality.93 At the same time, a 
single case study does not facilitate the comparison of laws, institutions, compliance 
behaviours, or trafficking situations. Even if an individual focus has the benefit of a deep 
analysis of historical developments.94 The selection of case studies here hopefully 
accommodates these concerns, in particular, as the purpose of the comparative research is to 
draw out international cooperation in transnational trafficking cases and the importance of legal 
harmonisation to this end. A more limited focus may be necessary when conducting a critical 
legal analysis of specific legal provisions in anti-trafficking instruments.95 Given the number 
of case studies used here the functional comparative methodology does not require thorough 
analysis of the broader cultural context of states, which already reduces some of the complexity 
in comparing different legal systems. Although, reducing the complexity of comparison also 
reduces the explanatory force of functional-based research.96 Thus, there is a real risk of 
excluding the voices of the non-dominant in the field of action whose input is necessary for a 
comprehensive and meaningful analysis. To a certain extent, their voices surface in the reports 
of local NGOs, hence, the value of their inclusion in this study. 
 That this study has not conducted any empirical research somewhat reduces the quality 
of the impact assessment of the anti-trafficking laws and mechanisms examined here. The 
heavy reliance on theoretical, literature-based, desktop research, however, underlines a lack of 
knowledge in the field. The differences in the trafficking experiences of the case studies are 
also reflected on an empirical level as information is more readily available and accessible in 
Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden than in the Czech Republic and Romania, 
especially on and by their NREMs. That the information is not translated into more widely 
spoken languages, such as English, presents a further impediment to comparative research. At 
the same time, translations in English tend to focus on legislation and do not always follow 
amendments to the law so that the information rapidly becomes outdated. The rather formalistic 
nature of the laws and reports examined here has facilitated their translating by the author 
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herself. To ascertain whether and to what extent information was lost in translation this 
information is cross-checked against general introductions in English, state reports, and reports 
and other material by the enforcement mechanisms examined here, in addition to the vast 
literature in the field generally.97 Given the different periods of state reporting to specific 
enforcement mechanisms information also depicts legislative and enforcement developments. 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis covers a subject-area that is broad from both a geographic and a thematic 
perspective. It is structured into four core chapters that examine, first, the laws and policies on 
sex trafficking in women and the systemic limitations to implementation of the preeminent 
legal instruments. Second, the mechanisms of enforcement attaching to these instruments and 
to what extent their work remedy the identified systemic limitations. To further facilitate 
comparison, each core chapter considers the three levels of comparison (international, 
European, and national) cumulatively so as to better depict the realities of international 
regulation. 
 Chapter 2 examines the definitional ambiguities, the conceptual uncertainties, and the 
practical obstacles to implementation of the UN Trafficking Protocol, the COE Trafficking 
Convention, and the EU Trafficking Directive as the preeminent legal instruments. Within the 
international paradigm, it also considers the effects of the trafficking provision in the CEDAW, 
the higher human rights standard in the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, and the inclusion 
of consensual prostitution in the TVPA on normative development in the field. The chapter 
assesses whether a successful harmonisation has taken place in Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden in favour of international cooperation.  
 Chapter 3 explores the main systemic challenges to implementation of the preeminent 
legal instruments to understand why the law on the books has not translated into the law in 
action in the case studies. In particular, what the legal choices of states reveal about the political 
priorities and interests underpinning international regulation, and whether these serve the 
international objective of cooperation or the narrow self-interests of individual states. The 
prostitution policies of the case studies are used here as an instructive example. The underlying 
challenges, thereby, discovered centre on the contentious nature of trafficking-related policies, 
the power asymmetries in negotiations that cannot effectively accommodate the interests of all 
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participants, and the need for state consent to ensure the effectiveness of the legal instrument 
and the institution managing cooperation.  
 Chapter 4 evaluates the formal mechanisms and tools of enforcement that attach 
directly or indirectly to the preeminent legal instruments, as well as, the CEDAW Committee, 
the TIP Office, and the NREMs in the case studies. This evaluation focuses on four features, 
namely the scope of mandate, the degree of independence and accountability of office, the 
availability of adequate resources, and the extent of cooperation with NGOs. As monitoring 
and reporting are believed to threaten the sovereign prerogatives of states, the four features 
reveal the level of intrusiveness of the mechanisms chosen by states to improve their 
compliance behaviours.  
Chapter 5 assesses the impact of the very mechanisms identified in chapter 4 on 
knowledge production and international regulation, since a global challenge requires a global 
response. In particular, whether and to what extent these mechanisms are able to remedy the 
definitional ambiguities, the conceptual uncertainties, and the practical obstacles identified in 
chapter 2. It probes whether the systemic limitations identified in chapter 3 warrant 
enforcement by more intrusive mechanisms, such as the TIP Office that operates outside any 
formal process of consent.  
Chapter 6 presents the central findings of the core chapters, with a recommendation for 
strengthening existing NREMs within a uniform framework based on their similarities and 
potential to progress the global fight against sex trafficking in women by improving the 
compliance behaviour of states. It ends with a call for further impact studies on the mandates 
of NREMs to raise awareness of their role and function and to explore the potential ways in 
which NREMs can influence the current anti-trafficking discourse through individual and 
collective action. 
  





2. The Legal Framework of Sex Trafficking: An International Definition and Harmonised 




Trafficking in persons, particularly women, for sexual exploitation not only persists but also 
appears to be rising as states struggle to prosecute traffickers as a means of deterrence. There 
is a corresponding increasing recognition of the inadequacies of current national responses 
rooted in the UN Trafficking Protocol. The international community is consequently desperate 
to explore new legal options to address the current inadequacies of international regulation of 
the trafficking problem. An important part of the problem is that the harmonisation project of 
national anti-trafficking legislation through the UN Trafficking Protocol and supporting 
regional responses has been largely unsuccessful in promoting effective and wide cooperation. 
The definitional and conceptual ambiguities found in international and regional responses 
illustrate that the trafficking problem is both complex and contested. These ambiguities form 
the basis of this chapter that seeks to explore how the international community has chosen to 
manage cooperation as a prerequisite for the prevention of transnational trafficking, the 
prosecution of transnational traffickers, and the protection of transnational victims. While 
domestic situations of trafficking can be adequately dealt with within the confines of domestic 
systems, transnational situations depend upon state cooperation through a harmonised 
framework.  
Section 2.2 deals with international responses, namely the UN Trafficking Protocol, the 
Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, the CEDAW, and the TVPA. The latter instrument is 
domestic by nature but the focus here is on its extraterritorial scope and effect on international 
regulation as it is the only domestic instrument in the field to exert significant influence at the 
international level. Section 2.3 concerns European responses, namely the COE Trafficking 
Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR), and the EU Trafficking Directive. Finally, section 2.4 focuses on national 
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responses in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden. 
By way of example of these case studies, this chapter illustrates that a successful legal 
harmonisation of supra-territorial responses has not taken place as there is relative divergence 
in national responses, particularly the law on the books has not translated into the law in action. 
This impedes state cooperation and has stinted progress in the global fight against sex 
trafficking in women. The core conclusions of this chapter are laid out in section 2.5. 
The inquiry about multilevel responses is facilitated by pluralist understandings of the 
relationship between legal systems at different levels of governance.98 In particular, that there 
exists ‘spaces for productive interaction among multiple, overlapping legal systems by 
developing procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to manage, without 
eliminating, the legal pluralism we see around us’.99 These help to mediate the conflicting 
interests of multiple systems seeking to assert their norms over the trafficking problem with a 
view to legal harmonisation. Thus, we see how regional responses in applying international 
definitions and seeking to raise international standards of protection of victim’s human rights 
are constituted within the broader international framework around trafficking in persons. While 
the comparative methodology based on a consideration of the law in context, including the law 
in action, pulls together the various components of multilevel regulation. Thereby, looking to 
deduce the preferred general direction of national responses to the trafficking problem, which 
will necessarily depend upon context. 
2.2. International Legal Responses 
The section begins by examining the UN Trafficking Protocol as current responses are rooted 
in the conceptualisation of trafficking in persons as manifest in this instrument. It is followed 
in section 2.2.2 by a closer look at the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines and the trafficking 
provision in the CEDAW, both with a human rights perspective on the trafficking problem. 
Finally, section 2.2.3 discusses the normative implications of the TVPA on the current anti-
trafficking discourse as it seeks worldwide criminalisation of consensual prostitution under the 
veil of trafficking responses. The three preliminary conclusions to this core section are outlined 
in section 2.2.4. 
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2.2.1. The UN Trafficking Protocol: The Conceptualisation of Sex Trafficking as a 
Transnational Organised Crime   
The UN Trafficking Protocol is riddled with definitional and conceptual ambiguities, which 
hamper effective application of key operational provisions by its currently 172 state parties. 
The Protocol’s definition is its most contested and notable feature as the first attempt to define 
contemporary trafficking at the international level through an all-inclusive but non-exhaustive 
list of exploitation forms, taking into account any forms unnamed or unforeseen during the 
negotiations.100 Sexual exploitation as a form of trafficking in persons was a particularly 
controversial issue during the negotiations of the Protocol because of the underlying policy 
concern over whether to include consensual prostitution as part of the international definition. 
As illustrated more clearly in the next chapter, states follow different approaches to 
prostitution, which influence how the migration of women in commercial sex work is viewed. 
The typology introduced by Outshoorn outlines three different prostitution regimes based on 
abolition by criminalising third parties, prohibition by penalising prostitutes, and regulation by 
the state.101 A fourth typology of neo-abolition by criminalising only sex-buying denotes the 
current prostitution regime promulgated by Sweden.102 While there are correspondingly four 
theoretical positions that define the relationship between women’s movement and women’s 
policy agencies, the major divide is between feminists who view prostitution as sexual 
domination and the essence of women’s oppression and those who perceive prostitution as 
work freely chosen by women.103 Thus, the former position advocates the abolition of 
prostitution and the latter one aims at legalisation by removing prohibitive provisions in 
criminal laws, as well as, some form of regulation to guarantee sex worker’s fair working 
conditions. 
The first expression of trafficking in women as an international political issue emerged 
in the regulation of the ‘white slave traffic’, which criminalised the procurement and 
transportation of typically white women for ‘immoral purposes’ abroad.104 While some note 
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that the underlying rationale for the adoption of the white slave traffic framework was the 
restriction of women’s movement to prevent the spread of venereal disease among troops, 
which threatened the European colonial project.105 Trafficking in women within this 
framework was intrinsically linked to prostitution. This basic conceptualisation of trafficking 
in women characterises subsequent efforts by the international community to regulate 
prostitution, culminating in the 1950 Trafficking Convention as the first trafficking instrument 
adopted by the newly established UN.106 In attempting to pierce the veil of state sovereignty, 
the Convention abolished state recognised prostitution and the licensing of brothels as part of 
trafficking.107 However, the Convention did not garner wide ratification, thus, indicating to the 
international community that the most appropriate response to trafficking in women was not to 
abolish prostitution as a profitable and legal market. While Nadelmann notes that societal 
changes, such as the development of effective contraception and the beginning of the sexual 
revolution, coupled with, the decline in prostitution following colonialism, made the 
Convention in large part obsolete.108 Thus, by 1978, ‘no State had license or recognize houses 
of prostitution within their territory’.109 
 For the next fifty years nothing much happened on the international front until the 
‘evils’ of globalisation forced a reuniting of states in 1998 on the issue of trafficking in children 
and women.110 Although the final text of the Protocol applies to trafficking in persons, 
especially women and children.111 Studies on consensus formation around trafficking in 
persons leading up to the adoption of the UN Trafficking Protocol observe that a new 
characterisation had emerged that viewed the problem as one of crime-fighting rather than 
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human rights. According to Charnysh, Lloyd and Simmons, the crime-fighting perspective is 
associated with ‘more sponsors, more diverse supporters, and stronger language’, all of which 
were necessary to ensure effective and wide cooperation as the paramount objective of 
regulation at the international level.112 That the 1950 Trafficking Convention was adopted 
within the international human rights system is seen as an important reason behind its failure 
to adequately address the trafficking problem. As Gallagher argues, ‘the disadvantages of a 
traditional, exclusively rights-based response to trafficking are significant … States could not 
even agree on a definition, much less on specific legal obligations’.113 It was also noted that 
‘trafficking was (and still is) rarely linked to the violation of a specific provision of a specific 
treaty’, despite criminalisation in the CEDAW and the 1950 Trafficking Convention.114 
 As it turns out, a crime-fighting perspective would have important implications for the 
treatment of victims and the preferred general direction of national responses. In particular, 
there appeared to be little understanding or acknowledgement of the role of states in the 
trafficking process, such as the corruption of public officials, or their moral and legal 
responsibilities. Since trafficking is typically committed by private actors either individually 
or as part of an organised criminal group and international human rights law requires that harm 
stems from an act or omission committed by a state to constitute a human rights violation.115 
As argued by one delegate during the negotiations of the UN Trafficking Protocol, 
‘[trafficking] is not like torture. It’s not even about human rights. We governments are not the 
villains here. Traffickers are just criminals. We can’t be responsible for what they are doing. 
In fact, if it wasn’t that we needed the cooperation of other countries to catch them, I wouldn’t 
even be here’.116 It cannot be said that this position has changed in current national responses 
given their focus on prevention and prosecution as the former two objectives of the Protocol to 
the detriment of protection as the third and final objective.117 A fourth objective of cooperation 
was formally acknowledged in 2008.118  
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States’ inadequate understanding of trafficking and their responsibilities further 
complicated the position of human rights lobbyists who entered the negotiation process in the 
hope of either abolishing all forms of prostitution or securing sex worker’s rights. A human 
rights perspective to the problem was critical ‘to make the victim of trafficking “visible” as a 
subject … whose basic rights have been violated by exploiters and whose rights can also be 
violated in the process of implementing anti-trafficking measures’.119 This formulation was 
particularly important to situations of illegal border-crossing and the consequent treatment of 
trafficking victims as ‘illegal’ non-citizens. It is an inadvertent consequence of the focus on 
prevention in the Protocol, thus, formulating the only ‘hard’ provisions in the Protocol, that the 
primary tool to fight trafficking is the strengthening of border controls.120 The link between 
prevention and border controls is concretised in the Protocol by placing the prevention 
provisions in the same part of the Protocol as its provisions on cooperation through information 
exchange and training, border controls, and security and legitimacy of travel documents.121 
This, in turn, will influence the scope of prevention measures, such as those seeking to alleviate 
the factors that create vulnerability to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment, and lack 
of equal opportunity, only to the extent that they further cooperation, rather than with a view 
to improving victims’ position in society generally.122 This is an important disadvantage of an 
almost exclusively crime-based response. It is also one of the major contentions that sets it 
apart from the limited but favourable trafficking provision in the CEDAW in the spirit that ‘an 
obstacle to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, 
economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society 
and the family and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in 
the service of their countries and of humanity’.123 Thus, the genuine efforts of human rights 
lobbyists ‘to inject a human rights perspective wherever possible’ in the Protocol inadvertently 
weakened the position of trafficking victims as visible subjects in favour of ‘political 
traffickers’ to whom the existence of the trafficked person is arguably a tangible benefit of 
financial and political gains.124 As Davies and Davies observe in relation to how trafficking 
was being created and sustained, first, by migration policy and, later, by reopening the 
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prostitution debate, that a strange alliance has formed between the ‘political traffickers’ who 
create a space for trafficking to take place and the criminal traffickers who then exploit women 
in that conceived space.125 Finally, the ‘political traffickers’ reconstruct the trafficked women 
and her ‘needs’ according to their political priorities. Their argument puts into context the 
metaphysical and physical absence of any prostitutes in the pro-sex work lobby group present 
at the negotiations of the Protocol as noted by Doezema.126 As it turns out, ‘the best way of 
protecting sex worker rights in the debate on defining trafficking was through making sex 
workers invisible’ to support the positions of both pro-sex work states, such as the Netherlands, 
and pro-abolition states, such as the US, which under domestic pressure from abolitionist 
groups vehemently advocated for the inclusion of consensual prostitution in the international 
definition.127 It was in striking a middle ground that the drafters intentionally left undefined the 
all-important term of ‘exploitation of the prostitution of others’, ‘which is therefore without 
prejudice to how States parties address prostitution in their respective domestic laws’.128 As 
illustrated below in relation to the case studies, this has had serious implications on how sex 
trafficking is conceptualised in individual states and whether as a result of including 
prostitution in their domestic trafficking definitions international cooperation is promoted or 
impeded. If both jurisdictions have adopted similar approaches to prostitution-related 
exploitation, cooperation is rendered workable. However, in jurisdictions where ‘what is 
termed ‘trafficking’ is different, the ability for the origin, transit, and/or destination countries 
to “join-up” is rendered unworkable by, for instance, extradition treaties that require crimes to 
be common to both jurisdictions, or the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction when what is 
deemed a crime in one jurisdiction is not so in another’.129 The UN Trafficking Protocol is 
placed within a broader framework of transnational organised crimes and the UNCTOC as the 
parent instrument stipulates specific provisions on matters of the laundering of proceeds of 
crime,130 money-laundering,131 corruption,132 liability of legal persons,133 prosecution, 
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adjudication and sanctions,134 confiscation and seizure,135 jurisdiction including optional extra-
territorial jurisdiction,136 extradition,137 mutual legal assistance,138 and assistance to and 
protection of victims and witnesses.139 These are the priority-areas of international cooperation 
in transnational trafficking cases but the effect of most provisions is intrinsically tied to the 
individual capacities of states. Thus, the vast majority of cooperation provisions in the 
UNCTOC are of a ‘soft’ nature as this affords states maximum protection from being 
accountable to precise obligations. For this reason, trafficking is criminalised not as an 
international crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court140 but as a 
transnational crime under the UNCTOC regime. Transnational crimes differ in an important 
way from the core of international criminal law because they depend upon domestic 
suppression of internationally-defined crimes.141 Accordingly, Boister defines transnational 
criminal law as ‘the indirect suppression by international law through domestic penal law of 
criminal activities that have actual or potential trans-boundary effects’.142 While international 
tribunals or the International Criminal Court enforce international criminal law. 
 There was a serious attempt by notably Caribbean states to include drug trafficking, 
with a transnational dimension like trafficking in persons, in the Rome Statute as a particular 
concern for those states.143 However, the majority of states notably Western states with 
different concerns, such as aggression, opposed the inclusion of transnational drug trafficking 
in the Rome Statute.144 They argued that the principle of complementarity dictated that 
transnational crimes fall within the jurisdiction of national courts and that the inclusion of this 
concern could be reconsidered at a later stage at a review conference of the Statute’s 
effectiveness.145 The exclusion of concerns deemed irrelevant by Western states with sufficient 
negotiating powers was identified as one of the greater hypocrisies of the negotiations of the 
Statute and international law-making more generally.  
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While article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute criminalises trafficking in persons as a form 
of enslavement in the limited context of crimes against humanity ‘when committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of 
the attack’.146 An inclusion of the broader context of transnational trafficking in persons in the 
Rome Statute finds favour among scholars notably Obokata on account of the crime’s 
seriousness, transnational nature, and increasing state complicity.147 More importantly, its 
inclusion in the Rome Statute would give rise to individual criminal responsibility under 
international criminal law. This means that both the trafficking offences typically committed 
by private actors, whose acts do not constitute human rights violations under international 
human rights law, and those committed by corrupt officials, who typically escape national 
prosecution, could be effectively prosecuted and convicted at the international level.  
However, opening the Rome Statute to such a possibility would inevitably have a 
knock-on effect on arguments to include other crimes with a transnational dimension. This, in 
turn, could lead to an overloading of the international criminal law system, rendering it 
unworkable or reducing the gravity of its crimes as delicta juris gentium. The possibility of 
effectively criminalising trafficking in persons within domestic jurisdictions exists, according 
to Van der Wilt, as national courts are increasingly overcoming the traditional hurdles of ‘lack 
of jurisdiction, poor implementation of substantive law and ineffective co-operation’.148 
Moreover, Van der Wilt questions whether international criminal tribunals can offer a ‘better’ 
alternative as ‘their performance and effectiveness is not necessarily superior’.149 While their 
involvement has a strong symbolic connotation, states can mobilise their resources and 
integrate criminal law enforcement with other measures.  
For example, international human rights law already provides substantial protections 
that state parties to the relevant instruments must continue to apply under the ‘saving clause’ 
in the UN Trafficking Protocol.150 This includes the slavery regime that recognises slavery as 
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a jus cogens norm and erga omnes obligation.151 While the conflation of slavery and trafficking 
in persons has the effect of diluting other forms of exploitation, such as sexual exploitation and 
the removal of organs, there is an increasing awareness of and interest in relabelling trafficking 
in persons as modern-day slavery because ‘slavery has been subject to some of the strongest 
sanctions of the international community’.152 Moreover, the prohibition on slavery extends 
beyond international human rights law to, for example, the law of the sea, humanitarian law, 
and international criminal law. The normative implications of this conflation are considered 
more appropriately below in the context of the ECtHR’s ruling that trafficking in persons itself 
falls within article 4 of the ECHR on slavery and forced labour.153 
In sum, leaving the term ‘exploitation of the prostitution of others’ undefined has had 
the aggregate effect of what Chuang labels ‘exploitation creep’, namely affording states 
sufficient safeguards from being accountable to precise obligations and sufficient flexibility to 
follow different approaches to prostitution-related trafficking to the detriment of international 
cooperation.154 This effect is facilitated by the criminalisation of trafficking under transnational 
criminal law rather than international criminal law. As will become apparent in the next 
chapter, the choice of a specific legal instrument will influence the consequent effectiveness of 
national responses. Thus, trafficking is a global challenge that requires a global response but it 
is ‘serious’ enough to warrant inclusion in the Rome Statute only where committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack. In any case, the focus is on crime-fighting to the detriment 
of the human rights protection of trafficking victims. As discussed in the next section, the 
crime-fighting perspective of the Protocol affirms the critical importance of human rights 
protection under the international human rights system, in particular, under the Trafficking 
Principles and Guidelines and the CEDAW. 
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2.2.2. The Trafficking Principles and Guidelines and the CEDAW: Grafting onto the 
Transnational Framework around Trafficking a Human Rights Perspective  
The outcome of the UN Trafficking Protocol left much to be desired for human rights lobbyists 
who viewed the crime-fighting perspective of the Protocol, in particular, the conditionality of 
the few human rights provisions on victim cooperation in investigations, prosecutions, and 
judicial proceedings as an incipient problem.155 As states can decide in individual cases 
whether to offer support depending upon the ‘usefulness’ of the victim in the relevant 
proceeding, there is no certainty of protection.156 The protections available to victims under the 
Protocol include confidentiality in proceedings,157 the right to information and legal 
assistance,158 measures for physical, psychological and social recovery, such as housing, 
medical care, and employment, that take into account their age, gender, and special needs,159 
physical safety while remaining in the territory of the destination country,160 and compensation 
for damage suffered.161 While victims deemed ‘useless’ to proceedings are repatriated to their 
origin country or to that in which they hold permanent residence, with due regard for their 
safety.162 However, the Protocol does not mention how the decision on safety is to be made 
and by whom and the provision on preferably voluntary return of victims only applies in 
relation to an ongoing proceeding in the destination country.163  
The human rights coverage in the UN Trafficking Protocol is inadequate, and 
insufficient protection under the law can exacerbate the vulnerability of victims, pushing them 
further into their exploitative situations and increasing the possibility of re-victimisation. Thus, 
even before the Protocol had entered into force, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) had developed the Trafficking Principles and 
Guidelines to ‘promote and facilitate the integration of a human rights perspective into national, 
regional and international anti-trafficking laws, policies and interventions’.164 The adoption of 
this instrument not only acknowledged the inadequate human rights coverage of the Protocol 
but also that human rights could not be successfully developed within a widely represented 
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forum as that of the Protocol because the deep and entrenched divide between human rights 
lobbyists made concerted lobbying, even on issues where agreement was expected, almost 
impossible.165 For example, the choice to leave undefined the term ‘exploitation of the 
prostitution of others’ in the Protocol’s definition is construed favourably by both camps of 
human rights lobbyists.166 On the one hand, the term is interpreted to include any migration 
that involves sex work so that all migrating sex workers are to be treated as trafficking victims. 
On the other hand, the term is intentionally undefined as no consensus could form on its 
definition, while a departure from the 1950 Trafficking Convention that abolishes prostitution 
and brothel licensing is believed to now allow states to focus on forced prostitution and to deal 
with adult prostitution other than through abolition. The heavy focus on the Protocol’s 
definition during the negotiations also meant that other areas did not receive adequate attention. 
The Trafficking Principles and Guidelines explicitly adopt the Protocol’s definition. It 
also distinguishes between trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants based on some 
form of coercion ‘throughout or at some stage in the process’.167 The failure of the Protocol to 
address the relationship between both crimes, in particular, how the identification process is to 
be made and by whom was one the issues raised by the OHCHR during the negotiations.168 In 
particular, as both crimes are processes that are ‘often interrelated and almost always involving 
shifts, flows, overlaps and transitions’.169 This means that a person can be smuggled one day 
and trafficked the next. Thus, the risks of misidentification are high and consequently trafficked 
persons may not receive their entitlements under the UN Trafficking Protocol, which are 
naturally not available to smuggled migrants as criminals rather than victims under the law.170 
Thus, the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines ask states to consider developing guidelines 
and procedures for rapid and accurate identification, including training national authorities and 
officials.171 The commentary on the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines additionally clarifies 
the terms of the Protocol’s definition, such as slavery, servitude, practices similar to slavery, 
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debt bondage, servile forms of marriage, and forced labour, with reference to relevant 
international human rights treaties, without touching on the term ‘exploitation of the 
prostitution of others’.172  
According to the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, a human rights-based approach 
centres on three legal issues, namely trafficking as a human rights violation, trafficking as a 
form of gender-based violence, and trafficking in international humanitarian and criminal 
law.173 The primacy of human rights as the first principle of all anti-trafficking efforts 
determines, for example, that human rights protection within the territory of a state extends to 
non-citizens and cannot violate non-discrimination principles or norms that protect the 
economic, social, and cultural rights of trafficked persons.174 These basic rights are in addition 
to the additional protections as applicable to specific categories of victims, such as women,175 
migrants,176 migrant workers,177 and refugees.178 In this context, the right to remedies, 
including compensation, is a critical aspect of the human rights framework as part of righting 
the wrongs committed against trafficked persons and ‘guaranteeing’ non-repetition.179 In 
particular, compensation is a ‘recognition that something happened to you, and that what 
happened was not ok’.180 Thus, it can be an important element of the recovery and reintegration 
processes of victims. For example, victims of prostitution-related trafficking can want 
compensation for the stigmatisation suffered by their community or family that in some cases 
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lead to social exclusion or their ostracising.181 The value of this principle in the Trafficking 
Principles and Guidelines is that, in practice, very few victims receive compensation or even 
know about its possibilities as states often refuse to use confiscated funds or make available 
alternative sources for this purpose.182 The UN Trafficking Protocol specifies in general terms 
‘the possibility of obtaining compensation’, without linking it to the use of confiscated funds 
or special funds.183 
Thus, the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines draw a direct link between the 
prohibition of ‘trafficking in persons’ as a violation in its own right and state responsibility, 
thus, clarifying the type and level of national responses. The failure of the UN Trafficking 
Protocol to define the different practices of, for example, slavery and forced labour, that already 
exist in their own right in international law means that ‘trafficking was (and still is) rarely 
linked to the violation of a specific provision of a specific treaty’.184 It is important for advocacy 
purposes from both a policy and practical perspective to be able to speak of ‘trafficking’ as a 
direct violation of international law. At the same time, speaking of trafficking as a human rights 
violation has consequences for those states that have introduced special protection measures in 
cases of infringement of fundamental rights, and it is for this reason that the COE Trafficking 
Convention examined below recognises trafficking as a human rights violation.185 
In addition to a human rights violation, trafficking in persons constitutes a form of 
gender-based violence according to both the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines186 and 
article 6 of the CEDAW on all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of 
women. The prohibition on sex-based discrimination under the CEDAW applies to both private 
and public acts of discrimination,187 and it affirms the duty of states of equal protection under 
the law.188 The CEDAW is the only other ‘core’ international human rights treaty alongside 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child with a specific reference to trafficking-related 
exploitation.189 An important reason behind its limited focus on trafficking in women was the 
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existing coverage under the 1950 Trafficking Convention.190 Yet, its inclusion within the wider 
international developments of women’s human rights manifest in the CEDAW marked a 
departure from the abolitionist approach of the 1950 Trafficking Convention around 
prostitution-related trafficking.191 
Violence against women is not directly addressed in any of the major international and 
regional human rights instruments.192 But the General Recommendations 19193 and 35194 on 
violence against women have influenced the direction and content of this debate. The former 
brings the issue of violence against women within the CEDAW by stipulating that the 
CEDAW’s definition of sex-based discrimination under article 1 includes gender-based 
violence as ‘a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men’.195 However, not all violence against women will 
constitute gender-based violence under the CEDAW, which depends upon whether it is 
‘violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately’.196 It follows that ‘acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or 
suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty’ constitute gender-
based violence under the CEDAW.197 Trafficking in women, especially for prostitution-related 
exploitation, under article 6 of the CEDAW is also a recognised form of gender-based violence 
because ‘[p]overty and unemployment increase opportunities for trafficking in women … [and] 
are incompatible with the equal enjoyment of rights by women and with respect for their rights 
and dignity’.198 Thus, putting women at special risk of violence and abuse. This point has been 
affirmed by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on many 
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occasions, including in its consideration of communications under the CEDAW’s Optional 
Protocol.199200  
According to the General Recommendation 35, the prohibition of ‘gender-based 
violence against women’201 has evolved into a principle of customary international law.202 
However, it continues in many states because of ‘non-existent, inadequate and/or poorly 
implemented’ legislation based on ‘tradition, culture, religion or fundamentalist ideologies, and 
significant reductions in public spending, often as part of “austerity measures” following 
economic and financial crises’.203 Thus, it has evolved from an individual problem to a social 
one and it is now one of the fundamental social, political, and economic means of perpetuating 
sex-discrimination under the CEDAW.204 State responsibility, therefore, extends beyond the 
acts or omissions of state actors to those of non-state actors, where those are attributable to 
states or there is a failure to exercise due diligence in prevention, investigation, prosecution, 
punishment, and providing reparation.205 This includes repealing all legal provisions on women 
in prostitution.206 
2.2.3. The US TVPA: Sex Trafficking is Consensual Prostitution 
The final legal instrument of relevance to international regulation is the TVPA. By contrast, to 
the other three instruments studied above, the TVPA is international in neither nature nor form. 
It constitutes the US’ domestic legal response to sex trafficking and qualifies as the first 
domestic implementation of the UN Trafficking Protocol precisely because of conscious efforts 
to ensure consistency with the Protocol’s definition and overall approach. The TVPA regime 
includes four reauthorisation acts adopted between 2003 and 2013,207 as well as, the Survivors 
of Human Trafficking Empowerment Act.208 Each of these acts strengthens the TVPA regime 
that prescribes more serious punishment and accords greater priority to prosecutions and victim 
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protection than border controls as in the Protocol.209 Of course, consensus on such matters 
forms more easily at the domestic level. However, the higher level of protection is important 
because the US typically distributes to all foreign states receiving aid a model law that aims to 
ensure compliance with the TVPA.210 For the same reason, it is beneficial that like the Protocol 
the TVPA emphasises the means of trafficking and frames the problem around its exploitation 
purposes.211  
The US is the first example of states to have interpreted the Protocol’s undefined term 
‘exploitation of the prostitution of others’ to include consensual prostitution. The TVPA, thus, 
criminalises consensual prostitution alongside sexual and labour exploitation albeit in two 
separate provisions. The latter two exploitation forms constitute ‘severe forms of trafficking in 
persons’ and they represent the key operational terms of the TVPA.212 Prostitution is 
criminalised separately as ‘sex trafficking’, which is confusing because this term commonly 
describes sexual exploitation for trafficking.213  Moreover, the recent framing of sex trafficking 
as modern day slavery, which also marks a policy shift from sexual exploitation to other 
exploitation forms, has reignited the familiar conflation of sex trafficking and slavery.214 
 Yet, the inclusion of prostitution in the TVPA was a ‘symbolic victory’ for neo-
abolitionist groups whose efforts at international criminalisation had failed. An important 
reason for their victory is that sex trafficking is a nonpartisan issue as evidence by the 
composition of neo-abolitionist groups of predominantly US-based feminists, 
neoconservatives, and evangelic Christians.215 Moreover, the inclusion of prostitution in the 
TVPA ensured the pursuit of the concomitant goal of global eradication of commercial and 
non-procreative sex as part of the US foreign policy on international cooperation against sex 
trafficking.216 In fact, the preamble of the TVPA explicitly recognises the US’ role in working 
‘bilaterally and multilaterally to abolish the trafficking’ and urging ‘the international 
community to take strong action in multilateral fora’ against uncooperative foreign states.217  
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In financial terms, this entailed becoming the largest single donor in the fields of both 
sex trafficking and prostitution. Since 2001, the US Agency for International Development 
Office of Women and Development has spent USD 528 million on anti-trafficking 
initiatives.218 Since 2003, the US has additionally spent USD 15 billion as part the US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.219 
In legal terms, this is achieved through the unilateral economic sanctions regime 
established under the TVPA that empowers the US President to withhold non-humanitarian, 
nontrade-related foreign assistance to any foreign state that does not meet the standards and 
criteria set forth in the TVPA. Chapter 4 revisits the sanctions regime in the context of the 
enforcement mechanism entrusted with monitoring compliance with the TVPA and foreign 
state progress in fighting sex trafficking. An important point is that the US is determined to use 
a full arsenal of enforcement tools to encourage international cooperation and assume the 
hegemonic position in the anti-sex trafficking discourse. Yet, the TVPA’s sanctions regime has 
not emerged in a legal or policy vacuum but, as Gallagher and Chuang explain, from an 
established tradition of congressional oversight of foreign states in matters of political 
significance to the US, such as human rights, religious freedom, and drug trafficking.220 
However, this oversight resonates with the image of an imperial international law of the 
nineteenth century because the US is the only superpower with the financial resources, political 
power, and foreign policy interest to assert such a powerful position in the international anti-
sex trafficking discourse. The UK assumed a similar hegemonic position over the seas that 
‘allowed it to precipitate the end of the slave trade at sea’.221  
The hegemonic position of the US in the present case is a serious threat to the consent-
based system of international law, least of all the UN Trafficking Protocol that rests on a very 
delicate consensus ridden with conceptual uncertainties. Moreover, the use of the sanctions 
regime to monitor foreign state progress and induce compliance is also objectionable on two 
grounds. First, the criteria and standards in the TVPA are purely domestic and no state has 
given its explicit consent to be bound by them. Second, in the same vein, states must consent 
to their monitoring by an international mechanism and they have serious reasons to oppose 
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monitoring, particularly unilateral monitoring, by a domestic mechanism due to a real 
possibility that monitoring serves a narrow self-interest. Moreover, international law rests on 
the principles of national sovereignty and domestic non-interference, and states have made it 
clear that they do not wish to lift the policy issues underlying sex trafficking to the lofty heights 
of international consensus or regulation, as evidenced in the previous sections. This will 
become evident in chapter 4 in the context of the design of the international enforcement 
mechanism that attaches by extension from the UNCTOC to the UN Trafficking Protocol. The 
hegemonic position of the US within the international anti-sex trafficking discourse, therefore, 
questions the possibility of international law to constrain powerful states from acting 
unilaterally at their pleasure and, in doing so, encroaching too heavily on the sovereign 
prerogatives of foreign states. 
2.2.4. Preliminary Conclusion 
The international study draws three preliminary conclusions. First, the UN Trafficking Protocol 
includes within its definition the ‘exploitation of the prostitution of others’ but does not define 
this term, which is therefore without prejudice to how states address consensual prostitution in 
their domestic laws. Second, the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines and the CEDAW 
underline the primacy of human rights in all anti-trafficking efforts so that victims become 
visible as subjects whose human rights as established in the Protocol have been violated. This 
is important given the Protocol’s predominantly crime-fighting perspective. Third, the US 
seeks to redirect normative development at the international level through the extraterritorial 
scope of the TVPA for worldwide criminalisation of consensual prostitution. Even though the 
Protocol intentionally leaves the precise definition to the sovereign prerogatives of states. 
2.3. European Responses 
This section illustrates regional responses to trafficking in persons with a view to determining 
whether there is harmonisation between international and regional responses, using the 
European legal systems as an instructive example. Section 2.3.1 examines the preeminent anti-
trafficking instruments of the Council of Europe, namely the COE Trafficking Convention and 
the ECHR. While section 2.3.2 focuses on the most recent response of the European Union 
manifest in the EU Trafficking Directive. The three preliminary conclusions to this core section 
are outlined in section 2.3.3. 
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2.3.1. The COE Trafficking Convention and the ECHR: Raising the Human Rights 
Standard of the UN Trafficking Protocol-based Framework in the Eurasian 
Context 
The Council of Europe (COE) has been battling trafficking in persons as early as the 1990s as 
trafficking directly undermines the fundamental values of the COE system, namely human 
rights protection. Early efforts focused on trafficking in women and children, in particular, 
prostitution-related trafficking as a form of gender-based violence.222 But the first legally-
binding instrument on trafficking was adopted only after the UN Trafficking Protocol had 
entered into force. The COE Trafficking Convention, then, is in many respects a (successful) 
response to the inadequate coverage of human rights under the Protocol as it seeks to strengthen 
the protection afforded by the Protocol and raise the standards laid down therein.223 As the 
‘hard’ nature of human rights provisions under the Convention will ensure that the human 
rights perspective forms the basis of all anti-trafficking efforts of member states. Even though 
the Convention applies to a specific Eurasian context of 47 member states, many of them are 
major origin, transit, and/or destination countries. Russia is the only member state that has 
neither signed nor ratified the Convention, which means it applies the lower standard of 
protection manifest in the UN Trafficking Protocol to which it is party since May 2004. 
Consequently, its anti-trafficking efforts are not subject to monitoring by the Group of Experts 
on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) as a key feature of the 
Convention.224 Non-ratification will influence international cooperation between Russia and 
other member states, as well as, the treatment of victims as Russia is an origin, transit, and 
destination country for sex and labour trafficking. Currently, about 1.5 million illegal migrants 
are believed to be working in Russia in exploitative labour conditions that are characteristic of 
labour trafficking.225 There are also reports of European women and children, predominantly 
from Ukraine and Moldova that are both parties to the COE Trafficking Convention, being 
trafficked for sexual exploitation to Russia.226 Yet, Russia appears to be inadequately involved 
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in the fight against trafficking as it consistently fails to meet the minimum standards for 
eliminating trafficking under the TVPA and is not making significant compliance efforts.227 
 The added-value of the COE Trafficking Convention lies in strengthening existing 
protections under the Protocol, as well as, concretising two of the more important human rights 
principles espoused by the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, namely the possibility of 
non-punishment of victims for criminal activities committed as part of their trafficking, and the 
non-conditionality of victim support on their cooperation in trafficking proceedings.228 Even 
though the standard laid down by the Convention does not fully meet that of the Trafficking 
Principles and Guidelines. An important reason behind the Convention’s failure to realise a 
higher human rights standard as originally conceived was the involvement of the European 
Commission in the negotiations and its efforts to lower the Convention’s standard to ‘the lowest 
common denominator of Community law’ then manifest in the crime-focused EU Trafficking 
Framework Decision, in favour of the 22 EU member states at the time.229230 As the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) observed, there was no majority 
position to be taken against the European Commission, and the Committee of Ministers 
appeared unwilling to take decisive action to amend some of the key provisions of the draft 
text.231 For example, the PACE recommended the right to appeal to an independent and 
impartial body against the decision not to identify a person as a trafficking victim, since correct 
identification is a prerequisite for support under the COE Trafficking Convention.232 As 
mentioned already, the overlapping between situations of trafficking in persons and smuggling 
of migrants can lead to misidentification, in particular, where the trafficking of a smuggled 
migrant has yet to take place. The Convention, however, focuses on identification through 
‘competent authorities’ who are trained and qualified to correctly identify victims and 
immediately upon suspicion that a person may be a trafficking victim to grant leave to remain 
in the territory and to receive necessary assistance until the identification process is 
complete.233 In connection therewith, another rejected recommendation would have granted all 
victims access to necessary medical care, which is available to only legally resident victims 
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under the Convention so that all victims are entitled to only emergency medical treatment.234 
However, effective medical assistance, particularly for psychological recovery, can be long-
term depending upon the damage suffered, and an abrupt ending following a decision that the 
detected person is not a trafficking victim and should be repatriated can negatively impact on 
that victim’s recovery process. 
 At the same time, some of the PACE’s key recommendations have been incorporated 
into the final text of the Convention, such as a 30-day recovery and reflection period during 
which time the identified victim cannot be removed from the territory so as to make an 
informed decision away from the influence of the trafficker on whether to cooperate in the 
trafficking proceeding as a necessary witness.235 It is expressed that a longer period of at least 
90 days, in fact, is necessary to recover and escape the trafficker’s influence.236 States have 
consequently adopted different grace periods of between 30 and 90 days as seen in relation to 
the case studies below. Nonetheless, its very inclusion in the Convention is viewed by 
Gallagher who participated in the negotiations of the UN Trafficking Protocol as a major 
achievement, since ‘[t]hose lobbying at the Trafficking Protocol negotiations would never have 
even bothered to seriously push for a mandatory recovery and reflection period’.237 While 
others note the overall modernity of the Convention, in particular, measures to discourage the 
demand that fosters all forms of exploitation under article 6, taking into account that the 
Convention was adopted just five years later and there was no prospect of political interests 
having matured to realise a human rights perspective to the trafficking problem.238  
Although, as rightly argued by Scarpa, the whole incorporation of the PACE’s 
recommendations would have transformed the COE Trafficking Convention into a ‘model 
convention’ for applicable member states and other regional systems.239  Yet, the Convention 
in important ways expands the scope of application and clarifies some of the definitional and 
conceptual ambiguities found in the UN Trafficking Protocol. For example, in applying the 
Protocol’s definition, the Convention expands its scope of application to domestic trafficking 
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and removes the requirement of an involvement in organised crime.240 There is disagreement 
over whether the trafficking act requires cross-border movement or movement of some sort, or 
if merely ‘harbouring’ is sufficient.241 The specific reference to both transnational and domestic 
trafficking in the Convention clarifies this disagreement as movement is not required to 
determine the ‘act’ of trafficking. Similarly, removing the connection with organised crime 
recognises acts committed by traffickers individually, such as by a relative or partner, even 
across borders.242  
Additionally, the Convention defines the term ‘victim’ to facilitate correct 
identification and guarantee to the identified victim the protections under the Convention.243 
The construction of the ‘ideal’ victim in national responses is a serious impediment to victim 
support as it ignores a whole group of victims who do not conform to this idealisation. With 
reference to the TIP Report, Wilson and O’Brien explain how the ‘littering’ of victims’ stories 
throughout the annual reports ‘helps to build and perpetuate a specific picture of the “typical” 
trafficking victim’ who is weak and blameless by focusing on age, gender, origin country, and 
sexual exploitation.244 In turn, these constructions contribute to policy responses that prioritise 
border security and law enforcement over human rights. Moreover, the case studies below 
illustrate that the stigma around prostitution and the ethnic discrimination of Roma victims 
provides an obstacle to their correct identification and subsequent assistance.245 At the same 
time, the Convention adopts a gender perspective to its priority-matters of prevention, 
prosecution, and protection, therewith, removing from its title a specific mention to women 
and children as in the Protocol so as not to ignore male victims, while integrating into all anti-
trafficking efforts a particular focus on the increased vulnerabilities of disadvantaged 
women.246 
 Within the COE context and discussions of normative development in the field, an 
interesting study is the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 
trafficking in persons under article 4 of the ECHR on slavery and forced labour.247 First, it 
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should be mentioned that the ECHR does not explicitly mention trafficking in persons as it was 
inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,248 which itself made no express 
mention of trafficking in 1948.249 Even though both instruments explicitly prohibit slavery as 
the more well-known exploitation form at the time. Thus, in just two cases, the former 
concerning domestic servitude and forced labour of a Togolese girl for families in France250 
and the latter involving sex trafficking of a Russian women to Cyprus on an ‘artiste’ visa who 
was found dead under suspicious circumstances,251 the ECtHR has determined that trafficking-
related exploitation falls within the scope of article 4,252 and by removing the need to assess 
which of the three types of conduct of slavery, servitude, and forced or compulsory labour 
under article 4 are engaged, that ‘trafficking’ as defined in the COE Trafficking Convention 
and the UN Trafficking Protocol itself falls within the scope of article 4.253 Some have 
interpreted the ECtHR’s normative development as paying heed to scholarly criticism that its 
reading in the former case was traditional and narrow and had produced a ‘schism’ between 
international human rights and criminal law following a wider reading of slavery by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which requires the exercise of 
powers attached to the right of ownership,254 rather than the exercise of the right of ownership 
over an individual to reduce them to the status of an ‘object’.255 A major contention of a 
narrower reading of slavery relates to possible difficulties in future interpretations of trafficking 
situations where a distinction between the three types of article 4 conduct cannot be clearly 
determined upon the case facts.256 In particular, as the distinction between article 4 conducts, 
according to the ECtHR, is one of degree, with slavery at one extreme and linked to servitude 
as an aggravated form of forced or compulsory labour,257 which is distinguishable from 
servitude by the victim’s feeling that his or her condition is permanent and the situation is 
unlikely to change.258 
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 Now that trafficking in persons directly falls within the scope of article 4 of the ECHR 
without the need to distinguish between the different article 4 conduct the group of victims to 
receive protection under the ECHR has widened. For example, in Siliadin, the ECtHR 
concluded that the treatment suffered by the applicant amounted to servitude and forced and 
compulsory labour but fell short of slavery because the case facts did not suggest that the 
applicant’s employers had exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus, reducing 
her status to that of an object, according to the ‘classic’ meaning of slavery.259 Even though the 
ECtHR recognised that the applicant was clearly deprived of her personal autonomy.260 Thus, 
the ECtHR’s current position on trafficking itself falling within the ambit of article 4 is 
important for the countless ways in which trafficking can take place using more or less subtle 
forms of coercion and deception for existing and emerging forms of exploitation. For example, 
Kotiswaran identifies at least sixteen different trafficking situations based on strong or weak 
coercion and exploitation, the legality of the means of entry, and the legality of the sector in 
which the trafficked labour is carried out, which would implicate anti-trafficking law but only 
a minute fraction of which the law actually targets based on the Protocol’s (and Convention’s) 
definition.261 That the ECtHR has not had many opportunities to consider trafficking offences 
is an important reason behind the limited but substantial normative development of the ECHR 
around trafficking. 
 A serious implication of the conflation of trafficking in persons and slavery is a 
‘muddying’ of the normative waters as both crimes exist in their own right under international 
law.262 That the ECtHR refers to trafficking as the modern form of slavery based on the need 
to interpret the ECHR in light of present-day conditions is considered by some as a failure of 
the ECtHR to engage correctly with the legal distinction between both crimes.263 In particular, 
as the ECtHR does not engage with the constituent elements of what constitutes trafficking, 
namely its methods, means, and purposes. Slavery properly defined under the Slavery 
Convention264 is only one form of exploitation explicitly listed under the umbrella term 
‘trafficking in persons’ in both the UN Trafficking Protocol and the COE Trafficking 
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Convention.265 While all slavery and slavery-like practices amount to trafficking, not all 
trafficking constitutes slavery properly defined. The importance of this conflation in early anti-
trafficking efforts is evident as the moral language around slavery provided the necessary 
impetus for international action culminating in the ‘white slave traffic’ instruments based on a 
term that distinguished female sexual slavery from transatlantic slavery.266 Certainly, the legal 
force of the prohibition on slavery under the ECHR as an absolute and non-derogatory right 
can propel that of trafficking in persons as a fundamental human rights violation.267 This 
conflation has it proponents among scholars and states, such as the US, with its current efforts 
to redefine the trafficking problem as modern-day slavery using this terminology in more recent 
TIP Reports.268 From a legal perspective, however, the conflation will influence the 
consideration of non-labour forms of exploitation, as well as, lead to a reconstruction of the 
‘ideal’ victim as ‘slaves’ ‘who, like trans-Atlantic slaves, must have been kidnapped or 
otherwise brought to the destination countries against their will’.269 It is difficult to see how 
either position conflating trafficking and prostitution or slavery is favourable from the 
perspective of the victim, in particular, those who do not fall into either category, such as 
victims of trafficking for the removal of organs as an often overlooked group.  
 At the same time, the ECtHR has clarified the different obligations of states, whether 
positive, operational, or procedural, in establishing an appropriate legislative and 
administrative anti-trafficking framework for rapid and correct identification of trafficking 
victims,270 protecting victims by removing them from their trafficking situations or the real and 
immediate risks of trafficking upon becoming aware or having credible suspicion of 
trafficking,271 and investigating potential situations once the matter has come to the attention 
of the authorities.272 Even though Stoyanova, for example, observes that an appropriate 
legislative and administrative anti-trafficking framework need exist only de jure, which is, then, 
a shallow and unsatisfactory positive obligation for states, such as Greece, where the law on 
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the books does not translate into the law in action.273 Yet, by developing a due diligence regime 
around trafficking the ECtHR effectively pierces the veil of state sovereignty that so far has 
allowed states to hide behind the ambiguous obligations of the UN Trafficking Protocol and, 
to a lesser extent, the COE Trafficking Convention. In particular, this regime applies to Russia 
as the only non-signatory to the Convention, since ratification of the ECHR is a prerequisite 
for COE accession.  
Russia was also party to an application alleging a violation of trafficking-related 
exploitation under article 4 of the ECHR for its failure to protect the applicant’s daughter from 
being trafficked and to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances of her arrival 
in Cyprus and the nature of her employment there.274 Having regard to the due diligence regime 
just outlined above, first, the ECtHR held that Russia had in place an appropriate legal and 
administrative framework to ensure the applicant’s daughter’s practical and effective 
protection.275 Even though Russian criminal law did not specifically provide for the trafficking 
offence at the material time and the conduct of which the applicant complained fell within the 
definitions of other offences.276 Again, bolstering Stoyanova’s argument of a shallow positive 
requirement. Second, the ECtHR decided that the circumstances had not given rise to an 
operational obligation for Russia to protect the applicant’s daughter as there was no evidence 
that the Russian authorities were aware of her circumstances giving rise to ‘a credible suspicion 
of a real and immediate risk’ prior to her departure for Cyprus.277 The ECtHR clarified that 
Russia’s positive obligation in this regard was limited to acts occurring on its own territory and 
that a general awareness of transnational sex trafficking in Russian women did not trigger 
Russia’s operational obligation.278 Finally, the ECtHR concluded that Russia had breached its 
procedural obligation to investigate the recruitment aspect of the applicant’s daughter’s alleged 
trafficking, in particular, those involved in the recruitment and the methods of recruitment, 
even after her subsequent death and the resulting mysteries around her departure from 
Russia.279 The ECtHR clarified that both the UN Trafficking Protocol and the COE Trafficking 
Convention explicitly include the recruitment of victims and that ‘a full and effective 
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investigation covering all aspects of trafficking allegations from recruitment to exploitation is 
indisputable’, particularly when the recruitment occurs on its own territory so that it is best 
placed to conduct an effective investigation.280 Thus, an effective investigation within the 
state’s own territory is an important element of cooperation in transnational trafficking cases. 
2.3.2. The EU Trafficking Directive: Adopting an ‘Integrated, Holistic, and Human 
Rights’ Perspective to Trafficking in the EU Area 
Like the COE, the European Union (EU) has been involved in the fight against trafficking in 
persons as early as the 1990s. However, by contrast to the COE’s objective of human rights 
protection of victims, the EU’s objective centred on facilitating an area of freedom, security, 
and justice within the EU through a common immigration policy.281 Thus, the trafficking 
problem had a predominantly crime-fighting perspective. With the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, trafficking in persons is additionally a violation 
of fundamental human rights.282 Unlike the UN Trafficking Protocol and the COE Trafficking 
Convention that are cast in stone upon adoption, EU anti-trafficking instruments are regularly 
updated in light of legislative procedural developments. Thus, between 1997 and 2011, the EU 
adopted three specific anti-trafficking instruments, namely the Joint Action 97/154/JHA,283 the 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA,284 and the EU Trafficking Directive. The Directive is the 
most recent EU response to trafficking in the EU and as such applies to the limited group of 28 
member states that are also members of the COE. Denmark is the only member state to which 
the EU Trafficking Directive does not apply as it does not take part in the adoption of any 
Council measures with respect to an area of freedom, security, and justice, also known as Title 
V measures.285 While Ireland286 and the UK287 that also do not take part in Title V measures 
have opted into adopting the EU Trafficking Directive as part of their involvement in the fight 
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against trafficking, as well as, the benefits to approximating criminal provisions around 
trafficking for effective cooperation with other EU member states, many of which are major 
origin countries for trafficking into the UK, such as Romania.288 
 The adoption of a directive to deal with the EU trafficking problem has important 
implications for anti-trafficking efforts because of the enhanced legal status of a directive 
compared to a framework decision that has virtually no judicial oversight and does not directly 
confer effective rights on individuals. In particular, certain provisions of a directive can have 
vertical direct effect in national law, if they are unconditional and sufficiently precise, and the 
deadline for its transposition into the domestic legal system has passed.289 Even though member 
states have an obligation to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of their obligations under EU law, in cases of failure to do so within the 
prescribed period individuals can directly rely on that directive before domestic courts.290 
Additionally, they can bring actions against the state for damages suffered as a direct 
consequence of that state’s transposition failure.291 The failure to transpose a directive in time 
and to notify the European Commission of said transposition is an overall challenge for 
member states. In the present case, 13 infringement proceedings were initiated against non-
transposing member states, including the Netherlands, for delayed or non-communication of 
transposition measures under the EU Trafficking Directive.292 However, all proceedings were 
closed at an early stage by the European Commission that has an overall responsibility for 
monitoring the effectiveness of EU law.293 The early closure of proceedings is instructive of 
the inherently political manner in which the European Commission conducts its monitoring 
given the need for flexibility based on the different legal systems and capacities of member 
states, particularly following the enlargement of the EU in 2004 to reunite Central European 
states.294 This issue is considered more appropriately in the next chapter in the context of the 
transposition challenges of the EU Trafficking Directive and chapter 5 in relation to the impact 
of the Commission’s monitoring work under the Directive. 
 Within what is best described as an ambitious anti-trafficking framework, the EU 
Trafficking Directive effectively establishes minimum rules on the definition of criminal 
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offences and sanctions around trafficking-related exploitation, as well as, common provisions 
based on a gender perspective like the COE Trafficking Convention to strengthen prevention 
and protection.295 It is in many respects an improvement to the EU Trafficking Framework 
Decision, which it supersedes, by moving away from a predominantly crime-fighting focus 
towards ‘an integrated, holistic, and human rights approach’ that gives effect to the 
fundamental prohibition on trafficking under the EU Rights Charter.296 For example, Obokata 
argues that the minimal prevention and protection measures under the EU Trafficking 
Framework Decision had forced a reassessment of the EU’s anti-trafficking policies.297 The 
EU Trafficking Directive, then, is supported by two existing instruments, the former dealing 
with the issuance of residence permits to non-EU nationals who are trafficking victims298 and 
the latter concerning the sanctioning of employers of illegally staying non-EU nationals.299 
Trafficking victims are, thus, at the forefront of EU anti-trafficking efforts. This indicates that 
the political interests of EU states, which prevented the adoption of a higher human rights 
standard under the COE Trafficking Convention, have finally matured to acknowledge the 
primacy of human rights in all anti-trafficking efforts. This also means that EU institutions with 
a human rights focus, such as the CJEU and the European Parliament, which previously were 
not sufficiently involved in the fight against trafficking because of the dominance of EU 
institutions with a crime focus, such as Eurojust, can contribute more effectively now to 
knowledge production and EU governance in the field. As Berman and Friesendorf observe, 
the focus on criminality and security often occluded other important measures, such as 
regulation of the labour market, gender discrimination, and human rights, and the involvement 
of predominantly human rights institutions.300 
 A notable feature of the EU Trafficking Directive is its definition. In applying the 
definition set forth in the UN Trafficking Protocol, the Directive significantly widens the list 
of exploitation forms now constituting a trafficking offence. This includes, in addition to sexual 
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exploitation, forced labour, slavery, and the removal of organs, the exploitation of criminal 
activities as a notion having the effect of transforming the set of categories listed in the 
Protocol’s definition to a concept in fact and law.301 In particular, the Directive explicitly 
mentions forced begging as a form of forced labour, and pick-pocketing, shop-lifting, and drug 
trafficking as forms of exploitation of criminal activities, as well as, illegal adoption and forced 
marriage as violations of human dignity and physical integrity.302 Thus, rather than outline 
what constitutes ‘exploitation’ by referring to established forms as done in the UN Trafficking 
Protocol, the Directive explains that the term ‘exploitation’ constitutes any criminal activity 
that is subject to penalties and implies financial gain, and for which the ‘victim’, a term not 
explicitly defined as in the COE Trafficking Convention, is exploited, whether intended or 
actual, using some form of coercion or deception.303  
 On the one hand, the expansion of the Protocol’s definition, facilitated by its failure to 
precisely delimit the term ‘exploitation’, has had the positive effect of ‘giving previously 
moribund prohibitions a new lease of life’ at both the national and international levels.304 Many 
of the trafficking forms explicitly listed in the Directive, such as forced marriage, are already 
subject to international prohibition. However, the absence of effective international scrutiny 
has meant that states are rarely held accountable for such practices. Their inclusion within a 
broader understanding of trafficking gives these previously moribund practices new impetus 
for focusing law, public attention, and resources where it is most needed. On the other hand, 
there is the risk of what Chuang labels ‘exploitation creep’ as recasting more forms of 
exploitation as ‘trafficking’ complicates law enforcement efforts, particularly in states with 
limited capacities.305 Thus, deflecting attention from previously narrow legal categories 
reserved for the worst forms of exploitation that attract the greatest amount of public 
opprobrium.306 The inclusion of forced begging in the Directive’s definition provides a case in 
point. The EU argues that the broader concept of trafficking, which includes forced begging, 
takes into account recent developments in EU trafficking.307 In practice, there is a fine 
distinction between consensual and forced begging, the latter defined in the Directive as a form 
of forced labour under the ILO Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 308 when 
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all the elements of forced labour or service occur.309 These elements centre on the requirement 
of ‘the menace of any penalty’.310 But in forced begging menace does not typically occur at the 
place of work so that it is uncertain whether the menace of which the victim complains actually 
amounts to forced labour.311 
Naturally linked to the inclusion of the term ‘exploitation of criminal activities’ in the 
Directive’s definition is the requirement of non-prosecution or non-application of penalties to 
identified victims for their involvement in criminal activities.312 Paradoxically, however, this 
provision remains optional for states, taking into account the basic principles of their own legal 
systems. For the same reason, the Directive explicitly defines the term ‘position of 
vulnerability’ as ‘a situation in which the person concerned has no real or acceptable alternative 
but to submit to the abuse involved’.313 It was one of the contentions around the definitional 
ambiguities that the UN Trafficking Protocol does not define this term, which is particularly 
relevant to situations of trafficking typically committed by a relative or partner outside an 
organised criminal group. While its broad construal in the travaux préparatoires on the Protocol 
along the lines of the current formulation in the Directive was considered to offer little direction 
‘[i]n a world economy that is rife with precarious labour’.314 In particular, as a broad 
understanding enables domestic courts to characterise prostitution and economic-related 
exploitation of poor migrants as trafficking.315 The explanatory report of the COE Trafficking 
Convention also uses a similar expression, adding that vulnerability can be of any kind, whether 
physical, psychological, emotional, family-related, social or economic, owing to victims’ 
different factual and legal positions in society.316 
 Nonetheless, the EU Trafficking Directive effectively raises the human rights standard 
laid down by both the UN Trafficking Protocol and the COE Trafficking Convention in three 
important ways. First, it sets penalties of five years of imprisonment for trafficking offences 
and 10 years of imprisonment for aggravated trafficking.317 Like the Convention,318 the former 
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Framework Decision, which the Directive supersedes, called for ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’ penalties for trafficking offences, in addition to, imprisonment of not less than eight 
years for aggravated trafficking.319 Penalties serve a dual role of punishing traffickers and 
deterring potential traffickers, which means they must be serious enough to fully acknowledge 
the gravity of trafficking. However, this is arguably not the case here. For example, the US 
prescribes a maximum term of imprisonment of 20 years or more for crimes of trafficking with 
respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labour.320 Second, the Directive 
additionally offers mandatory assistance to victims with special needs associated with 
pregnancy, their health, a disability, a mental or psychological disorder, or a serious form of 
psychological, physical, or sexual violence that they have suffered.321 Such assistance goes 
well beyond any emergency medical treatment offered by the Convention.322 Finally, the 
Directive requires member states to additionally establish extraterritorial jurisdiction based on 
the principles of nationality and passive personality.323 The former principle reflects the current 
position of some member states, including Austria, Denmark, and Ireland,324 while the latter 
acknowledges the victimisation of EU citizens as part of trafficking within the EU area.325 
2.3.3. Preliminary Conclusions 
The European examination draws three preliminary conclusions. First, there is harmony 
between the responses of the Council of Europe and the European Union in relation to 
normative developments at the international level as those are rooted in the UN Trafficking 
Protocol. Second, the political priorities of states have matured from the crime-fighting focus 
of the UN Trafficking Protocol and early responses of the EU as illustrated by the human rights 
perspective of the COE Trafficking Convention, the expansion of the scope of article 4 of the 
ECHR to cover trafficking-related exploitation, and the integrated, holistic, human rights 
approach of the EU Trafficking Directive. Third, the term ‘trafficking in persons’ is a concept 
rather than a set categories of exploitation for sex, labour, and the removal of organs, as 
illustrated by the Directive’s expansion of the international definition to include any 
exploitation of criminal activities that are subject to penalties and imply financial gain.  
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2.4. National Responses 
By way of example of the anti-trafficking responses of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, this section examines progress in the global fight 
against trafficking in women for sexual exploitation. As the first measure of progress, this 
section focuses on the extent of harmonisation of national responses with international and 
European anti-trafficking norms and standards. Section 2.4.1 outlines the current status of 
ratification and transposition of the UN Trafficking Protocol, the COE Trafficking Convention, 
and the EU Trafficking Directive. Sections 2.4.2 to 2.4.5 examine the individual components 
of national responses, namely the definition of trafficking in persons and the specific measures 
around prevention, prosecution, and protection respectively. Section 2.4.6 considers the extent 
to which those components promote cooperation, whether bilateral or multilateral, as the 
primary objective of legal harmonisation. The four preliminary conclusions to this core section 
are outlined in section 2.4.7. 
2.4.1. Ratification and Transposition 
Ratification in the international context326 and transposition in the EU context327 are critical for 
the effectiveness of the instrument and the institution under which it was developed as state 
consent remains the cornerstone of subsequent compliance. A specific national response is 
deemed ‘effective’ when the provisions of the instrument are fully implemented or transposed 
into the domestic laws of states. Given the differences in domestic legal systems, 
implementation and transposition typically transpire in different ways as it entails determining 
the most appropriate form and method for achieving the intended outcome. Thus, instruments 
are binding as to their object and purpose.328 One factor that will influence the process is the 
status of the supra-territorial law in the domestic legal system.329 Civil law states tend to follow 
a monist approach based on the idea that international and national law are two components of 
the same legal system. Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Romania have a 
monist system of international law, thus, international instruments as customary rules or 
general principles of law form part of the domestic system, take primacy over domestic law, 
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and can be invoked before domestic courts. The most common technique for ratification of 
international instruments is an incorporation clause in the constitution. For example, the 
Czech330 and Dutch331 incorporation clauses declare that international law becomes part of the 
domestic system upon its entry into force.  
By contrast, Finland and Sweden have a dualist system of international law that 
considers international and national law as two separate legal systems with different legal 
subjects and different sources. Thus, international instruments as sources of international law 
do not directly apply within the domestic system and for their provisions to have domestic 
effect they need to be transformed or adapted into domestic law through incorporation, with or 
without substantive modifications, into a statute or another source of domestic law. However, 
irrespective of the status of international law states cannot invoke the provisions of their 
domestic laws as justification for their failure to perform an international instrument.332 
Another factor influencing the process is the instrument itself, in particular, the nature 
of the provisions, such as the number of mandatory provisions versus optional provisions. The 
implementation and transposition of optional provisions typically depend upon the 
administrative and financial capacities of individual states. Cho and Vadlamannati argue that 
provisions that trigger less domestic resistance and political costs are most effectively 
implemented or transposed.333 
Ratification and transposition are typically lengthy processes, even when this entails 
only amendment(s) to existing laws. Thus, there can be a significant gap between signature and 
ratification, or adoption of the instrument and its transposition. Although the EU Trafficking 
Directive requires transposition within 2 years from the date of its adoption, thus, by 6 April 
2013.334 This is the typical length of the prescribed period for transposition of EU directives. 
All transposing measures must be transmitted to the European Commission335 and non-
communication will trigger an infringement proceeding.336 The same happens in the case of 
late transposition. Similarly, measures of ratification of the UN Trafficking Protocol337 and the 
COE Trafficking Convention338 must be deposited with the Secretary General of the respective 
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institution. There is an added difficulty to the ratification of the Protocol as the provisions of 
the parent instrument, namely the UNCTOC, apply mutatis mutandis to the Protocol339 and in 
order to become a party to the Protocol the state must already be a party to the UNCTOC.340 
Thus, ratification of the Protocol entails ratification of the UNCTOC.341 
 As illustrated in the table below, the case studies are all parties to the three preeminent 
instruments, namely the UN Trafficking Protocol, the COE Trafficking Convention, and the 
EU Trafficking Directive. As the Protocol’s ratification is linked to that of the UNCTOC, the 
dates of signature and ratification of instruments are specified in the table. The Czech Republic 
is the most recent case study to ratify both the Protocol and the Convention as a result of the 
absence of domestic laws to define criminal liability of legal persons for specific offences, 
including trafficking in persons.342 Since 2012, the criminal liability of legal persons is set out 
in a separate law with subsidiary application of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure 
Code.343 It was one of the few European states that had not domestically defined criminal 
liability of legal persons, which also posed a challenge for acts to be criminalised under EU 
law.344  
The signing of the Protocol and the Convention correspond with the dates on which 
either instruments were adopted, namely 15 November 2000 and 16 May 2005 respectively. 
This is typically interpreted as a good signal of future compliance as it entails first and foremost 
an intention to do something about the trafficking problem. In the present case, early signature 
also indicates the need for international cooperation through legal harmonisation of national 
responses, since the effectiveness of responses in transit and destination countries necessarily 
depends upon countermeasures in origin countries.345 
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Table 2. Dates of signature, ratification, and transposition of the preeminent instruments.346 
 
UNCTOC/ 












































16.05.05 31.05.10 01.11.15 
 
 The deadline for the transposition of the Directive was 6 April 2013. According to the 
date of adoption of the most recent transposing measure as communicated by the member state 
to the European Commission, timely transposition was a serious challenge for all case studies. 
In fact, the Netherlands was one of 13 member states to which the Commission issued a formal 
notice under the infringement procedure but the proceeding was closed on 16 December 
2014.347 
The Commission takes very seriously the transposition duty of member states, which 
is, therefore, a priority-matter of its work, since late transposition leads to inconsistent 
application of EU law and ‘the continued existence of discriminatory practices’.348 There are 
many reasons for late transposition. König and Luetgert observe that the timely transposition 
of EU law more generally depends upon ‘member-state willingness (or national preferences) 
and strategic choice, on the one hand, and capacity (or administrative restrictions and 
resources) or legal complexity and ambiguity, on the other’.349 According to qualitative 
compliance studies, the capacity of individual states depends upon the organisation of the 
executive and the involvement and independence of national administrative authorities.350 An 
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additional factor that can influence member-state willingness is domestic political opposition 
from constituents, as well as, the Commission’s role in encouraging enforcement through the 
threat of an infringement proceeding.351 In particular, the ‘goodness of fit’ theory purports a 
consideration of both the policy instrument and the extent of convergence between EU policy 
objectives and the national status quo. The latter, however, is only relevant in relation to 
domestic political opposition from constituents who can influence policy change and delay 
subsequent transposition. A further strand of the goodness of fit theory mentions the national 
administrative culture as an additional factor. This refers to the overall compliance culture of 
individual states so that states with an ingrained compliance culture will more likely comply 
with EU law in a correct and prompt manner.352 These explanatory factors are revisited in the 
next chapter in relation to the systemic challenges to transposing the EU Trafficking Directive. 
2.4.2. Definition 
A common definition of trafficking in persons is a prerequisite for state cooperation as states 
must speak to each other in the same language both literally and figuratively.353 Figuratively, 
as their jurisdictions are not truly compatible with each other, thus, when they speak of 
‘trafficking’ they often speak of different forms of exploitation. In the context of the term 
‘exploitation of the prostitution of others’ this may entail consensual prostitution, which, in 
turn, affects the ability of states to cooperate as the crime must be common to both jurisdictions. 
Thus, rendering unworkable international cooperation based on the provisions on extradition 
and extraterritorial jurisdiction in the preeminent instruments. As Allain observes, by off-
loading to domestic legislators the need to define key operational terms, the UN Trafficking 
Protocol has raised more questions than it answers because ‘the definition is a flawed piece of 
drafting’.354 Then, the challenge to cooperation is heightened in jurisdictions that copy 
verbatim the Protocol’s definition into domestic laws and subsequently depend upon domestic 
courts for interpretation.  
 Prior to the UN Trafficking Protocol, the trafficking definitions of all case studies 
focused on the exploitation of the prostitution of others in accordance with early understandings 
of the trafficking problem manifest in white slave traffic instruments and the 1950 Trafficking 
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Convention. In particular, their domestic legislations focused on the transnational dimension 
of trafficking. For example, Belgium introduced the trafficking offence in 1995 to deal with 
transnational trafficking in foreign nationals.355 There was an implied focus on prostitution-
related trafficking as the other provisions of the legislation concerned prostitution and child 
pornography.356 Sweden also criminalised only transnational sex trafficking in 2002.357 The 
criminalisation of sex trafficking in the Netherlands until 2005 was associated with the policy 
on prostitution, which aimed at reducing the dependence of migrant women upon criminals by 
legalising migration for sex work.358 This means that sex trafficking was already criminalised 
in all case studies. It also means that the UN Trafficking Protocol was a major impetus for 
expanding the umbrella term of trafficking to include additional forms of exploitation, such as 
labour exploitation and the removal of organs, which constitutes the contemporary 
understanding of the trafficking problem.  
The Czech Republic359 and Romania360 were the first case studies to criminalise 
‘trafficking in persons’ in 2002, followed by Finland361 and Sweden362 in 2004, and Belgium363 
and the Netherlands364 in 2005. Their latest anti-trafficking laws365 reflect the most recent 
expansion of the Protocol’s definition manifest in the EU Trafficking Directive, according to 
which trafficking consists of acts of recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means 
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
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the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments 
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purposes of exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, including begging, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, 
or the exploitation of criminal activities, or the removal of organs.366 
 The acts of recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or reception of persons are 
explicitly included in the domestic definitions. However, the Czech, Dutch, Romanian, and 
Swedish definitions do not explicitly refer to ‘the exchange or transfer of control’, which are 
generally included as part of the term ‘reception of persons’. The means of threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, as well as, abuse of a position of vulnerability are explicitly 
included in the definitions of all case studies but the Czech and Finnish definitions do not 
explicitly mention abduction and fraud. Only the Dutch and Swedish definitions include 
explicit references to all purposes of exploitation. Forced begging is not explicitly mentioned 
in the Czech definition, slavery and practices similar to slavery in the Belgian definition, 
exploitation of criminal activities in the Finnish and Romanian definitions, and the removal of 
organs in the Swedish definition. In the specific case of Sweden, an all-inclusive provision 
covers forced begging, slavery, practices similar to slavery, servitude, the exploitation of 
criminal activities, and the removal of organs. Similarly, in the specific case of Romania, an 
all-inclusive term ‘with the intent of exploiting’ covers the listed forms other than sexual and 
labour exploitation. Interestingly, both the Czech and Swedish definitions go beyond the 
minimum exploitation forms laid down by the Directive to additionally include forced service 
in the armed forces and/or the production of pornography, taking into account their domestic 
situations. The Belgium definition also takes as a minimum the Directive’s definition as it aims 
to apply a more severe definition so as to incriminate a broader range of trafficking-related 
exploitation. However, the complexity of the Belgian definition makes its interpretation 
particularly in relation to the means of trafficking incidental to a judge’s guilty verdict in a 
trafficking case.367 Thus, it follows that the case studies have chosen to apply the Directive’s 
definition to varying extents and using different techniques as some have incorporated the 
definition almost verbatim, while others have introduced an all-inclusive term to incorporate 
the newer means and forms of exploitation. This necessarily complicates state cooperation. 
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2.4.3. Prevention 
Prevention is a key interest for the vast majority of states involved in the fight against 
trafficking and according to empirical studies prevention measures are least likely to trigger 
domestic resistance and, thus, entail the least political costs to implement.368 For this reason, 
‘ratification leads to the strongest effect on compliance with the prevention policy’.369 
However, prevention policies that typically centre on addressing the root causes of victims’ 
vulnerabilities are also the most difficult to enforce because it requires that states tackle issues, 
such as poverty, gender and ethnic discrimination, societal marginalisation, and illegal 
migration, which lie at the heart of the structural substratum of states. Moreover, an effective 
prevention policy will likely draw on other policy areas, such as the prosecution of traffickers 
and the protection of victims.  
Prevention measures are not typically incorporated into domestic anti-trafficking 
legislations but into national plans of action, strategies, and programmes around trafficking, 
which take into account the constantly evolving nature of trafficking. The typical length of an 
action plan, strategy, or programme around trafficking is between two and four years. The most 
recent action plans of Belgium370 and Romania371 will expire after four years, those of the 
Czech Republic,372 the Netherlands,373 and Sweden374 after three years, and that of Finland375 
after two years. The prevention policies are a good indication of states’ priorities in the fight 
against trafficking both domestically and internationally as they reveal the key actors involved 
in the fight, their responsibilities, and the extent of coordination at the ministerial level. 
However, there is often a delay in the adoption of a new action plan upon the former’s expiry 
and it is expressed that certain proposed measures remain unimplemented following the expiry 
of an action plan, or their implementation carries on even after the expiry of the relevant action 
plan. For example, the Finnish National Rapporteur on trafficking had repeatedly 
recommended that government update its 2008 action plan following expiry in 2011 and new 
proposals by a steering group based on a final report on the effectiveness of implemented 
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measures.376 The Rapporteur had also noted that the steering group’s proposals were too 
general and that the absence of a coordinated follow-up on the implemented measures had 
influenced the incidence and spreading of trafficking.377 A new action plan was adopted only 
in 2016, even though the 2008 action plan continued to be implemented in 2013.378 While 
Sweden is currently without an action plan that explicitly deals with trafficking in persons.379 
Trafficking for sexual exploitation in women is covered by the action plan on men’s violence 
against women, taking into account the need for an overall national strategy on women’s issues 
for the period 2017 to 2026.380 It is also observed that the Dutch anti-trafficking action plan is 
classified and only the main priorities are publically accessible, taking into account the 
sensitivity of information, particularly on on-going criminal investigations.381 
Prevention in the EU Trafficking Directive centres on measures, such as training and 
education through awareness-raising.382 The regular training of officials who are most likely to 
come into contact with potential victims is important as a means of deterrence of traffickers 
who rely on inadequate border controls and identification procedures, as well as, for providing 
identified victims with the necessary protection and assistance. Correct identification of 
persons crossing borders can in certain instances prevent the trafficking from occurring in the 
first place where the exploitation has yet to take place. At the same time, given the complexity 
of trafficking processes and the overlapping with related crimes, such as smuggling of 
migrants, an adequate understanding of the nature and forms of trafficking is critical for 
identifying ‘signs’ of trafficking. Thus, the prevention policy of Belgium, for example, 
considers training of immigration officers, judges, and employees of different ministries. While 
the Czech prevention policy additionally mentions training of labour inspectors and army 
officers participating in missions abroad. Similar references to training of judges, prosecutors, 
and law enforcement bodies also exist in the Swedish and Dutch prevention policies. 
Raising awareness of trafficking-related exploitation entails both short-term and long-
term measures. Short-term measures include campaigns to reduce the demand for commercial 
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sex in Romania through theatrical plays,383 an anti-trafficking campaign at a Finnish film 
festival, distribution of brochures to prevent sex tourism at an annual travel show in Finland, 
and a government-run hotline in Romania that informs nationals about working abroad safely. 
Even though the operation of the hotline is restricted to standard business hours. As a major 
origin country, Romania introduced into its Criminal Code a prohibition on Romanian-based 
recruitment companies that facilitates the exploitation of nationals abroad.384 However, so far 
no recruitment company has been punished for trafficking-related crimes.  
Short-term measures cannot adequately tackle the root causes of victims’ 
vulnerabilities, while they can inform both victims and the public about trafficking, making 
them vigilant to trafficking-related exploitation. As Bailey rightly argues, preventive strategies 
should focus beyond public awareness campaigns on ‘boosting the economy, increasing access 
to secondary education, and facilitating dialogue about how to promote legal immigration 
avenues’.385 An informed society can, in turn, exert the necessary pressure on government to 
strengthen anti-trafficking efforts. Simmons uses the example of litigation as a political strategy 
to mobilise political movements as the publicity of cases, in particular, the moral outrage can 
cause social mobilisation that forces governments as political actors and representatives of the 
people to show greater concern for what groups in society ‘want’.386 For example, the framing 
of prostitution as violence against women mobilised political movement that lead to the 
banning of sex-buying, and an evaluation report on the ban found that public support for the 
ban had increased, particularly among young people.387 
Finland and Sweden as major destination countries have adopted some notable long-
term measures, such as the assignment of law enforcement officials to Finnish embassies to 
assist in trafficking prevention and victim identification during the visa application process. 
Moreover, institutional changes were made in Finland to develop a new government-wide 
coordination structure with trafficking prevention offices in each ministry that also cooperate 
with NGOs that provide victim support. While Sweden increased overall funding for its anti-
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trafficking action plans to strengthen prevention efforts, such as programs for victim 
rehabilitation and development funds for national authorities and NGOs.388 
Surprisingly, there are no prevention efforts in the Czech Republic to address the 
particular vulnerability of Roma women, since about 20 percent of Roma persons are trafficked 
from the Czech Republic, even though the Roma community constitutes only about three 
percent of the Czech population.389 This means that the proportion of Roma persons trafficked 
from the Czech territory is greater than the proportion of Roma in the Czech population. The 
Roma community is the largest ethnic minority group in Europe as they suffer, in particular, 
from poverty and social exclusion, ethnic and gender discrimination, lack of education, 
domestic violence, and substance abuse.390 It is expressed that the Czech government fails to 
provide adequate prevention measures to integrate the Roma community into its society.391 For 
example, the Czech National Roma Integration Strategy between 2015 and 2020 that aims to 
address the vulnerabilities of the Roma community through EU funding does not include anti-
trafficking measures, despite being a recognised problem.392 Even more specific strategies, 
such as the National Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings between 2016 and 2019 
neither mention the Roma community nor explicitly focus on trafficking.393 Instead, the 
Strategy refers to a generic term of ‘socially excluded localities’ in which there is an increased 
risk of trafficking.394 
A more recent development within prevention efforts is taking measures to establish as 
a criminal offence the use of services, which are the objects of exploitation with the knowledge 
that the person is a victim. Preventing trafficking by discouraging demand is explicitly 
mentioned in the EU Trafficking Directive that asks member states to consider such 
possibility.395 The European Commission under its reporting duties in relation to the Directive 
has already assessed the impact of existing national laws to this end, with a view to providing 
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adequate proposals at the EU level.396 Its assessment will influence EU policy on prostitution 
and draw an intrinsic link between sex trafficking and consensual prostitution, thus, piercing 
the veil of states’ sovereign prerogatives to determine what constitutes ‘sex trafficking’.  
According to the Commission’s report, 10 member states, including Romania, have 
already established as a criminal offence the intentional use of services performed by victims 
for all exploitation forms, while 15 member states, including Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
and the Netherlands, have no explicit domestic provisions to this end.397 Even though these 
states have established a similar offence in relation to the Directive sanctioning employers of 
illegally staying non-EU nationals mentioned above as part of the Trafficking Directive’s 
integrated, holistic, and human rights framework.398 However, the Commission notes that 
criminalisation under that Directive is insufficient given its limited application to third country 
nationals illegally staying in the EU, thus, excluding victims who are EU nationals and third 
country nationals lawfully residing in the EU.399 Moreover, Belgium argues that the provisions 
relating to sexual offences or child sexual exploitation can be relied upon to this end.400  
Finland and Sweden are among the fewer states with domestic legislation that targets 
the use of services provided by trafficking victims for specific exploitation forms, namely 
sexual exploitation. In fact, the criminalisation of the use of trafficking-related services takes 
inspiration from the Swedish criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services rather than its 
sale in 1999.401 Sweden previously permitted self-employed prostitution402 and the proposal to 
criminalise sex-buying was part of a government bill on violence against women that argued 
prostitution was shameful and unacceptable in society.403 Finland followed suit with a similar 
criminalisation targeting only the use of trafficking victims for sexual exploitation.404 Since 
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then five more states, namely Norway,405 Iceland,406 Canada,407 Northern Ireland,408 and 
France,409 have jumped on the bandwagon of the Swedish model around prostitution. 
Impact studies on the criminalisation of sex-buying were conducted in both Sweden 
and Finland. A government commissioned report in Sweden concluded that street prostitution 
had reduced by half following the ban,410 which, therefore, was ‘an effective barrier against the 
establishment of traffickers in Sweden’.411 Further research appears to support this finding.412 
However, as Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer rightly argue the unavailability of nationwide 
statistics prior to the Swedish criminalisation in 1999 makes a direct comparison between the 
pre and post-criminalisation periods impossible.413 While the Finnish commissioned research 
found that very few cases of abuse of a victim of sex trade had been detected, investigated, 
prosecuted, and punished.414 An important reason behind the inadequate application of the ban 
was the difficulty in establishing intent. Sex buyers tend to avoid gaining any knowledge of the 
prostitute’s circumstances, even though as the Finnish Supreme Court notes it is difficult for a 
buyer to completely exclude the possibility of procuring and trafficking.415 Thus, the research 
recommended a full criminalisation of sex-buying to prevent sex trafficking and protect victims 
of the sex trade.416 
The difficulty of building evidence around the requirement of intent was also noted by 
other member states in the Commission’s report as the burden of proof typically lies with the 
prosecutor based on the principle of the presumption of innocence.417 Only in Ireland is the 
burden of proof shifted to the defendant to prove that he or she had no reasonable grounds for 
believing that the person was in fact a trafficking victim. However, the Commission clarified 
that the difficulty of finding evidence was not a conclusive argument for not treating a certain 
conduct as a criminal offence, and that states should closely consider the level of knowledge 
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required for this offence.418 The Commission finally concluded that the legal landscape on the 
issue of demand was too diverse to effectively contribute to discouraging demand of services 
provided by trafficking victims so that states must strengthen their efforts to ensure a more 
unified and dissuasive action for the accountability of perpetrators, both traffickers and 
intentional users.419 
2.4.4. Prosecution 
As a serious crime that is often committed within the framework of organised crime, combating 
trafficking in persons is a priority for the vast majority of states. The priority-areas in combating 
trafficking are investigation, prosecution, and conviction. In addition to reducing crime, there 
is a pragmatic reason behind focusing on these areas, namely that they produce quantifiable 
indicators of state progress.420 Even though scholars remain critical of the overarching 
dominance of the crime-fighting perspective of anti-trafficking policies, which can lead to 
‘simplistic notions of the circumstances, mind-sets and needs of those defined as victims’.421 It 
would also explain the overwhelming focus of prosecution on sexual exploitation.  
Due to the lack of reliable data in the field, the numbers of investigations, prosecutions, 
and convictions provide at least a glimpse of the domestic realities on the ground. They also 
provide useful indicators for cross-country comparisons to measure global anti-trafficking 
efforts, which appear to indicate a worldwide decrease in law enforcement efforts, especially 
compared to the generally accepted size of the trafficking problem.422 It is a major contention 
that very few traffickers are brought to justice and very few victims are able to benefit from 
the criminal justice system. Ending the high levels of impunity for traffickers and guaranteeing 
justice to victims requires vigorous prosecution of trafficking crimes. However, it would appear 
that the pressure to prosecute, particularly on underdeveloped criminal justice systems, has 
inversely led to poor quality prosecutions that target low level perpetrators, unfair and unsafe 
prosecutions that do not respect basic criminal justice standards, and disproportionate and 
politically motivated targeting of certain sectors, such as the sex industry.423 In particular, there 
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is an unnecessary pressure on victim cooperation as primary witnesses in criminal proceedings. 
Even though the link between victim cooperation and victim support is strongly discouraged 
in the preeminent instruments, and the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines identify the link 
as contrary to the promotion of their human rights.424 
 Moreover, it would appear that the lack of detailed information on criminal justice 
responses, in particular, the process and quality of prosecutions has less to do with an overall 
shortage of primary information on prosecutions, which tend to focus on sexual exploitation in 
women, based on general understandings of the problem. But with states being less eager to 
share detailed information other than on protection and prevention because ‘it reveals 
information that could reflect badly on the state concerned and thereby compromise 
relationships’.425 Gallagher believes that such concern is aggravated by the threat of a low 
ranking in the TIP Report and the subsequent effect on states’ international reputation in 
combating trafficking.426 
As illustrated in the table below, there is great divergence in the number of 
prosecutions, convictions, and penalties for trafficking in persons among the case studies. 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Romania have comparably higher numbers of prosecutions than 
the Czech Republic, Finland, and Sweden. Even though the ratio of prosecutions to convictions 
is highest for the Czech Republic, Finland, and Sweden. The higher numbers of prosecutions 
in Romania and the Netherlands necessarily correlate with them being major origin countries 
for trafficking, thus, there being a heavier flow of victims and traffickers in these territories. 
While Belgium reports a high volume of Romanian nationals being trafficked into its territory, 
although the information on prosecutions for Belgium is not conclusive. Despite the high 
number of prosecutions in Belgium, only a third had resulted in successful convictions. A 
possible reason behind the low number of convictions is that trafficking was not considered a 
priority by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office until the issue was explicitly included in the action 
plan covering the period 2012 to 2014.427 Another reason is that detailed information on 
trafficking-related convictions has become available only since 2010, since the previous 
codification of offences did not distinguish between trafficking in persons and smuggling of 
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migrants.428 As convictions are registered manually, there is a possibility that some records are 
still missing.429 However, this does not explain why 52 of the 88 sentences in Belgium were 
suspended entirely or partially. Although the Czech Republic also suspended 7 of the 19 
sentences. The information on prosecutions for the Czech Republic is not conclusive. The 
overall average sentence was between one and five years of imprisonment. Sweden is the only 
state to impose a fine in addition to a prison sentence, and both convicted traffickers were 
deported upon serving their sentences. In Finland, the prison term for sex trafficking was twice 
as high as for labour trafficking. A possible reason behind the lower sentence may be an 
unfamiliarity with labour-related exploitation as the first conviction for labour exploitation was 
only pronounced in 2012.430 In particular, extortionate work discrimination as a related crime 
is punished by a fine.431 
 
Table 3. Number of prosecutions, convictions, and sentences for the basic offence of trafficking 
in persons in 2015.432 
 Prosecutions Convictions Sentences 
Belgium 299 93 88 (ave. 1-5 years; 
52 suspended) 
Czech Republic 12 19 19 (5: 1-5 years; 7: 
5-15 years; 7 
suspended)  
Finland 4 4 4 (32-46 months for 
sex trafficking; 12-
20 months for labour 
trafficking) 
Netherlands 189 139 n/a 
Romania 480 331 225 (ave. 1-5 years) 
Sweden 2 2 2 (26 months; 30 
months) & SEK 
82,200 & deportation 
after term 
 
The number of prosecutions and convictions for each case study is still low considering 
the generally accepted size of the trafficking problem. This can be for a variety of reasons, 
including but not limited to, first, the different position of states in the international criminal 
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network of trafficking. Second, the variable size of their populations and the corresponding 
number of potential victims and traffickers. Romania with a population of over 21 million 
inhabitants will more likely identify and subsequently prosecute more traffickers than, for 
example, Finland with a population of 5.5 million inhabitants. Third, the complexity of the 
anti-trafficking laws will influence the possibilities of investigations leading to prosecutions 
and successful convictions. For example, the previous overlapping of Finnish penal provisions 
on trafficking and procuring meant that the authorities were using laws on pandering, 
discrimination, and usury to investigate and prosecute suspected traffickers, while the higher 
threshold of the trafficking offence meant less broad use by the courts to capture subtler forms 
of coercion used in trafficking situations.433 Forth, the data collection and analysis 
methodology of individual countries is an important consideration, particularly whether they 
refer to the number of traffickers, victims, or cases, since they may consider the number of 
investigations, convictions, or both. Whether a country is an origin, transit, or destination also 
influences the number of registered cases, since transit countries may find it difficult to prove 
the trafficking offence where the suspected trafficker is caught at the border before the 
exploitation occurs typically in the destination country. Consequently, many trafficking cases 
may be recognised incorrectly as smuggling of migrants because the distinction is less clear on 
the ground. Finally, many trafficking cases do not reach the authorities because of mistrust by 
victims and fear of retaliation by traffickers. Even when they do, there may be confusion about 
the distinction between trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, or a lack of knowledge 
about the elements of trafficking and the profile of potential victims.434 As investigations and 
criminal proceedings are often very lengthy and may not garner the expected outcome, this 
may be a disincentive for initiating investigations in the first place. For example, an 
international investigation led by the Netherlands and involving Nigeria, Italy, France, 
Belgium, Spain, and the UK resulted in the arrest of 24 suspected traffickers. However, Dutch 
police officers involved in the investigation that lasted almost two years were disappointed 
with the outcome of convictions as a number of suspects were convicted for smuggling of 
migrants rather than trafficking in persons.435 In particular, the victim statements were excluded 
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as evidence because of improper police registration and insufficient monitoring by the public 
prosecutor.  
In addition to the number of prosecutions, convictions, and sentences, the levels of 
penalty for the crime of trafficking in persons provide a good indication of the gravity accorded 
to the crime by individual states. Higher levels of penalty can act as better deterrents of crime. 
The EU Trafficking Directive prescribes a maximum penalty of at least five years of 
imprisonment, which is met by the case studies as illustrated in the table below.436  
 
Table 4. Levels of penalty for the basic offence of trafficking in persons.437 
 Trafficking in Persons by 
Individuals 
Trafficking in Persons by 
Organised Criminals 
Belgium 1-5 years & EUR 500-
50,000 
n/a 
Czech Republic 2-10 years 10-18 years 
Finland 4 months-6 years n/a 
Netherlands max. 12 years max. 15 years & EUR 82,000 
Romania 3-10 years n/a 
Sweden 2-10 years 
max. 4 years (less grievous) 
n/a 
 
Belgium and Finland have opted for maximum sentences at the lower threshold set by 
the Directive, namely a maximum of 5 and 6 years of imprisonment respectively. The Czech 
Republic, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden have opted for comparably higher prison 
sentences of maximum 10 years, or 12 years in the specific case of the Netherlands. However, 
the European Commission’s report on transposition of the EU Trafficking Directive notes that 
some European states have penalties carrying a maximum imprisonment of 20 years, which is 
a better indicator of the gravity of the trafficking offence that effectively deprives victims of 
their liberty.438 Belgium has additionally chosen to apply a maximum fine of EUR 50,000. Two 
states, namely the Czech Republic and the Netherlands maintain the distinction between 
individual traffickers and individuals involved in an organised criminal group, which according 
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to the definition in the UNCTOC entails a structured group of three or more persons.439 While 
the UN Trafficking Protocol because it was adopted within a transnational organised crime 
framework restricts its scope of application to offences that are transnational in nature and 
involve an organised criminal group,440 the COE Trafficking Convention effectively removes 
this requirement to acknowledge domestic trafficking and exploitation by individual 
traffickers.441 However, due to the severity of trafficking that involves organised criminals 
given its geographical scope and the number of victims exploited, trafficking by organised 
criminals carries heavier penalties. The Netherlands in addition to a maximum prison term of 
15 years also imposes a fine of EUR 82,000. Together, the penalty for organised criminals is 
considered to take into account the gravity of trafficking, especially if the penalty is supported 
by the confiscation of proceeds of crime. 
 When the penalties prescribed by law are compared to the sentences in trafficking cases 
in both tables, a convergence is found in all but one case study, namely Romania, where the 
lowest sentence of one year of imprisonment is below the minimum penalty of two years of 
imprisonment as stipulated by the domestic anti-trafficking law. It is important that judges 
adhere to the minimum levels of penalty prescribed by law to maintain the gravity of the 
trafficking offence. Otherwise, it leans towards relative impunity for traffickers. At the same 
time, it will influence the willingness of police officers to start an investigation that is both 
complex and dependent on valuable police resources, since ‘[c]ourt verdicts serve as beacons 
for the police in this matter’.442 
2.4.5. Protection 
The protection of victims is the most contested of priority-areas for states involved in the fight 
against trafficking, especially when protection is not directly beneficial to prosecution efforts. 
A narrow understanding of protection centres on retribution or intimidation from traffickers, 
while a broader understanding underpins victims’ access to social, legal, and medical 
assistance.443 The latter addresses harm, including physical and psychological harm, and the 
socio-economic vulnerabilities that are likely to leave victims at risk of continued exploitation 
and/or re-trafficking. More recent instruments, such as the COE Trafficking Convention and 
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the EU Trafficking Directive, require states to provide unconditional assistance to victims at 
least during the reflection period.444 A person should receive assistance and support as soon as 
there is a reasonable ground for suspecting that he or she is a victim of trafficking, irrespective 
of his or her willingness to act as a witness. It follows that during the reflection period the 
person cannot be removed from the territory of the state and must be in receipt of safe 
accommodation, medical assistance, and legal assistance.445 The period serves to free the 
victim from the influence of the trafficker so that he or she can make a consensual and informed 
choice on cooperating with authorities. However, victims remain necessary witnesses in 
criminal proceedings due to the lack of evidence and the complexity of investigations so that 
often states continue to link victim cooperation with victim assistance. There is a further 
enticement of residency as cooperating victims have improved chances of receiving residency 
in the destination country.446 This has become particularly problematic from a due process 
perspective as it questions the veracity of victim testimonies.447 As victims have something to 
gain from testifying, there is a credible possibility that their testimonies are exaggerated. In 
particular, where their stories do not support an ‘ideal’ victimhood to appear credible in court. 
For example, in Romania forcing ‘innocent’ women into prostitution is a crime but the same 
act when committed by a sex worker amounts to pandering.448 Thus, in the former instance, the 
‘victim’ is entitled to protection and assistance but in the latter instance the person is viewed 
as a ‘perpetrator’ deserving of prosecution and punishment. The link between victim 
cooperation and victim support, thus, has the effect of weeding out useful witnesses with 
valuable information. Thus, the common notion is not that protection leads to cooperation but 
that cooperation leads to protection. As Brunovskis and Skilbrei argue, ‘[t]his distinction in 
terms of its impact on victims’ decision-making and well-being, is an important one’.449 
 In relation to the case studies, only the Netherlands, Romania, and Finland explicitly 
require that assistance and support should be provided as soon as there is a reasonable ground 
for suspicion that the person is a victim of trafficking.450 Romania additionally includes a list 
of indicators outlining ‘reasonable grounds’ and the main differences between trafficking in 
persons and smuggling of migrants, which are available to police officials and immigration 
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officials.451 The unconditionality of victim assistance is provided for in the domestic anti-
trafficking laws, although information for Belgium is not conclusive as to whether such 
provision exists and is applicable for victims irrespective of nationality. A further indication of 
unconditionality is the transposition of the Council Directive 2004/81/EC on the issuance of 
residence permits to third country nationals who are victims of trafficking by the case 
studies.452 This Directive forms part of the integrated, holistic, and human rights approach 
envisaged by the EU Trafficking Directive. However, the Directive does not specify the 
duration of the reflection period, which is therefore without prejudice to the individual 
capacities of states. The explanatory report of the COE Trafficking Convention mentions at 
least 30 days.453 While NGOs providing victim support recommend a period of not less than 
90 days.454 Sweden’s reflection period lasts 30 days, Belgium’s 45 days, the Czech Republic’s 
60 days, both the Netherlands’ and Romania’s 90 days, and Finland’s between 30 days and six 
months. Thus, only the latter three states provide grace periods that are truly reflective of 
victims’ needs and particularities. In particular, where victims develop an emotional bond with 
their traffickers akin to the Stockholm syndrome that makes it difficult for them to act as 
witnesses in proceedings against their traffickers.  
In relation to appropriate and safe accommodation, the provision of specialised shelters 
for trafficking victims in Belgium,455 the Czech Republic,456 the Netherlands,457 and 
Romania458 is noted. Sweden accommodates trafficked women in shelters for female victims 
of violence and child and young person victims of sexual abuse, substance abuse, and 
psychological difficulties.459 However, such shelters will most likely fail to address the 
specificities of trafficking victims’ harms, as a result of psychological, physical, and/or sexual 
abuse, forced or coerced use of drugs or alcohol, social restrictions and emotional 
manipulation, economic exploitation and debt bondage, legal insecurity, and abusive working 
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conditions.460 Like Sweden, Finland accommodates trafficking victims in shelters for migrant 
women along with victims of domestic violence.461 Besides the inadequacy of support 
measures, there will most likely be an issue of bed space, which implies a selective screening 
process to determine priority-victims. The lack of space is a wider problem. For example, in 
Belgium, the three specialised reception centres assisting victims, including accommodation, 
have a total of 50 places for the three facilities, thus, victims are also housed in transit flats and 
other accommodation for a stay of typically between five and six months depending upon their 
individual needs.462 
 The number of residence permits issued or renewed by the case studies in any given 
year varies considerably. Belgium has by far issued and renewed the most number of permits, 
totalling 552 permits in 2015, followed by the Netherlands with 251 temporary permits in 2014 
for a period of three or more years.463 The Netherlands is one state to grant to cooperating 
victims permanent residency following a successful conviction. Romania makes no provision 
for permanent permits, only renewable six-month temporary permits.464 The information on 
the number of permits issued is not conclusive. In Finland, the misidentification of trafficking 
victims as witnesses in trafficking-related cases, such as pimping, inversely affected their 
eligibility for a residence permit.465 Thus, only two temporary and nine permanent residence 
permits were granted in 2015. Like the Netherlands, Sweden grants to cooperating victims and 
witnesses residency following a successful conviction. On this basis, in 2015, 12 trafficking 
victims and 29 witnesses received temporary residence permits of at least six months. A serious 
obstacle to the issuance of Swedish residence permits is that only an investigating police officer 
or prosecutor can file an application for residency, which means that temporary residence 
permits are typically only available to victims who are already in contact with law enforcement 
officials. Moreover, in the specific case of Sweden, the Group of Experts on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings observed that uncooperative victims were immediately 
repatriated following the expiry of their reflection period without a proper assessment of 
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possible risks of repatriation to these victims.466 This observation bolsters the notion that 
cooperation and protection are intrinsically linked.  
 The intent to protect victims has not transpired with the same rigour into practical 
action, whether due to the absence of political will or administrative and financial resources to 
offer the necessary support. The political, social, and economic developments in Romania and 
the Czech Republic do not compare to those in Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden. 
This suggests immediate differences in the abilities of the former group of states to offer victim 
support on a par with the latter group of states that generally follow a tradition of equality 
policy and respect for human rights, which, in turn, implies a greater willingness to provide 
victim assistance and support. Even though it cannot be said on the basis of information 
available that the latter group of states provides comparably better protection to victims. An 
important reason behind the overall inadequacy of protection is the optional nature of 
protection provisions compared to the mandatory nature of prosecution. While the optional 
nature of protection necessarily takes into account the different capacities of individual states, 
it affords states maximum protection from being accountable to precise obligations. A further 
reason lies in the structural substratum of states and the bias and stigma that authorities hold in 
relation to victims and specific exploitation forms. For example, it was mentioned already that 
the majority of victims in the Czech Republic belong to the Roma community and that 
prevention policies largely ignored persons belonging to this ethnic group. The same is true in 
relation to their protection as very few Roma women benefit from the Support and Protection 
of Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings Programme established in 2005 for foreign and 
Czech victims. This Programme offers important protection to victims, such as non-
prosecution of criminal activities committed as part of their trafficking. The ethnic prejudice 
against Roma victims often leads to their exclusion from such programmers, who are blamed 
by authorities and victim service providers for their vulnerability.467 While, in Finland, negative 
attitudes towards prostitutes means sex trafficking victims are less likely to enter the victim 
assistance system.468 The Finnish victim reception centre, therefore, plays a crucial role in 
identifying and caring for victims ignored by national authorities.469 However, such care occurs 
through general rather than specialised shelters for trafficking victims.  
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Thus, the protection of victims continues to have a strong link with victim cooperation 
in criminal proceedings, and outside this framework protection does not appear to amount to 
any meaningful measure that addresses the specific needs of trafficking victims and reduces 
the risks of harm to continued exploitation and/or re-trafficking based on the broader 
understanding of protection. 
2.4.6. Cooperation 
Cooperation, whether bilateral or multilateral, is the paramount objective of states becoming 
parties to international and regional anti-trafficking instruments. Cooperation is necessary for 
both law enforcement and information exchanges as the crime manifests itself in different 
forms and using different methods in both domestic and transnational contexts. Above all, 
cooperation is crucial for upholding the rule of law. The fragmented nature of anti-trafficking 
efforts provides high levels of impunity for traffickers and does not secure justice for those 
who have been trafficked. In particular, respect for the principles of sovereign equality and 
territorial integrity, as well as, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states restrict 
the exercise of jurisdiction and the performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for 
the authorities of that other state by its domestic law.470 While the absence of international 
scrutiny of anti-trafficking efforts allows those states to disregard their commitments, either 
partially or fully, when compliance is not necessarily in their interest or capacity. This creates 
an ambivalent attitude towards cooperation in matters of prevention, prosecution, and 
protection.  
Institutions at the international and regional levels are, therefore, tasked with facilitating 
cooperation through technical assistance.471 However, these institutions report that state 
cooperation is minimal. For example, Eurojust works at the EU level with judicial and law 
enforcement authorities of the involved states to facilitate the exchange of information, support 
mutual legal assistance measures, coordinate ongoing investigations and prosecutions, and 
detect, prevent, or resolve conflicts of jurisdiction or ne bis in idem-related issues.472 Thus, 
between 2012 and 2016, Eurojust, with significant participation from Europol, held 121 
coordination meetings on trafficking cases as a priority-area of its general casework.473 
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However, its resources, including the 28 anti-trafficking coordination centres, were sparsely 
used by cooperating states in transnational trafficking cases. Only one trafficking case 
concerning sex trafficking in women in Romania and France benefitted from a coordination 
centre in relation to arrests and confiscation of proceeds of crime.474 In particular, member 
states have a reporting obligation to Eurojust of a minimum level of information in specific 
circumstances so that Eurojust can contribute in a meaningful way to cooperation efforts.475 
According to Eurojust, states are cooperating bilaterally and multilaterally at the EU 
level, even though multilateral cooperation is comparably less (15 percent).476 Both the Czech 
Republic and Romania as major origin countries are seen to actively cooperate with other EU 
states under the coordination of Eurojust. For example, combined efforts in the Czech Republic 
and Sweden resulted in five convictions for child pornography with sentences from 2 to 12 
years of imprisonment, as well as, the confiscation of proceeds of crime and victim 
compensation.477 The Czech Republic has also worked with Ireland and the UK against forced 
marriages.478 While Romania has cooperated with both France and Denmark in sex and labour 
trafficking cases respectively. In the former case, 25 suspects were arrested and proceeds of 
crime confiscated.479 In the latter case, a multidisciplinary approach among NGOs, tax 
departments, immigration services, and law enforcement agencies put an end to the exploitation 
of about 300 victims and proceeds of crime totalling EUR 7.2 million were confiscated.480 
In the specific cases of Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as, Sweden and Finland 
cooperation is further facilitated through the Benelux Union and the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS) respectively. The Benelux Union has established a cross-border framework for 
the identification and protection of trafficking victims in relation to criminal proceedings, 
residency, and repatriation.481 The framework provides information on authorities who are 
most likely to come into contact with victims, the domestic anti-trafficking laws in Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and the national referral mechanisms and other support 
service providers. While the CBSS through its anti-trafficking task force contributes to state 
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cooperation by facilitating the exchange of information. For example, the ‘trafficking as a 
criminal enterprise’ project developed state-of-the-art knowledge on ‘the activities of the 
perpetrators by developing an understanding of the structure, social relationships, modus 
operandi, travel routes, and technologies’ associated with different exploitation forms.482 One 
of the notable partners in the project is the National Agency against Trafficking in Persons as 
the national rapporteur on trafficking in Romania. Due to the sensitivity of information, the 
findings of the project are not publically accessible.  
 Within discussions on state cooperation, a number of obstacles are identified in relation 
to effective investigations and prosecutions. For example, investigating officials make 
incorrect distinctions between trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants because often 
the exploitation does not occur until after the person is smuggled into the EU. Thus, it is 
important ‘to assess all stages of the smuggling/trafficking in order to identify the correct legal 
definition of the conduct’.483 As otherwise the foreign victim cannot receive protection from 
prosecution or penalisation for illegal entry that was committed as part of his or her trafficking.  
Eurojust also notes as obstacles to effective cooperation the admissibility of evidence 
provided by victims, the conflict of jurisdiction, the execution of European arrest warrants, and 
proving money laundering.484 In one trafficking case, the conflict of jurisdiction was resolved 
using a video conference to facilitate the hearing of a witness before the issuance of a European 
arrest warrant, in accordance with Romanian procedural law.485 In another case, the 
Netherlands observed that traffickers were laundering proceeds not only through banks but also 
financial service providers, such as Western Union and Money Gram, thus, providing valuable 
insight into newer modi operandi of traffickers.486 Two further examples underline the 
challenges to transposition of the EU Trafficking Directive that contains the most recent 
obligations in relation to enhancing cooperation.487 The differences in domestic legislation in 
relation to wiretapping hindered a joint investigation involving Bulgaria where wiretapping can 
only be conducted for a maximum period. However, article 9(4) of the Directive requires 
member states to provide officials with effective investigation tools, including for the 
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interception of communications.488 Also, the use of trafficked persons for drug trafficking 
between states with different drug laws constitutes trafficking in persons for the exploitation 
of criminal activities under article 2(3) of the Directive.489 In such cases, international and 
regional coordination institutions have an important role to play in mitigating the divergence 
in substantive and procedural laws. These examples also underline that a successful 
harmonisation of national responses has not taken place with a view to enhancing cooperation. 
2.4.7. Preliminary Conclusions 
The national exploration draws four preliminary conclusions. First, the ratification of the UN 
Trafficking Protocol and the COE Trafficking Convention and the transposition of the EU 
Trafficking Directive are major push-factors for wide and effective cooperation in matters of 
prevention, prosecution, and protection. Second, there is overall compliance on the books with 
international and European obligations with a view to harmonising national responses. Third, 
there still remains significant room for improvement with regard to prevention, prosecution, 
and protection, in practice and to a lesser extent on the books, so that the harmonisation project 
has not yet come to fruition. Fourth, cooperation efforts are minimal compared to the generally 
accepted size of transnational trafficking, in part, due to the differences in domestic anti-
trafficking laws.  
2.5. Conclusions 
The international community has made great strides in combating trafficking in persons 
through knowledge production and international regulation. The UN Trafficking Protocol, the 
Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, the CEDAW, the COE Trafficking Convention, and the 
EU Trafficking Directive have contributed significantly to normative development in the field 
towards a preferred general direction of national responses. Current responses to the trafficking 
problem are rooted in the Protocol, examined in section 2.2.1, which has had a critical role in 
defining ‘trafficking in persons’ and establishing minimum standards on prevention, 
prosecution, and protection, with a view to promoting state cooperation through harmonised 
responses. While the Convention and the Directive, studied in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, provide 
a contextual understanding of trafficking in Europe.  
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According to the most recent formulation of the trafficking problem manifest in the 
Directive, trafficking is a concept of exploitation of criminal activities that are subject to 
penalties and imply financial gain. This has opened up the umbrella term of trafficking, 
originally concerning only sexual and labour exploitation and the removal of organs, to forms 
unnamed or unforeseen during the Protocol’s negotiations, such as forced begging. However, 
widening the scope of the Protocol’s definition from a set of categories to a concept creates 
uncertainty in the implementation process as illustrated by the inclusion of exploitation forms 
not explicitly mentioned in any of the preeminent anti-trafficking instruments, such as forced 
service in the armed forces, in Sweden and the Czech Republic. While there is a serious 
possibility that widening the Protocol’s definition will give new life to previously moribund 
prohibitions in international law, such as forced marriage, there is a significant risk of 
deflecting attention from previously narrow legal categories reserved for the worst forms of 
exploitation, such as prostitution and slavery-related trafficking. In particular, the conflation of 
trafficking in persons and slavery by the ECtHR, reviewed in section 2.3.1, by bringing 
trafficking within the scope of article 4 of the ECHR adds to the normative complexities of this 
crime. As different understandings of the trafficking problem encourage different approaches 
to prevention, prosecution, protection, thus, rendering state cooperation unworkable. 
 The human rights perspective to the trafficking problem most prominently espoused by 
the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines and the CEDAW, considered in section 2.2.2, and 
the Convention, appraised in section 2.3.1, has removed the overwhelming focus on the 
transnational and organised crime dimensions of the problem, in favour of victims who are 
increasingly visible as subjects whose human rights have been violated by traffickers. This has 
also been important for the development of regulation in the field in terms of designing more 
appropriate responses. However, as illustrated by the case studies, in section 2.4, in practice, 
protection remains linked to prevention and prosecution to the detriment of victim assistance 
and support, based on a broader understanding of protection as tackling the risks of harm to 
continued exploitation and/or re-trafficking. There is still significant room for improvement in 
terms of formal and practical compliance with international and European anti-trafficking 
obligations. Even though the greatest divergence in national responses associates with the law 
in action, and to a lesser extent the law on the books. This divergence influences cooperation 
efforts and explains, in part, the reason behind minimal cooperation, especially multilateral. 
 The open threat posed by the TVPA, scrutinised in section 2.2.3, to normative 
development in field, especially when there appears to be a preferred general direction of 
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national responses, cannot be downplayed. It is no secret that the US is using the extraterritorial 
scope of the TVPA as a veil for worldwide criminalisation of consensual prostitution as a form 
of prostitution-related trafficking. Even though the Protocol intentionally leaves undefined the 
respective term ‘exploitation of the prostitution of others’, taking into account the different 
approaches to prostitution in individual states. Using the TIP Report as a tool to shame states 
around the globe not only to comply with the minimum standards for eliminating ‘trafficking’, 
which were unilaterally developed and adopted by the US, but also to include within national 
responses efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. Thus, drawing an intrinsic link 
between trafficking in persons and prostitution. It is this credible threat to normative 
development that begs the all-important question of effectiveness of current anti-trafficking 
responses, in particular, the usefulness of international and European anti-trafficking 
instruments that appear unable to hold states accountable to precise obligations around 
prevention, prosecution, and protection, not least a common definition as the prerequisite for 
cooperation. 
 As will become apparent in the next chapter the definitional, conceptual, and practical 
uncertainties raised here by these very instruments touch on the systemic limitations of the 
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States have developed and accepted within the formal processes of international and European 
law a number of anti-trafficking instruments, which underline the importance of cooperation 
in matters of prevention, prosecution, and protection. In the context of trafficking in women 
for sexual exploitation in Europe, the previous chapter examined the UN Trafficking Protocol, 
the COE Trafficking Convention, and the EU Trafficking Directive as the preeminent 
instruments in the field. Additional instruments that are directly or indirectly relevant to 
normative development in the field, namely the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, the 
CEDAW, and the TVPA were also examined with regard to their influence on current 
understandings of the trafficking problem. That subsequent international and regional 
responses are rooted in the Protocol illustrates the preferred general direction of national 
responses. Even though there are significant gaps in compliance with international and 
European anti-trafficking norms and standards in the case studies of Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden. Thus, leading to conclude that the 
harmonisation project that is critical for effective and wide cooperation, in relation to 
trafficking with transnational and/or organised crime dimensions, has not yet come to fruition.  
The definitional, conceptual, and practical uncertainties found in the anti-trafficking 
instruments probe the effectiveness of current national responses based on international and 
regional understandings of the trafficking problem. In order to make sense of the inadequacy 
of current responses, this chapter argues it is necessary to look at the systemic limitations of 
the institutions tasked with managing the trafficking problem and coordinating cooperation 
among involved states. As this chapter demonstrates, the ineffectiveness of current responses 
to promote cooperation are rooted in the limitations of the formal processes of law to define 
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the problem and establish minimum standards around prevention, prosecution, and protection, 
which take into account the interests of all involved states.  
The trafficking problem is complex and manifests itself in different forms and to 
different extents in individual states. Moreover, the underlying issues, in particular, illegal 
migration and border security, gender discrimination and gender-based violence, prostitution, 
and organised crime and the rule of law, will influence the approaches of individual states to 
the trafficking problem. For example, the vast majority of states draw an intrinsic link between 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others as a form of trafficking and consensual prostitution. 
The latter, however, is addressed differently among states and there are broadly-speaking four 
typologies of prostitution regimes, namely abolitionism, prohibitionism, regulation, and neo-
abolitionism. A state that abolishes or prohibits prostitution as gender-based violence is most 
likely to consider consensual prostitution within the anti-trafficking framework. For example, 
Sweden and Finland criminalise sex-buying to reduce the demand for exploitable services 
provided by trafficking victims. By contrast, the Netherlands regulates prostitution as 
employment and affords sex workers the rights and guarantees of labour contracts, thus, 
reducing the demand for exploitable services provided by trafficking victims through a 
legalised sex market. While Sweden and Finland link their approaches to forced and consensual 
prostitution, the Netherlands distinguishes between both categories of prostitution. It is, 
therefore, evident that different definitions of trafficking-related exploitation will impede 
cooperation, which depends upon a common anti-trafficking framework in the jurisdictions of 
cooperating states.  
That states are able to define the trafficking problem for themselves is a weakness of 
the international and European anti-trafficking instruments that leave the term ‘exploitation of 
the prostitution of others’ intentionally undefined. On the one hand, to accommodate the 
different interests of states without whose involvement trafficking cannot be combated 
effectively. On other hand, to create an illusion of consensus, which in reality is lacking to 
encourage the development of a common definition and minimum standards for effective and 
wide cooperation. Thus, there have been increasing efforts of international institutions and one 
specific state, namely the US, to redefine the trafficking problem outside the formal processes 
of international law. For example, the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines have rather 
successfully raised the human rights standard of national responses as manifest in the adoption 
of certain principles in the COE Trafficking Convention and subsequently the EU Trafficking 
Directive. At the same time, US unilateralism in the field threatens the fragile consensus 
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formed around the trafficking problem. However, so far, the international community has been 
unable to challenge the hegemonic position of the US in the field. This is seen as one of the 
many systemic limitations of international law to adequately address the trafficking problem.  
The ensuing challenges to cooperation form the basis of this chapter. These are 
appropriately considered through a functional comparative methodology that looks at the 
operating institutions to explicate the law in action. Thus, section 3.2 deals with international 
institutions, namely the United Nations, within which the UN Trafficking Protocol, the 
Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, and the CEDAW were developed and accepted by 
involved states. Again, the TVPA is placed within the international examination to illustrate 
the hegemonic position of the US in the international anti-trafficking discourse. Section 3.3 
concerns the European institutions, namely the Council of Europe within which both the COE 
Trafficking Convention and the ECHR were developed and accepted by involved states, as 
well as, the European Union that adopts the EU Trafficking Directive as part of the Title V 
measures, which involved states have opted to transpose. Additionally, a historical comparative 
methodology is used to understand how the policies around prostitution and its link to sex 
trafficking have developed in relation to the case studies, in section 3.4. This examination 
serves to explicate the divergence in the law on the books and the law in action as observed in 
the previous chapter, and on the basis of which the compliance behaviours of the case studies 
can be divided into different ‘worlds of compliance’. Finally, the core conclusions of this 
chapter are laid out in section 3.5. 
3.2. International Responses 
The section begins by assessing the implications of UNGA-involvement as a facilitator of a 
transnational cooperation forum for the development and adoption of the UN Trafficking 
Protocol. It is followed in section 3.2.2 by an exploration of the changing role of the UN’s 
human rights system in normative development around the trafficking problem. Finally, section 
3.2.3 evaluates the value, if any, of the hegemonic position of the US through the extraterritorial 
scope of the TVPA on the anti-trafficking discourse. The four preliminary conclusions to this 
core section are laid out in section 3.2.4. 
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3.2.1. The UN Trafficking Protocol: Elaborating a Transnational Criminal Law 
Instrument through Widespread Participation and Consensus Decision-
Making 
 
The previous chapter touched on three systemic limitations to enforcement of the UN 
Trafficking Protocol. First, cooperation agreements as commitment devices depend for their 
effectiveness on national implementation, which is imperfect. Second, cooperation agreements 
as representative of the interests of all involved states require negotiating venues that reflect 
universal or quasi-universal membership. However, power in international negotiations is 
asymmetric. Third, the swiftness in adopting cooperation agreements is indicative of normative 
convergence but only by weakening their content. This section considers each of these 
limitations in turn to understand why the UN Trafficking Protocol was the most appropriate 
option and outcome at the time. 
 The previous chapter already delved into the inappropriateness of criminalising 
transnational trafficking in persons under international criminal law. During the Rome Statute’s 
finalisations states distinguished between transnational crimes of international concern and the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, also known as 
delicta juris gentium. Thus, trafficking falls within the scope of article 7 of the Rome Statute 
only when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population. Otherwise, it is a jurisdictional matter for national courts based on the concept of 
complementarity.  
Transnational criminal law provided a useful framework for international cooperation 
that would allow states to combine their efforts and resources to combat transnational crimes.490 
Developing states despite a desire to tackle trafficking lacked the necessary technical capacities 
to fight transnational organised crime, and developed states depended on the former’s 
cooperation as common origin countries. Moreover, due to the multiplicity of trafficking flows 
bilateral agreements were deemed inadequate. The crime focus and the reluctance of states to 
view trafficking as a human rights problem naturally lent support to the use of ‘suppression 
conventions’ under transnational criminal law that serve three crime purposes. First, they 
criminalise the transnational crime and stipulate punishment that is commensurate to the 
gravity of the offence under national law.491 Second, they establish territorial and 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction to protect national sovereignty prerogatives.492 Third, they enhance 
international cooperation in matters of investigation, prosecution, and conviction as the 
paramount objective of lifting trafficking to the lofty heights of international regulation.493 
Thus, suppression conventions adequately address the transnational nature of the crime because 
they emphasise the role and significance of international cooperation. In connection with 
cooperation, such conventions also underline the need for harmonisation of national laws to 
make domestic criminal justice systems more consistent and compatible with each other. 
Suppression conventions, thus, create cooperative frameworks at the international level that 
leave the actual criminal prohibition of individuals to the domestic systems. This is important 
because of differences in the political interests and priorities providing impetus for the 
regulation of the crime, including the contentious policy issues at the heart of trafficking. 
Another important reason for the utility of suppression conventions, particularly in respect of 
developing states, is that suppression conventions help to build the rule of law domestically 
because criminalisation and prosecution happen at a level closer to the crime and its victims. 
During negotiations of the UN Trafficking Protocol, states had considered the 
feasibility of existing instruments on, or related to, trafficking and the possibility of updating 
them in relation to organised crime.494 This included the 1950 Trafficking Convention, which 
as explained in the previous chapter was the preeminent anti-sex trafficking instrument at the 
international level. However, updating an instrument that was not widely ratified, outdated, 
and insufficiently comprehensive to combat the multidimensional nature of trafficking was 
difficult. By contrast, a single new instrument could save time and resources as opposed to 
negotiating a series of instruments to address each specific category of criminal conduct. 
Moreover, it could save time and resources involved in renegotiating common provisions, such 
as extradition and mutual legal assistance, thus, mitigating possible implementation 
problems.495 This is important because the Protocol itself does not contain any cooperation 
measures, such as on extradition and mutual legal assistance, which are, therefore, included in 
the UNCTOC and apply mutatis mutandis to the Trafficking Protocol.496 Thus, by omitting the 
elaboration of cooperation measures in the Protocol, in fact, in all three additional protocols to 
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the UNCTOC, states saved time and resources over needless renegotiation of common 
provisions.  
The negotiating venue was also reflective of a political choice to ensure wide 
participation of states based on a critical realisation that trafficking as a global challenge 
required a global response with all involved states. The UNGA was one forum based on 
universal or quasi-universal membership of 185 member states at the time, which, in turn, 
raised its perceivable legitimacy and that of the legal instruments it endorsed. In fact, the 
UNGA had adopted a host of cooperation agreements as the default system for managing 
international law-making of collective action problems.497 Some scholars argue that 
international institutions are indispensable as a means of cooperation because they provide 
channels for communication, offer an administrative machinery for elaborating cooperation 
decisions, and, thus, help to settle differences and find compromises to minimise conflict 
effects.498 
In particular, UN sponsored forums prefer consensus decision-making to majority 
voting. Despite their inherent flaws in compelling only basic agreement, such forums offer 
developing countries relative parity with their developed counterparts. This is particularly 
important because the initial push for the elaboration of a transnational organised crime 
framework that included trafficking came from developing states. On the one hand, developing 
states lacked the capacity to address an influx of transnational criminal groups and the UNGA 
had adopted a Statement of Principles and Programme of Action that provided assistance to 
member states.499 On the other hand, developing states lacked the resources and negotiating 
power to influence existing regional and bilateral cooperation agreements on criminal matters, 
most notably developed by Western European states.500 However, Western states remained 
reluctant to broach a subject as ‘thorny’ as organised crime because of the conceptual and legal 
difficulties, and the possibility that a new transnational organised crime convention could 
weaken or jeopardise existing agreements.501 However, globalisation had resulted in the mass 
movement of persons across states and regions, and trafficking as an inadvertent effect of 
globalisation, which required an international rather than regional or bilateral response. 
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However, Western states could not risk placing the future of international regulation of 
transnational organised crimes in the hands of weaker states, particularly given different 
political interests and priorities. In particular, the contentious policy issues around trafficking, 
such as prostitution. As explored in detail in the next section, such policy issues, particularly 
respect of women, traditionally fell within the purview of individual states. This had also 
become evident with failed attempts to end brothel licensing under the 1950 Trafficking 
Convention as already observed. By throwing their support behind a transnational cooperation 
agreement, developing states essentially forced their developed counterparts to jump on the 
bandwagon. However, once this happened, the balance of power completely shifted in favour 
of larger, more powerful states. Two examples are instructive of the power imbalances during 
negotiations. First, there was disagreement between origin countries and destination countries 
over the inclusion of a provision on victims’ repatriation to their origin countries and states, 
such as China, initially abstained from signing the Protocol for this reason.502 Although the 
provision remains intact, it places a financial and administrative burden on origin countries to 
facilitate victims’ repatriation.503 China had proposed that destination countries should provide 
the necessary facilities for returning victims, which destination countries opposed.504 Second, 
Western countries with commercial sex markets, including Canada and the Netherlands, 
successfully opposed the firmer abolitionist position of the US on prostitution. Their opposition 
is the main reason that the proper term of sex trafficking, namely ‘exploitation of the 
prostitution of others’, remains undefined in the Protocol.505  
The negotiations within a universal forum, therefore, demonstrated the domination of 
preferences held by the powerful, larger states over the weaker, smaller states. This is precisely 
because the powerful and influential set the benchmark for universalism.506 Wielding power 
by influencing decisions is, therefore, a key incentive for state participation.507 While increased 
participation, at the very least, addresses illegitimacy, incompleteness, ineffectiveness, and 
exclusion concerns faced increasingly by the UN system.508 Thus, the UN celebrated that 
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negotiations of the Protocol had garnered participation of about 120 country representatives 
from different regions of the world, alongside representatives from UN organisations and of 
the Missions of Permanent Observers, IGOs, NGOs, and institutes of the UN Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Program network.509 However, wide participation had serious 
consequences for the consequent outcome as highlighted in the previous chapter. The Protocol 
suffered from an ambiguous international definition and little human rights protection. The 
apparent normative convergence that led to the swift adoption of the Protocol in just two years 
rests on the failure of states to agree on the key operational terms of the Protocol. Leaving such 
determinations to individual states has significantly weakened the content of the Protocol. As 
scholars continue to debate the correct interpretation of key operational terms, while 
compliance gaps continue to widen because states determine for themselves what constitutes 
‘trafficking’.  
 Thus, in reality, consensus decision-making creates nothing more than a deceptive 
atmosphere of basic agreement based on the lowest common denominator of international 
cooperation. When states must consider the exact parameters of international cooperation, they 
weigh these against the sensitive policy issues at the core of trafficking, thereby, continuing to 
weaken the content of the agreement until consensus forms.510 Normative convergence must 
not be mistaken for normative imprecision. The latter is an important tool for states to ‘exercise 
control over the international political and legislative process’.511 As the uncertainty of 
obligations means states cannot be accountable to clear and measurable expectations. The 
Protocol is, therefore, a victim of its own success as the wide participation that was necessary 
to establish a global response ultimately hampered the conclusion of any meaningful consensus 
and precise obligations for states. 
3.2.2. The 1950 Trafficking Convention, the CEDAW, and the Trafficking 
Principles and Guidelines: Undermining the Consent-Based System of 
International Law through Reservations and Soft Law   
   
Under the newly established UN system, trafficking in women for sexual exploitation was first 
a human rights violation. Human rights was spreading globally in the wake of the atrocities of 
the Second World War and sex trafficking was recognised to be ‘incompatible with the dignity 
and worth of the human person’ under the 1950 Trafficking Convention.512 However, the 
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Convention itself contained very few provisions on human rights protection because it 
primarily aimed to criminalise prostitution and end brothel licensing. In fact, it largely ignored 
victim support and the need to address the socio-economic root causes of sexual exploitation 
for effective prevention as one of the primary concerns of contemporary responses.513 
Moreover, it served a questionable utility in the wake of colonisation once the demand for 
prostitution had naturally reduced. The explicit criminalisation of brothel ownership meant that 
states that sought to fight sex trafficking within their commercial sex markets could not become 
parties to the Convention. The Convention also inadvertently hampered detailed coverage of 
sex trafficking in the CEDAW that addresses the trafficking problem as part of the 
discrimination against women.  
The CEDAW was one of the most controversial instruments to be adopted under the 
UN’s human rights system. But it reflected the growing sophistication of the international 
system around the protection and promotion of women’s human rights in comparative terms to 
men’s. The distinction in the traditional literature between public and private spheres of law 
explains that matters, such as sex and the family, traditionally fell outside the regulatory ambit 
of governments.514 This also explicates why the right to equality in marriage and the family, or 
the abolition or modification of customs and laws perpetuating discrimination proved 
especially controversial.515 In particular, as such matters were regarded as more appropriately 
governed by the values and cultures of society.516 Even today, women’s rights link to the 
religious values of states and Islamic states observe a conflict between the notion of sexual 
equality under articles 9, 15, and 16 of the CEDAW and their state laws or constitutions that 
enshrine religious law. For this reason, the CEDAW is among the most heavily reserved against 
human rights treaties. 
On a fundamental level, these reservations attack the universal notions of human rights 
that claim that international human rights are and must be the same everywhere. However, 
cultural relativism argues that notions of universal human rights are largely representative of 
Western values and beliefs, which, therefore, conflict with the values of non-Western states. 
Thus, to the relativist, ‘universality may suggest primarily the arrogance or “cultural 
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imperialism” of the West, given the West’s traditional urge – expressed for example in political 
ideology (liberalism) and in religious faith (Christianity) – to view its own forms and beliefs 
as universal, and to attempt to universalise them’.517 Moreover, universalistic conceptions 
impede on the ability of non-Western states to comply fully with the human rights espoused by 
a single treaty, particularly when the subject of women links fundamentally to the value system 
of the state. For this reason, reservations are arguably an important tool for states to signal 
credible commitment and respect for human rights, as well as, a desire to remain within the 
dialogue of human rights issues, even if they cannot fully commit with human rights norm-
settings.518 As Milanovic and Sicilianos argue, reservations represent a progressive shift ‘from 
a rigid system of law requiring unanimous acceptance of reservations by all treaty parties, to a 
more flexible one that would accommodate differences between states and facilitate as broad a 
membership of multilateral treaties as possible without sacrificing their object and purpose’.519 
However, the issue of reservations is more controversial in relation to the CEDAW 
because of early concerns that some reservations to the CEDAW were not entered to analogous 
provisions in other human rights treaties.520 Currently, 57 state parties having entered also 
general or multiple reservations to one or more provisions and human rights issues in the 
CEDAW.521 Such efforts to keep the CEDAW in a side-lined position through a large number 
of substantive reservations forces the argument that states were fearful of the CEDAW’s 
‘radical potential’.522 In this sense, reservations may allow repressive states to ‘join treaties by 
eviscerating a treaty’s effectiveness and enforceability’.523 There is no criteria for determining 
the incompatibility of a reservation beyond article 28(1) of the CEDAW that permits 
ratification subject to reservations that are not incompatible with the ‘object and purpose’ of 
the CEDAW. In fact, states that submitted statements of objection to the Islamic reservations 
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conceived them to be incompatible with the overall object and purpose of the CEDAW.524 
Unfortunately, the CEDAW Committee that reviews national implementation of the CEDAW, 
and, therewith, the extent of reservations has no competence to reject incompatible 
reservations. Even if it has on many occasions questioned the representatives of state parties 
about their reservations.525 Similarly, state parties have taken no action in the UN biennial 
meetings to obtain an authoritative determination on the compatibility of reservations to the 
CEDAW.526  
No state has entered a reservation to article 6 on sex trafficking, which, therefore, 
underlines the CEDAW’s potential to establish a minimum standard for an anti-discrimination 
approach to sex trafficking. The rationale behind the inclusion of article 6 within the CEDAW 
centres on the wealth and gender disparities caused by globalisation. As a result of gender 
disparities, globalisation is also termed the ‘feminisation of poverty’.527 Gender discrimination 
is a characteristic of sex trafficking and reliable sources indicate that the majority of identified 
trafficking victims are women and girls.528 Moreover, gender discrimination forces women into 
gender-specific exploitative labour, such as forced prostitution and domestic work, and gender-
specific trafficking harms, such as unwanted pregnancy, forced abortion, and sexually 
transmitted diseases. Sex trafficking is, therefore, worthy of criminalisation under the 
CEDAW. As Chuang argues, ‘the [CEDAW’s] identification of trafficking as a problem rooted 
in discrimination is an important paradigm for exploring the root causes of the phenomenon’.529 
However, reservations to trafficking-related issues, such as gendered and stereotypical 
prejudices, customs, and practices under article 5(a) indirectly weaken this paradigm as they 
impact on modifications of the social and cultural patterns that allow the commodification of 
women for sex trafficking. For example, India maintains its reservation to article 5(a) based on 
its policy of non-interference in the personal affairs of any Community without its initiative 
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and consent. However, the majority of trafficking victims in India are from the most 
disadvantaged social strata, namely lowest caste Dalits.530  
Nowhere is the contention of human rights more visible than within the UN’s human 
rights system. On the one hand, states have adopted within its consent-based system the 
CEDAW to address gender discrimination. However, within this system states have come up 
with ways to weaken the effectiveness of the treaty by bombarding it with reservations, some 
perceived to be contrary to the object and purpose of the CEDAW. On the other hand, the UN’s 
human rights system frustrated by states’ disinterest in human rights protection during 
negotiations of the Protocol rushed to elaborate a soft law instrument that aspires to a much 
higher human rights standard than found in the Protocol, namely the Trafficking Principles and 
Guidelines.  
The elaboration of the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines involved only a select 
group of UN officials and expert groups and it was never submitted to states for their 
consideration or approval, even though it is regularly referred to by the Human Rights 
Council.531 More recently, certain principles, such as the non-conditionality of victim 
assistance on their cooperation with authorities and non-prosecution for criminal activities 
committed as part of their trafficking, have found their way into legally binding instruments, 
such as the COE Trafficking Convention and the EU Trafficking Directive. However, the 
Trafficking Principles and Guidelines themselves do not impose legal obligations on states and 
another construal could distort their legal weight. As they are non-binding on states and no 
states were consulted during their drafting, there is a legitimacy concern over the extent to 
which states are accountable to integrate into their national responses the espoused principles. 
Within their limits, then, soft law instruments of this kind can play an important role in helping 
states to identify or confirm legal developments around the trafficking problem. In particular, 
as they seek to clarify the ambiguous obligations of states under the UN Trafficking Protocol 
from a human rights perspective. The Trafficking Principles and Guidelines are, thus, viewed 
as grafting onto the skeleton of the Protocol a body of human rights.532 
Scholars recognise that the focus on consent in international law creates a cumbersome 
status quo bias because states can choose their commitments, thereby, withholding consent to 
any instrument that is not in their interest.533 This has created a consent problem in international 
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law, which due to the limited means to circumvent this problem encourages the use of soft law. 
There is no single definition of soft law but it commonly refers to quasi-legal rules that do not 
bind states, yet are more than ‘mere’ politics.534 Legal positivists dismiss soft law altogether in 
the same vein that they perceive sublegal obligations as neither hard nor soft law because the 
circumvention of formalities makes them insufficiently accountable.535 However, soft law also 
receives recognition from scholars because it offers many of the advantages of legally binding 
commitments without the costs associated with their adoption.536 Most importantly, soft law 
affects the behaviour of states, which, in turn, may be ‘a way station to harder legalization’.537   
However, the absence of formal procedures also makes it more difficult to determine 
its impact on states, particularly whether states actually refer to the Trafficking Principles and 
Guidelines when developing their domestic responses. Dottridge argues this is less likely 
because formal acceptance makes states targets of greater scrutiny by human rights actors.538 
Those who consider the utility of international law based on the legal form of the instrument 
argue that whether an instrument is hard-binding law or soft-nonbinding law may influence 
how states perceive the effectiveness of international law.539 This, in turn, may indicate the 
extent to which they actually implement their obligations. Scholars argue that compliance is 
typically higher with state-consented instruments where states must relinquish some of their 
sovereignty for expected long-term benefits because at all other times they are ‘anxious to 
shake off the restraining influence that international law might have upon their foreign 
policies’.540 Yet, international human rights law serves precisely to limit state sovereignty, 
‘even within the state’s own jurisdiction, for the sake of individuals themselves’.541 Although 
the extent to which the international human rights system actually constrains states is debatable, 
it has significant moral costs. Powerful states may misuse the system to pursue their own 
geopolitical objectives, or the system may offer soft law instruments, such as the Trafficking 
Principles and Guidelines, the global moral lingua franca through which they may become a 
focal point for effective political action. Thus, ‘because of its saliency, its relative 
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determinateness, and the prestige it enjoys, international human rights law serves as a moral 
standard that can be employed for political mobilization to change the behaviour of states’.542 
3.2.3. The US TVPA’s Global Engagement against Trafficking: Responding to 
the UN Trafficking Protocol through Hegemonic Position and 
Unilateralism 
 
It was observed in the previous chapter how the US had placed itself at the forefront of 
international regulation both in financial and legal terms. The US is the largest bilateral donor 
in the field and its unilateral sanctions regime withdraws foreign assistance to any state not 
making adequate progress against trafficking. The regime determines the adequacy of state 
progress using four minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking543 and 12 criteria as 
indicia of serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking.544 However, 
the minimum standards and criteria are unilaterally developed and applied by the US through 
the extraterritorial scope of the TVPA. Thus, the US relies on domestic standards to determine 
the international progress of states, most of which are parties to the UN Trafficking Protocol. 
Despite recent efforts to bring the TVPA’s standards and criteria in accordance with the 
Protocol,545 it remains questionable why the US has chosen domestic standards for monitoring. 
The most logical conclusion given its concomitant goal of global eradication of commercial 
and non-procreative sex is to serve a narrow self-interest. Thus, the US example is instructive 
of a state choosing to go beyond what the international legal framework of sex trafficking 
requires for parallel interpretation, ostensibly with the aim of reinforcing the framework, when 
actually its actions do not advance international standards further.  
US unilateralism, therefore, raises profound problems for the consent-based system of 
international law. Despite the contradictory political reality, the consent system is 
indispensable as a means of cooperation and safeguard from individual states encroaching too 
heavily on the sovereignty of other states. Thus, the US’ hegemonic position underlines the 
inability of international law to constrain hegemonic powers from acting unilaterally at its 
pleasure.546 Scholars often note how the US acts both as a world leader within the international 
order and the world’s chief locus of resistance against the same order on the basis that 
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international law lacks real democratic legitimacy.547 In the past, superpowers, such as the UK, 
have used their hegemonic position to advance international standards and the UK’s 
‘dominance of the seas [that] allowed it to precipitate the end of the slave trade at sea’ is an 
instructive example.548 Nonetheless, the US’ self-proclaimed role as international 
‘watchdog’549 and ‘global sheriff’550 remains controversial because the US seeks to promote 
narrow self-interest rather than international solidarity as a key value of the international 
community.  
The Clinton administration originally opposed the unilateral sanctions regime 
conceived as contrary to the Protocol’s objective of enhancing international cooperation.551 In 
fact, by nature, scholars consider unilateralism to be an unfriendly act that might escalate 
disputes or enable stronger states to bully weaker states.552 Along these lines, the objection to 
unilateralism rests on the choice of unilateral economic sanctions as a matter of foreign policy, 
rather than a contention that resort to unilateralism violates international law principles of non-
intervention and territorial jurisdiction. Economic intervention in the affairs of foreign states is 
a violation of neither customary international law nor the UN Charter.553 Scholars would agree 
that unilateralism is lawful as an enforcement tool, particularly in the absence of an 
international coercive alternative, to make effective again the ineffective law. Even if it 
undercuts state sovereignty or the rule of law generally, unilateralism may be justified if the 
purpose of bringing a noncompliant state into compliance rests on an internationally recognised 
obligation rather than national interest.554 As Hakimi argues, the use of unilateralism in 
international law-making serves to ‘help keep international law relevant by instigating or 
giving effect to collective decisions’.555 In fact, the US justifies unilateralism because of the 
absence of an effective enforcement mechanism to review implementation of the Protocol,556 
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and some would argue that the US has become the de facto treaty-monitoring body of the 
Protocol, which currently lacks an effective review mechanism. 
Unilateral economic sanctions can be effective tools in the hands of the superpower to 
create real normative change in faraway places. As Hacker argues, the TVPA’s minimum 
standards, particularly in relation to victim protection, ‘are general and vague enough to allow 
the nation state wide discretion in designing the exact form of compliance’.557 Thus, weaker 
countries can use the discretion granted by the TVPA to alleviate possible tensions between 
external pressures and their own foreign interests. This is important because a major problem 
in pursuing the objectives of the Protocol is that its key operational terms, whether the 
international definition or the specific implementation measures on protection and prevention, 
are undefined internationally.  
The unilateral sanctions regime has attracted both proponents and opponents to US 
unilateralism in the field. Supporters underline how the ranking system through which the US 
measures foreign progress and ranks states to identify noncompliant states has raised awareness 
of trafficking and encouraged the adoption of appropriate national legal responses in 
accordance with the TVPA’s minimum standards.558 There is even talk about how the system 
encourages more convictions globally,559 further substantiated by empirical studies based on 
official US documents, interviews with US government officials, and trafficking statistics.560 
Although recent empirical research indicates that prosecutions have dropped globally due to 
the negligence of law enforcement. An important indication of its overall positive impact is the 
promotion of low-ranked countries to higher ‘tier’ placements because of the viable threat of 
sanctions.561 However, in reality such claims cannot be validated because of the lack of reliable 
data on the hidden population of trafficking victims. As Gallagher and Chuang observe, in 
reality, ‘the limited research undertaken thus far provides little useful guidance on this point’.562  
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At the same time, the US’ unilateral regime receives immense scrutiny for its politicised 
nature.563 There is no adequate explanation of the methodology employed for ranking564 and 
foreign states with poor human rights records and high trafficking numbers still receive high 
rankings. An important reason for such selectivity is that these states are politically important 
to the US.565 A study on enforcing the TVPA in emerging markets, such as those of India and 
China, illustrates how the US is unwilling to employ sanctions against emerging markets with 
opportunities for exchange of raw materials, regardless of their deplorable human rights records 
and consistently low ranking in respect of trafficking.566 Since 2010, the US subjects itself to 
ranking alongside foreign states. Unsurprisingly, it ranks among the highest that comply with 
the TVPA standards and make significant progress in this regard, despite being an origin, 
transit, and destination country for trafficking. Bernat and Zhilina argue that the US’ 
consistently high ranking is evocative of the fact that even these states are not free of 
trafficking.567 Finally, the threat of unilateral economic sanctions may force countries with 
severe trafficking situations to mask their domestic realities to attract higher rankings and 
continuous US foreign assistance. Manipulations of this sort to the information provided to the 
US for ranking purposes inadvertently removes from the trafficking radar the very victims 
whom the US seeks to protect through global monitoring.568  
Despite its many weaknesses, the US’ unilateral sanctions regime attracts immense 
international attention as a controversial but somewhat successful international enforcement 
mechanism. The international attention is important to induce states to take action against 
trafficking by attacking their international reputations as deviant states. Within the 
institutionalist theory of compliance, reputation acts as ‘the primary anchor of compliance for 
all but those countries for which compliance is costless’.569 In fact, ‘naming and shaming’ 
deviant states is a tested and proven strategy in international human rights law, particularly in 
the contexts of landmine use and trade, recruitment or use of child soldiers, and environmental 
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protection.570 In the context of foreign assistance and investments, scholars argue this strategy 
is particularly effective if it affects the credit or country risk ratings, which help investors 
determine whether their investment will fail, due to the ‘failure of the host country to pay its 
debts, enforce agreements, or maintain adequate control of its territory’.571  
In the absence of more effective enforcement mechanisms, examined in the next 
chapter, scholars consider not only improving the current US regime572 but also extending its 
extraterritorial reach. In relation to global under-prosecution of trafficking, Meron proposes 
extending US domestic laws to prosecute traffickers for trafficking offences committed in 
foreign countries should they fail to take action.573 This proposal examines the TVPA’s 
extraterritorial applicability based on the principle of universal jurisdiction, which finds 
support domestically in the US Foreign Relations Law that authorises universal jurisdiction 
based on the nature of the crime.574 However, the justification for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction under international law is questionable. On the one hand, the crime must be heinous 
to the international community, and no other state willing or able to prosecute the offence. On 
the other hand, either a treaty or custom must establish universal jurisdiction over the crime. 
Although universal jurisdiction may exist through customary international law if trafficking 
qualifies as slavery575 or a crime against humanity,576 neither the UNCTOC nor the UN 
Trafficking Protocol provide clear universal jurisdiction provisions.577 Meron’s proposal only 
heightens concerns about the possible effects of US unilateralism on the international anti-
trafficking discourse. Particularly, as scholars are already theorising how to side-line the 
Protocol and deem irrelevant the consent-based system from which it emanates. 
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3.2.4. Preliminary Conclusions 
The international study draws four preliminary conclusions. First, consensus decision-making 
creates nothing more than a deceptive atmosphere of basic agreement based on the lowest 
common denominator of international cooperation. Second, reservations weaken the 
effectiveness of legal instruments, even if they are necessary for states with conflicting cultural 
norms to remain within the dialogue of human rights issues. Third, soft law instruments that 
are adopted outside the formal processes of international law can, nonetheless, help states to 
identify or confirm their ambiguous obligations, and through increased reference find their way 
into legally binding instruments. Fourth, US unilateralism demonstrates the inability of 
international law to constrain hegemonic powers from acting unilaterally at their pleasure. 
3.3. European Responses 
This section considers in greater detail how the two regional institutions operating within 
different contexts, namely the Council of Europe from a predominantly human rights 
perspective and the European Union from a predominantly crime-fighting perspective, manage 
cooperation in anti-trafficking efforts with a view to avoiding double standards in relation to 
common member states. Section 3.3.1 considers, in particular, the hypocrisy behind the 
‘silencing’ of the Parliamentary Assembly’s voice on raising the human rights standard in the 
COE Trafficking Convention, as well as, the casuistic judging style of the European Court of 
Human Rights in trafficking cases. While section 3.3.2 associates late transposition of the EU 
Trafficking Directive by a number of member states, including the Netherlands, with the 
ambitious nature the EU anti-trafficking framework proposed by the Parliament and the 
Council and enforced by the Commission. The three preliminary conclusions to this core 
section are outlined in section 3.3.3.  
3.3.1. The COE Trafficking Convention and the ECHR System: Legally Binding 
Human Rights Protection and the Under-Developed ECHR Jurisprudence 
on Trafficking in Persons 
 
The negotiations of the COE Trafficking Convention are another instructive example of the 
asymmetric power in international human rights law-making in the European context. These 
have hampered rather than promoted the human rights standard around trafficking. It is a 
systemic limitation of the COE legal system that it cannot constraint the will and want of more 
powerful states, particularly when the latter’s serve an evident attempt to escape the scrutiny 
of the COE and its higher human rights ideals. Two thirds of the amendments proposed by the 
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Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) to the draft Convenion were rejected at the initiative of the 
European Commission. The Commission acting on behalf of its 22 member states at the time 
systematically objected to the inclusion of more effective and sufficient victim protection.578 
Without the incorporation of the PACE’s proposed amendments, therefore, the draft text 
largely echoed rights already granted to victims under the ECHR that was adopted 55 years 
earlier without any explicit mention of trafficking in persons.  
In fact, the PACE observed how the provisions on human rights had weakened over the 
course of the negotiations to reflect the overall desire of member states to protect themselves 
from illegal migration’.579 In the context of the traditional international legal order, Buchanan 
identifies the control of immigration as a key norm of sovereignty that confers ‘dangerous’ 
powers and privileges on states to treat ‘individuals as if they were of consequence only so far 
as the interests affected the interests of states’.580 This norm of sovereignty is so severe that it 
makes the international human rights system morally unjustifiable. It is, in fact, a disturbing 
reality that most individuals are not the subjects of international human rights but the objects 
of human rights discourses. In the context of trafficking, therefore, the human rights approach 
underlines that victims should be visible as subjects ‘whose basic rights have been violated by 
exploiters and whose rights can also be violated in the process of implementing anti-trafficking 
measures’.581 The shift in attention from states’ right to control to victims’ humanity and states’ 
obligation to protect, thus, emphasises ‘victims’ need for and entitlement to respect’.582 A 
similar rationale underpinned the drafting of the Convention and formed the basis for 
subsequent criticism by the PACE that the insufficiency of rights protection in the draft text 
was contrary to the objective pursued.583  
 A further example of power asymmetries and its potential for creating double standards 
in human rights protection between COE/EU member states and other COE member states is 
the ‘disconnection clause’ incorporated into the Convention at the Commission’s behest.584 In 
short, this clause asserts that in the case of overlapping between the Convention and EU anti-
trafficking law the latter takes precedence over the former. The Commission argued that the 
clause was necessary for its accession to international conventions because of the transfer of 
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sovereign powers in certain fields from member states to the European Community.585 The 
Commission also clarified that the clause does not aim to reduce the rights or increase the 
obligations of non-EU states vis-à-vis the Community and its member states, ‘inasmuch as the 
latter are also parties to this Convention’.586 A regional report supported the Commission’s 
claim, arguing that the clause does not affect the scope of the obligations but simply its 
implementation modalities to ensure integration of the Convention within the Union.587  
However, the International Law Commission reached a different conclusion, noting the 
multitude of EU disconnection clauses of varying extents in many international treaties. It 
argued that the effect of disconnection clauses is to replace treaty rules wholly or partially with 
Community rules in relation to its member states. In doing so, it creates uncertainty because 
Community rules are subject to change. Thus, even if it is permissible because they are initially 
agreed by all parties to the Convention, their potential to ‘create double standards, be politically 
incorrect or just confusing’ is real.588 There is heightened concern in relation to Belarus as the 
only party to the Convention that is a member of neither the COE nor the EU, and where non-
EU membership will most certainly lead to double standards in human rights protection. 
 The second instrument of relevance within the COE context is the ECHR that grants to 
citizens of member states within the espace juridique fundamental human rights protection. 
Although not explicitly covered by the ECHR, the ECtHR more recently brought trafficking in 
persons within the scope of article 4. As examined in the previous chapter, the ECtHR has 
developed an interesting jurisprudence on trafficking in persons even though it has not had 
many occasions to do so. This jurisprudence expands the principle of state responsibility to 
prevent human rights violations by non-state actors by placing on states positive, operational, 
and procedural obligations. However, the underdeveloped nature of this due diligence regime 
presents a challenge to its effective enforcement under article 4 of the ECHR.  
 As mentioned already, the ECtHR requires states to adopt an appropriate legislative and 
administrative framework that must afford effective protection to victims through correct 
identification, removal from exploitative situations and risks, and immediate investigation once 
a matter comes to the attention of national authorities. Yet, the ECtHR remains silent on what 
it means with ‘effectiveness’. At the basic level, states can measure effectiveness against the 
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deterring effect of a criminal law provision. They can consider the levels of penalty and 
increase the success rates of prosecutions, without undermining the right to a fair trial. In this 
context, deterrence focuses on the prevention of trafficking despite its link to the threat of 
punishment. However, scholars agree that effectiveness in the human rights context should 
have a more profound goal.589 Unfortunately, it is common practice for the ECtHR to afford a 
margin of appreciation to states to determine the specific wording of effective laws.590 One 
inference from the trafficking case law is that laws are effective if they mirror the UN 
Trafficking Protocol, even partly.591 The absence of further guidance by the ECtHR, however, 
remains problematic. On the one hand, in light of the few trafficking cases before it, the 
ECtHR’s failure to clarify key terms, such as effectiveness, is a missed opportunity. On the 
other hand, it points to the ECtHR’s ‘casuistic judging style’ as it prefers to maintain flexibility 
in national implementation of ECHR rights.592  
Some scholars argue that the ECtHR, in fact, has no power ‘to prescribe to states 
precisely what needs to be done in order to correct a violation’.593 This means that the ECHR 
is ‘best understood as constitution-enhancing in respect of the specific political and judicial 
system of each member state’.594 Certainly, some flexibility is necessary because the ECHR 
applies to a Eurasian context. Within such context, scholars note ‘the ECtHR’s stridency and 
willingness to exceed the status quo in relation to certain institutional arrangements … as it 
moves further East’.595 This willingness most likely recognises criticism by cultural relativists 
of the universalistic character of international human rights and the shameless expansion of 
Western ideals.596  
Nonetheless, clearer guidance on the ECtHR’s due diligence regime in respect of 
trafficking, as Eriksson argues, would lead to greater victim protection across state parties.597 
One particular benefit of uniform application is that it mitigates the potential consequences of 
Russia’s non-ratification of the COE Trafficking Convention in terms of victim protection. 
Ratification of the ECHR is a prerequisite for COE accession. This means that Russia as the 
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only member state not to have signed the COE Trafficking Convention still has positive, 
operational, and procedural obligations to prevent and suppress trafficking under the ECHR. 
In fact, Russia was party to the very case in which the ECtHR held that trafficking in persons 
falls within the scope of article 4 of the ECHR.598 There are, however, limitations to a reliance 
on the ECtHR to hold Russia, or for this matter any state party, accountable.  
ECHR ratification does not guarantee proper application of ECHR rights at the national 
level, although national authorities are primarily responsible for ensuring respect for ECHR 
rights in the first place. Moreover, as a court of last resort and in the absence of regular 
monitoring of state performance, potential implementation challenges become visible only 
after the ECtHR considers an application alleging an article 4 violation. Even so, these 
applications represent only the tip of the iceberg, as many cases may never reach the ECtHR 
and some containing potential implementation challenges may be inadmissible because of a 
failure to exhaust domestic remedies.599 In the present context, 10 of the 18 trafficking 
applications were inadmissible or struck out.600 Furthermore and relating to the trafficking case 
against Russia, whether or not a judgment is properly implemented domestically depends upon 
the willingness and capacity of national institutions, as well as, negotiation with the Committee 
of Ministers that supervises the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments.601 A final point in this 
regard is that the ECtHR regularly comes under attack because it is ‘less democratically 
legitimate than domestic legislative and judicial mechanisms’ that promote human rights. 
States question its accountability because the transfer of powers from the state to the ECtHR 
lacks democratic authorisation in the first place.602 As compliance often links to a perception 
of legitimacy, such criticism may affect the proper national implementation of ECHR rulings. 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on trafficking draws an important link between the criminal 
law and human rights approaches. By establishing positive, operational, and procedural 
obligations, the ECtHR has dared to pierce the veil of national sovereignty and draw national 
criminal law into its ambit. However, the exact impact of its jurisprudence remains uncertain. 
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3.3.2. The EU Trafficking Directive: Late Transposition and the Failure to Notify 
the European Commission of National Transposition Measures 
The most significant challenge to enforcement of the EU Trafficking Directive is its ambitious 
framework that comprises policies on gender-based violence, victim protection and assistance 
in legal redress, immigration, and organised crime. These policies are interwoven into the 
preamble of the Directive with reference to eight additional EU legislative measures, which 
combined embody the integrated, holistic, and human rights approach to trafficking envisaged 
by the Directive. Thus, the Directive embodies in one document the breadth of EU measures 
of direct or indirect relevance to the EU trafficking problem. This is important because it 
significantly adds to the substantive value and quality of existing provisions in the EU 
Trafficking Framework Decision, which it replaces. 
In December 2016, the European Commission released the first assessment report on 
national transposition measures of the Directive, in accordance with its responsibilities under 
article 23(1) of the Directive.603 Although the deadline for transposition passed in April 2013, 
almost half of the member states failed to notify the Commission of full transposition within 
the prescribed period, which, in turn, delayed the preparation of the Commission’s report. For 
this reason, the Commission has not considered Germany’s national transposition measures in 
its report. Some of the measures of member states notified to the Commission date 2016. For 
example, Belgium’s most recent measure dates 31 May 2016.604 Timely transposition is 
important for the effectiveness of EU law, even if it does not equate with successful 
implementation, and even less with real policy and societal change. As Toshkov argues, 
‘[t]ransposition is a necessity but not a sufficient condition for compliance. At the same time, 
transposition is a necessary condition for compliance’.605 
A further potential challenge in this regard is the number of national transposition 
measures notified by individual states. In the context of the case studies, Belgium notified six 
measures; the Czech Republic, 67; Finland, 26; the Netherlands, 2; Romania, 43; and Sweden, 
34. However, to what extent does a high number of national transposition measures, such as 
67 in the case of the Czech Republic, provide any meaningful insight into the genuine efforts 
of the state to transpose the Trafficking Directive? Transposition numbers are no indication of 
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whether the relevant state has effectively catered for the results to be achieved vis-à-vis the 
Directive.  
The transposition of any instrument, even if it aims only to strengthen existing standards 
and entails a purely technical, bureaucratic exercise of translating and drafting national 
transposition measures, requires significant legislative action by states.606 In the present case, 
the Directive substantively improves the rights protection, or lack thereof, in the EU 
Trafficking Framework Decision, thus, significant transposition action was expected. The 
Netherlands was one of fewer states to incorporate the Directive’s provisions in just two 
documents, one being the Dutch Criminal Code that naturally contains extensive criminal 
provisions. Thus, the choice of legal form is an important consideration for states. This choice 
depends upon inter alia the comprehensiveness of existing national provisions and how recently 
the relevant state ratified its other international and regional commitments against 
trafficking.607 International ratification that is more recent will most likely speed up the 
transposition process of the Directive because there will be fewer legal gaps to fill. In relation 
to the complexity of transposition, scholars also recognise that more recitals in the preamble 
will attract greater transposition efforts, which, in turn, may lead to longer transposition 
delays.608  
The Trafficking Directive has 36 recitals in its preamble that explain its key operational 
terms and reflect the extensive scope of related but critical policy issues. Typically, EU 
directives contain between 1 and 50 recitals, which, on the one hand, may entail issues that due 
to their sensitivity or complexity could not be incorporated into the main text of the document 
or, on other hand, may be so specific that they reflect a ‘third kind of law-making’.609 This 
level of issue linkage is also an indication of possible transposition delays as directives bind 
member states as to ‘the results to be achieved’, without laying down the means by which those 
results are to be achieved.610 Moreover, greater integration of related policy areas requires 
greater involvement of political and legislative actors at the domestic level, which, in turn, 
results in a slower transposition process because of the higher likelihood of domestic resistance 
to any of the issues recited.611  
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The ‘goodness of fit’ theory mentioned in the previous chapter proposes that the 
transposition process of an EU directive will flow more smoothly where only minor 
amendments to existing national laws are stipulated.612 However, as mentioned, this is not the 
case in relation to the EU Trafficking Directive vis-à-vis the EU Trafficking Framework 
Decision. To this end, it is important to understand why framework decisions were inadequate 
for approximating national anti-trafficking law. The focus here is on the choice of legal form 
rather than its coverage as examined in the previous chapter. Framework decisions became 
obsolete with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon613 but they were an important legislative 
tool. Although by contrast, in their adoption the Council had no obligation to amend the 
proposed legislative measure in accordance with the European Parliament’s opinion. However, 
the Parliament’s involvement in the Community decision-making process provides more 
openness and visibility and, thus, some degree of accountability, which is necessary as the 
Council’s competence grows with the EU’s expanding law and policy environment. In 
particular, in the sense that the EU is a collection of rules and regulations resting on a 
community of states, scholars argue that it lacks genuine democratic political legitimacy.614 If 
the EU’s existence depends upon the implementation of its rules and regulations, the moment 
such activity ceases so does the EU. For this reason, compliance issues with EU law attract 
considerable scholarly attention.  
A further weakness of framework decisions is that once adopted the European 
Commission and the CJEU did not control framework decisions in the same manner as 
directives that are an enforcement-priority for the Commission. Thus, framework decisions 
were an ineffective legislative means of ensuring harmonisation, or approximation in the EU 
context, of criminal law measures, which, in turn, could not ensure a minimum level of 
protection through EU criminal law. As argued already, a minimum standard is critical to 
ensure that member states deal with trafficking crimes in a similar fashion and use the same 
language of cooperation when dealing with its transnational dimension, as well as, to prevent 
perpetrators from taking advantage of existing gaps between national anti-trafficking laws. 
However, as evidenced by the replacement of the EU Trafficking Framework Decision, the 
approximation principle is difficult to implement in practice.615 On the one hand, growing EU 
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membership requires a wider margin of discretion to reflect growing differences between 
national legal systems and the manner in which they implement their EU obligations. On the 
other hand, there remains the need to respect national sovereignty and protect states’ security 
from illegal migration, facilitated partly by the creation of an area of freedom, security, and 
justice without internal borders.616 
 Genuine compliance is hard to establish and even more complicated to monitor through 
member states’ communications of national transposition measures, particularly when this 
involves a total of 709 instruments in relation to the EU Trafficking Directive. More 
importantly, what constitutes correct interpretation and application of EU law is contestable, 
and the EU legislators have not provided the Commission with any objectives or methodology. 
The Commission exercises its enforcement powers granted by article 17 of the TEU in the 
general EU interest.617 However, as Andersen observes, interpreting the general EU interest is 
inherently political.618 Thus, despite the advantages of directives in terms of flexibility, the use 
of directives also creates potential legal uncertainty for member states in the transposition 
phase.619 Absolute rule specificity is rare and unlikely due to the need for flexibility to 
accommodate ‘the different quality and quantity of administrative and financial resources’ 
available to each state to transpose a specific directive.620 Even directives as the most common 
EU legislative form, with more or less narrowly defined objectives, leave it to individual states 
to transpose directives into their national legal systems and, thus, to ‘give effect’ to them.621 
This may lead to incorrect transposition. While a greater degree of regulatory detail is evocative 
of a longer transposition phase. Thus, late transposition as in the case of the EU Trafficking 
Directive is a key trait of EU law enforcement. 
3.3.3. Preliminary Conclusions 
The European examination draws three preliminary conclusions. First, the EU group’s 
domination in the COE law-making process around the Trafficking Convention presents 
serious power asymmetries to the detriment of non-common COE/EU member states. In this 
connection, non-ratification by Russia as a COE member state and ratification by Belarus as a 
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non-COE/EU member state suggest further challenges in harmonising national anti-trafficking 
laws. Second, ECHR jurisprudence on trafficking in persons is underdeveloped and the due 
diligence regime outlining positive, operational, and procedural obligations is imprecise 
because key operational terms, such as effectiveness, remain undefined. Third, issue linkage 
complicates transposition and leads to delays in timely transposition. At the same time, 
directives as the most common legislative form leave too much discretion to member states in 
the transposition process that may undermine the objective of approximation, even if discretion 
is necessary given the growing differences among the legal systems of member states.  
3.4. National Responses 
By way of example of the different prostitution regimes in the case studies, this section 
illustrates how different approaches to consensual prostitution can influence the general 
direction of national responses to sex trafficking, particularly in states that draw an intrinsic 
link between forced and consensual prostitution, such as Sweden. The examination provides 
further insights into current debates at the EU level about reducing the demand for trafficking 
by criminalising the use of services provided by trafficking victims.622 The debate is necessarily 
influenced by early criminalisation of sex-buying in Sweden, where consensual prostitution 
like forced prostitution constitute violence against women, which cannot be tolerated in a 
society that is generally accepted to hold women’s human rights in high regard. While the EU 
debate extends to all exploitable services around trafficking, this section focuses on sexual 
services performed by trafficking victims, taking into account the scope of research.  
Moreover, this section aims to tease out some of the more pertinent issues around 
prostitution that will influence compliance with anti-trafficking norms and standards based on 
the national observations in the previous chapter. Thus, it follows, in sections 3.4.2 to 3.4.4 
respectively, with a categorisation of the case studies into three ‘worlds of compliance’ as 
proposed by Falkner and Treib in their analysis of the different compliance behaviours of EU 
member states with preselected EU directives.623 Accordingly, Sweden and Finland belong to 
the group of states for whom respect for the rule of law is part of their ingrained compliance 
culture. It is acknowledged that transnational crimes, such as trafficking, create growing 
challenges for national authorities at all levels ‘from foreign policy and security establishments, 
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to law enforcement authorities, to border control officials, to local courts’.624 Thus, trafficking 
threatens the rule of law and state sovereignty globally. The Netherlands and Belgium also 
have a strong compliance culture, however, it is distinguishable from the first group based on 
their analysis of the costs and benefits of complying with certain norms and standards. For 
example, it is debated that exploitation increases in the legalised sex market because of the 
increased demand for cheap sexual services.625 Even though evidence tends to point to an 
inadequate comparison of the pre and post-criminalisation periods of sex-buying in Sweden.626 
However, on this basis it can be argued that compliance with European anti-trafficking norms, 
such as the requirement to consider criminalising the use of sexual services performed by 
trafficking victims, would suggest that the Netherlands is unable to control and prevent 
trafficking through the regulation of the legalised sex market, which, moreover, remains a 
highly profitable market generating high tax revenues. Finally, the Czech Republic and 
Romania belong to the group of newer entrants to the European Union whose law on the books 
depicts overall compliance as a prerequisite for EU accession based on the acquis 
incorporation. But whose law in action demonstrates fundamental compliance gaps, 
particularly in relation to the protection of trafficking victims as national anti-trafficking 
policies do not appear to tackle the root causes of victims’ vulnerabilities, such as ethnic 
discrimination of Roma women in the Czech Republic, and the penalisation of prostitutes in 
Romania. The three preliminary conclusions to this core section are outlined in section 3.4.5. 
3.4.1. Six Approaches to Discourage Demand 
According to the UN Trafficking Protocol, there is a demand ‘that fosters all forms of 
exploitation of persons, especially women and children, that leads to trafficking’.627 Thus, 
states are required to adopt or strengthen anti-trafficking measures to discourage demand. 
However, the Protocol does not mention what constitutes demand in relation to trafficking or 
the most appropriate measures to discourage demand. More recently, the UNGA refers to anti-
trafficking policies addressing demand or the demand-side of trafficking chains in economic 
terms. Thus, recognising that ‘trafficking in supply chains … needs to be addressed in various 
economic sectors, including those integrated into global markets … [as] some of the demand 
fostering sexual exploitation, exploitative labour and illegal removal of organs is met by 
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trafficking in persons’.628 In this sense, victims are reduced to mere commodities that are 
bought, sold, transported, and resold according to market forces of supply and demand. 
Measures and policies around trafficking that aim at reducing the vulnerability of workers by 
increasing compliance with labour rights are viewed as alternatives to demand-side measures 
and policies. The requirement under the EU Trafficking Directive that member states consider 
measures to criminalise the use of services, which are the objects of trafficking-related 
exploitation, with the knowledge that the person is a trafficking victim is the most recent 
position on demand-side measures in economic terms.629 The clearest reference in this context 
is demand for sexual services or the demand for prostitution in states where prostitution is 
conflated with sex trafficking.  
 Specific policies aimed at addressing demand have been triggered most importantly by 
a specific event in a national context or through policy learning or transfer of policy and policy-
copying.630 Thus, current prostitution policies reflect the most appropriate response to the 
political, cultural, and religious values of the present society, rather than the most appropriate 
response to the demand for trafficking-related exploitation. In particular, as the vast majority 
of states had at one point in time legalised prostitution.  
Six main approaches can be distinguished. First, the moral approach that criminalises 
all forms of prostitution as sex trafficking because the treatment is harmful. Here prostitution 
is viewed as the oldest oppression and ‘a product of lack of choice, the resort of those with the 
fewest choices, or none at all when all else fails’.631 While abolition of prostitution appears to 
be the only way to end sexual exploitation, the most appropriate way to achieve this aim is 
debated. According to the Swedish model based on a neo-abolitionist approach, the demand 
for prostitution is most appropriately addressed by criminalising the buyers as the source of 
demand, as well as, the pimps and traffickers as suppliers, while eliminating any criminal status 
for prostitutes, and allowing them to choose the services and job training that they want. Even 
though it is observed that legal sanctions on sex buyers inadvertently cause further harm to 
prostitutes who are forced into ‘worse working conditions, lower pay, greater dependence on 
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pimps, and higher health risks’.632 However, a growing number of states follow the neo-
abolitionist model pioneered by Sweden, including Finland.  
Finland’s approach is connected to the moral approach but it primarily views 
prostitution as a threat to public health and order. Thus, the second approach of public health 
and order aims to control prostitution through strict regulation using different forms of state 
control, such as mandatory health checks for prostitutes. Even if the law criminalises both the 
buying and selling of sex, punishment is typically directed at prostitutes who are morally 
condoned for spreading sexually transmitted diseases. Thus, clients often escape prosecution 
by cooperating with local police and giving up the details of prostitutes whose services they 
have used.633 Prostitution is tolerated because of the ‘inevitable’ demand of male clients and 
justified on grounds of the right to sexual self-determination or autonomy of prostitutes.634 
Even though, its practice is restricted to certain geographical locations within the control of 
authorities to reduce the nuisance to public order in ‘decent’ spaces and the perceived threat to 
women’s free movement as a result of street prostitution.635 Finland, therefore, criminalises 
only sex-buying from procured prostitutes and trafficking victims to reduce the demand for 
sexual exploitation.   
The third and fourth approaches based on illegal migration and organised crime in 
connection with trafficking are most commonly followed by states, including Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, and Romania. Here prostitution is an issue of illegal or ‘unorderly’ migration 
that demands more restrictive immigration policies to address the rapid rise in illegal migrants, 
both sex workers and migrants forced into prostitution, who seek employment abroad. This 
approach links to the framing of prostitution-related trafficking also as a problem of crime to 
be solved with heavier punishments, better international cooperation, and effective prosecution 
as a means of deterrence and accountability for criminals. These two approaches are heavily 
criticised by human rights scholars, such as Chacon, who argue that anti-trafficking efforts are 
constrained by the politics and policies of rigid immigration enforcement that ‘have the perhaps 
unintended effect of reinforcing migrants’ vulnerability to exploitation’.636 It follows that the 
anti-trafficking discourse based on these two approaches rests on ‘the myth of migrant 
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criminality’ that scrutinises migrant sex workers rather than sex clients who create demand as 
‘bad actors’.637 Moreover, for these frames to work the trafficking victim is depicted as ‘a 
woman or (girl) child, needing protection from a barbaric foreign national who has associations 
with organised crime’.638 This depiction, according to Anderson, fuels a language of ‘harm’ in 
immigration policy that recasts ‘enforcement as protective of rights, and in particular protective 
of the human rights of migrants’.639 However, the harm principle proposed by Mill restricts the 
rightful exercise of power ‘over any member of a civilised community, against his will … to 
prevent harm to others’.640 Mill, therefore, distinguishes between compulsion to prevent harm 
to others and to the individuals themselves. This means that enforcement is necessary for the 
good of the community but less so for the good of migrants themselves. Yet, governments use 
the language of harm to conflate compulsion for the good of others, namely migrants, and 
compulsion for their own good, namely citizens. Thereby, hiding the role of the state and its 
restrictive immigration policies in reinforcing dependencies and vulnerabilities that expose 
migrants to greater bodily and mental harms.641 
The fifth and sixth approaches are cast within more recent human rights debates around 
state accountability. Linked to the moral approach, prostitution is recognised as a violation of 
women’s human rights, in particular, as a form of violence against women. These two 
approaches combined most appropriately capture the Swedish prostitution policy and the 
intrinsic link that it establishes between forced and consensual prostitution. However, it is 
possible to approach prostitution from a human rights perspective without linking both forms 
of prostitution by focusing on the conditions of coercion, abuse, and deceit, rather than 
prostitution itself. Here the protection of prostitutes is ensured by decriminalising sex work and 
the sex industry. Thus, within the labour approach, employed by the Netherlands, sexual 
exploitation is reduced by affording sex workers the rights and guarantees of labour contracts 
because sex work is legitimate work. By empowering sex workers the stigma and 
discrimination attached to prostitution can be reduced, which directly and indirectly negatively 
impact on the physical, sexual, and psychological health of sex workers. This is particularly 
the case for trafficking victims, according to Zimmerman, Hossain, and Watts, whose health is 
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a neglected policy concern in the public health sector.642 A legalised sex industry, then, can 
perhaps help to address physical, sexual and psychological harm, occupational hazards, legal 
restrictions, and difficulties associated with being marginalised or stigmatised.643 
It is impossible to tell which of the two models based on human rights as promulgated 
by Sweden and the Netherlands most appropriately addresses the needs of prostitutes/sex 
workers, and by extension most appropriately discourages the demand for sexual services 
performed by trafficking victims. If prostitution-related trafficking is an economic activity 
driven by profit motives, then it is arguably most prevalent in countries where prostitution is 
legalised.644 Like Jakobsson and Kotsadam, Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer also appear to argue 
that legalising prostitution leads to an expansion of the prostitution market and, thus, an 
increase in trafficking.645 At the same time, in order to discourage the demand for exploitable 
sexual services in the legalised sex markets, Verhoeven, for example, demonstrates the 
unintended effects that expanding state control to prevent prostitution-related trafficking can 
have on sex workers, namely control, discrimination, and work restrictions.646 There appears 
to be a conflict of interests between the government seeking to preclude the possibility of 
trafficking victims working in the sex industry and sex workers viewing their situations as a 
possibility to improve living-conditions. Thus, forcing them to withhold information about 
pimps and partners from authorities when registering as sex workers and meeting with 
authorities searching for any signs of trafficking, which can lead to work restrictions. 
Consequently, sex workers are found to ‘move to work in other cities, and sparingly use the 
assistance offered by the authorities’.647 
At the same time, any claim that purports to show that all sex work is inherently 
oppressive and exploitative is thrashed by Weitzer as the ‘sweeping generalisations’ of 
nonpeer-reviewed reports with biased data collection procedures yielding warped 
conclusions.648 As they ‘tend to select or accent the most disturbing instances of abuse and 
present them as representative and indicative of intrinsic problems’.649 It follows that the 
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pragmatism on which anti-prostitution policies, such as the Swedish model, are additionally 
based suffers greatly from a lack of reliable indicators.650 Even Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer 
admit that there is no ‘smoking gun’ to prove that legalised prostitution definitely increases 
inward trafficking flows.651 The scholars acknowledge that the use of UNODC data as the most 
reliable existing data ‘do not capture the number of human trafficking victims because the data 
are not weighted by the (reported) number of victims’.652 Similarly, the governmental 
evaluation report on the banning of sex-buying in Sweden that is often cited as a reliable source 
that criminalisation reduces sexual exploitation fails to provide sufficient detail about the 
sampling methods.653 Weitzer underlines that this is a general problem with data collection 
procedures in studies based on the oppression paradigm.654 Thus, the only credible finding in 
the field is that the clandestine nature of both prostitution and trafficking markets makes it 
almost impossible to produce evidence-based research. Yet, the Swedish model finds favour 
among the Nordic countries655 and the Dutch model among states, such as Germany.656 
3.4.2. Sweden and Finland: An Ingrained Compliance Culture around Women’s 
Human Rights 
The Swedish and Finnish examples illustrate how two states sharing a political unity of 600 
years and shared values on prostitution have come to address prostitution differently. Both 
approaches emerge from a moral condemnation of prostitution. But while Swedish prostitution 
policies aim to remove prostituted women from oppressive forms of employment by valuing 
respect for gender equality, Finnish prostitution policies make no mention of the rights of 
prostitutes but of women’s human rights in a larger societal context. In both cases, this has 
been achieved through the socialisation and persuasion of norms and identity. Beliefs about 
right and wrong become norms, which, in turn, reshape state identities, interests, and behaviour. 
Thus, through persuasion pro-compliance groups generate appeal ‘by framing issues so that 
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they resonate with accepted norms and/or evoke strong feelings’.657 This, in turn, creates an 
ingrained compliance culture. 
In the 1980s, legal feminists and women’s movements reframed prostitution as an issue 
of gender equality that was part of a larger problem of the cultural status of women in society. 
In particular, as early vagrancy laws depicted prostitutes as ‘socially deviant’ or ‘the fallen’ 
and from whom society needed to be protected by imposing restrictive penalties on prostitutes. 
Sweden had already reformed its prostitution laws in 1964 and Finland followed suit in 1986. 
The gap of 22 years of issue framing is considered an important reason why Finnish prostitution 
laws find it easier to label prostitutes as ‘criminals’ and, in turn, why their rights are not readily 
considered as part of prostitution policies.658  
One of the advantages of the gender equality frame is that it shifts attention from 
prostitutes and the supply side of prostitution to sex clients and the demand side of prostitution. 
This means that prostitution is ‘the product of market forces’ and the only way to end gender 
inequality, as prostitutes are primarily women and sex clients primarily men, is to discourage 
the demand for prostitution and place the onus directly on clients to abstain from contributing 
to women’s sexual exploitation in any form.659 Under the gender equality frame, the current 
Swedish prostitution law criminalises only sex-buying, not sex-selling as prostitutes need 
protection and their penalisation would only increase their vulnerabilities. Yet, it is increasingly 
argued that the criminalisation of sex-buying has, in fact, increased the risk of violence against 
prostitutes.660 It follows that the framing of prostitution as gender-based violence by female 
parliamentarians and women’s movements has been detrimental to any consideration of 
prostitutes’ rights as sex workers as they are now forced to provide sexual services further 
underground where the risks of sexual exploitation are, in fact, higher based on the demand of 
sex clients to escape prosecution.  
Swedish right-wing parties had unsuccessfully proposed the criminalisation of sex-
buying and sex-selling based on the principles of the judicial system, liberalism, individualism, 
and personal autonomy to make free choices and bear responsibility for them.661 Right-wing 
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parties believed prostitutes could be adequately protected and provided with necessary health 
and social protections only by criminalising prostitution. However, the gender equality frame 
was ultimately more frequent and influential as it sought to demonstrate to the international 
world that Swedish national identity was ‘most gender equal’ and criminalising sex-buying 
was ‘a first and necessary step towards creating a fundamentally gender equal society’, or ‘a 
silent revolution for gender equality and against violence’.662 
It is also important to note the absence of pro-sex worker movements to represent the 
interests of Swedish prostitutes.663 This can perhaps also explain why the Finnish prostitution 
law criminalises only sex-buying from procured prostitutes and trafficking victims as the first 
union of sex workers was established in the years leading up to the Finnish sex-buying ban.664 
Yet, there was no framing of prostitution around the disadvantaged positions of prostitutes akin 
to the gender-based frame in Sweden. Instead, prostitution was addressed as a public nuisance, 
in particular, as the increase in street prostitution in certain cities, such as Helsinki, had 
threatened the free movement of women in public places.665 As the parliamentary debates 
hardly mentioned prostitutes, the focus was on the problems prostitution brought upon 
‘women’ within the larger societal context.666 Despite the presence of a sex workers’ union and 
efforts of individual autonomous women’s wings to make the voices of prostitutes heard, they 
had to deal with women’s human rights externally and, therefore, could not form party support. 
This also marked a continuous need for renegotiations of interests and priorities.  
While there was a positive responsiveness to the Swedish model as part of the Finnish 
identity around Nordic views,667 the criminalisation of sex-buying from procured prostitutes 
and trafficking victims is ultimately rooted in compliance with international anti-trafficking 
norms. As Jyrkinen observes, international anti-trafficking instruments ‘functioned as a push 
factor for improvements in position of women – otherwise the changes would have taken much 
longer time’.668 This can relate back to the 22-year gap in prostitution reforms between Sweden 
and Finland. However, it also relates in an important way to the fact that in Finland trafficking 
in persons was criminalised before the banning of sex-buying, while in Sweden the ban 
precedes criminalisation of trafficking in persons. Thus, Finnish prostitution policies were 
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necessarily influenced by international developments and the ban was intentionally introduced 
only after the negotiations of the COE Trafficking Convention were completed.669 
Thus, the Finnish prostitution policy based on moral and public order concerns and the 
Swedish prostitution policy based on moral and gender-based violence concerns are embedded 
into the national identities of these states as part of the Nordic view of prostitution. Moreover, 
that these values echo international prohibitions on, for example, gender discrimination under 
the CEDAW and the COE Trafficking Convention, makes it easier for them to comply overall 
with international anti-trafficking norms and standards. 
3.4.3. The Netherlands and Belgium: Assessing the Costs and Benefits of 
Compliance with Measures to Discourage Demand 
The Netherlands and Belgium also have a strong compliance culture like Sweden and Finland. 
Both states were actively involved in the elaboration of early anti-sex trafficking instruments 
at the international level and the resonance of European ideologies around the cross-border 
movement of women for prostitution have arguably made compliance with contemporary anti-
trafficking instruments sharing similar sentiments around restricting migration easier. This is 
particularly the case with Belgian anti-trafficking responses that echo the crime-fighting frame 
around contemporary responses rooted in the UN Trafficking Protocol as the Belgian fight 
against trafficking is part of the National Security Plan.670 It is argued that states whose 
practices are already in conformity with treaty expectations are more likely to comply because 
the eventual ‘costs’ of compliance are less.671 For these former imperialists, sex trafficking was 
of particular interest in affirming their territorial boundaries as its regulation was an important 
tool for controlling migration, population, and sexual relations.672 Even though regulation lost 
its appeal once prostitution was nationalised around the world following the Second World 
War. Moreover, the spread of human rights had shifted attention to domestic prostitution in 
women and the ostensible desire to protect prostitutes from sexual exploitation through 
regulatory regimes.673 
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 The decriminalisation of pimping and brothel keeping in the Netherlands were 
discussed at length over three parliamentary debates.674 On the one hand, prostitution served 
as a legal channel of gratification of male lust. On the other hand, violence against prostituted 
women demanded safeguards in the form of labour rights and guarantees. There was an influx 
of migrant sex workers in the 1980s with reports alleging signs of sexual exploitation in the 
legalised sex market.675 However, such concerns were silenced by diverting public debate and 
media attention away from the possible decriminalisation of pimping and brothel keeping. This 
has been identified as one of two ways in which the Dutch government orchestrated ‘state 
feminism’ in favour of decriminalisation. Additionally, the government maintained control 
over women’s movements and ensured their cooperation during parliamentary debates through 
state-funding of women’s NGOs.676 In a similar way that the voices of pro-sex work 
movements were silenced in the Swedish and Finnish debates around the banning of sex-
buying, Raymond argues that governmental control over women’s NGOs during debates had 
made it impossible for international feminist abolitionist organisations to establish a strong 
foothold in the Netherlands and in partnership with local NGOs to challenge 
decriminalisation.677 It follows that the financial benefits of decriminalisation, in particular, 
‘the potential windfall of a 19 percent value-added tax’ as argued by Raymond had quickly 
silenced any opposition based on violence against women campaigns.678 Even though tax 
revenues were never formally recorded during the parliamentary debates. While it may be 
argued that Raymond’s opposition to decriminalisation is rooted in her abolitionist views on 
prostitution,679 more recently the Czech government considered a proposal based on the Dutch 
prostitution model precisely to accumulate taxes of which the state was ‘deprived’.680 Thus, 
Raymond’s argument perhaps holds some truth. In fact, in the initial years following 
decriminalisation there was a violation by 43 of the 348 municipalities to grant ‘the basic 
federal right to work’ in brothels, which marked a mixed toleration for re-establishing brothels 
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at the administrative level.681 Even though there appeared to be immense public support for 
prostitution as legitmate work.682 
 Since 2000, prostitution is subject to a licensing system that is administered by the 
municipal and is believed to lead to better control and regulation through regular inspections 
by the labour inspectorate and local health authorities.683 However, evaluations of the effects 
of decriminalisation reveal that the sex sector is increasingly susceptible to sexual exploitation 
by organised criminals as a result of municipal and regional differences in licensing and a lack 
of visibility in the sex industry.684 The subsequent withdrawal of brothel licenses have led to 
the closing down of whole sex work areas.685 Some policymakers even question whether the 
Netherlands is on the ‘right track’ with the regulation of prostitution.686 This has spurred a bill 
to regulate prostitution and combat abuses in the sex industry that aims to tackle sexual 
exploitation through mandatory and uniform licensing for prostitution, a registration 
requirement for all sex workers, better tools for monitoring and enforcement, and 
criminalisation of the use of illegal sexual services.687 Under the new regime, the operation of 
‘sex companies’, whether brothels, escort agencies, or adult movie theatres, without a license 
and exploitation of prostitution will become illegal. The mandatory registration of all sex 
workers will require them to come into contact, at least once, with national authorities so that 
these have an opportunity to identify and remove detected trafficking victims. However, it 
assumes that victims will always show signs of trafficking or that authorities will be able to 
easily deduce such signs. In particular, as victims under coercion are less likely to respond 
truthfully.688 Moreover, only persons above 21 years of age who are registered in the national 
register of prostitutes may work in the sex industry. The high age restriction will certainly push 
younger, more vulnerable victims further underground where they have no labour and health 
rights. Moreover, the criminalisation of the use of illegal sexual services places an onus on sex 
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clients to enquire whether the sex worker is registered but the sex worker could simply lie.689 
Thus, supervision and enforcement will be extremely important to reduce risks of sexual 
exploitation. 
In Belgium, over the past decade, several legislative bills closely modelled after the 
Dutch and German prostitution laws, as well as, the Swedish prostitution law were submitted 
to Parliament, however, none passed.690 Even though public debate on measures to discourage 
demand for sexual exploitation reveals a Belgian tendency of policy learning and policy-
copying based on foreign models. The lack of public support for the legalisation of prostitution 
partly explains why prostitution is de facto legal in a few Belgian cities, including Antwerp, 
but not de jure legal at the national level.691 In fact, Belgian federal law prohibits brothels and 
pimping, although in some cities it is tolerated and regulated. Like the de facto legalisation, 
regulation is permitted on pragmatic grounds, although technically such regulation itself 
violates federal law. Inadequate protection of domestic prostitutes has had a spill-over effect 
on the protection of sex trafficking victims under a legal framework that describes trafficking 
as a security concern most appropriately dealt with as an immigration and to a lesser extent 
labour issue.692 According to Dormaels, Moens and Praet, it is this security dimension to the 
trafficking problem that afforded a certain urgency to the anti-trafficking response and led to 
the immediate implementation of anti-trafficking policies.693 This was notable because quick 
implementations were contrary to Belgian legislative tradition. 
The Dutch and Belgian examples demonstrate how assessments of the costs and 
benefits of compliance can lead to different approaches to sexual exploitation, which need not 
draw an intrinsic link between forced and consensual prostitution. Thus, the Netherlands 
distinguishes clearly between sex trafficking and prostitution and seeks to protect sex workers 
from exploitative situations through increased regulation of the legalised sex industry. While 
Belgium criminalises prostitution at the national level yet tolerates the same at the sub-national 
level so that victims remain without adequate protection in between the de facto and de jure of 
a prostitution law. Yet, it continues to delink forced and consensual prostitution. 
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3.4.4. The Czech Republic and Romania: When Law on the Books Does Not 
Translate into Law in Action Due to Stigma, Discrimination, and Technical 
Incapacity 
The Czech Republic and Romania are major origin countries for sex trafficking into Western 
Europe. In particular, the geographical location of the Czech Republic facilitates trafficking at 
its border shared with Germany.694 Similarly, there is an influx of Romanian victims trafficked 
into Belgium as a result of regularisation efforts during the early 2000s of Romanians already 
living in the Belgian territory.695 Further facilitated by the removal of Belgian visa 
requirements for Romanians in the wake of the latter’s EU accession.  
 While both the Czech Republic and Romania demonstrate a significant divergence in 
formal and practical compliance, this does not preclude the former’s high level of formal 
compliance that is arguably on a par with highly compliant Western European states, such as 
Finland and the Netherlands, according to a recent transposition study of the EU Trafficking 
Directive.696 The Czech Republic is also one of the few Eastern European states to be ranked 
in the highest tier of compliance by the TIP Report, with a few annual exceptions due to 
resource constraints and inadequate penalties for labour trafficking.697 While Romania 
consistently receives a lower ranking for the persistence of trafficking in its territory.698  
Thus, the over compliance records of the Czech Republic and Romania with anti-
trafficking efforts offer an interesting comparison to the four preceding case studies with a 
strong compliance culture that is either ingrained or based on a cost-benefit analysis. According 
to Keith, newer democracies, such as the Czech Republic and Romania, readily demonstrate 
strong formal compliance because they tend to ratify more treaties ‘to constrain or “lock in” 
future generations of political actors and limit their ability to undermine or overthrow 
democratic institutions’.699 At the same time, managerial models of compliance explain that 
noncompliance is rarely intentional but the result of inter alia capacity limitations.700 There are 
evidently economic and socio-political disparities between the four Western European states 
and these two Eastern European states, which add to the latter’s capacity limitations. After all, 
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the wealth disparities between them are an important reason behind the higher risks of 
trafficking in Eastern European states. In particular, there are problems with effective 
prosecution and protection in origin countries given the difficulty of proving the trafficking 
offence or identifying victims before the exploitation occurs typically in the destination 
country. Additionally, the stigmatisation and discrimination of victims of prostitution-related 
trafficking precludes their effective protection under domestic anti-trafficking laws and they 
are subsequently less likely to receive assistance and support from state-run services.701 
In the Czech Republic, prostitutes were perceived by the Communist Party as ‘social 
parasites’ unwilling to work, ‘cunning entrepreneurs’ abusing the welfare system, as well as, 
ethnically and nationally different from the Czech people because often they were migrants 
and/or persons belonging to the Roma minority.702 Prostitution was, therefore, a problem 
external to the Czech society and Czech citizens, and prostitutes were the sources rather than 
the victims of prostitution as a problem. It was after the Communist rule that feminist groups, 
still few in numbers, began to lobby for the decriminalisation of prostitution as sex work.703 In 
public debates on prostitution during the 2000s, two feminist groups involved in the 
prostitution and trafficking fields lobbied against the abolitionist positions of, first, members 
of parliament and ministers and, second, local governments’ representatives who promoted the 
regulation of prostitution and the compulsory registration of prostitutes. These feminist groups 
offered a third option, namely to distinguish clearly between consensual and forced 
prostitution, replace the notion of prostitution with ‘sex work’, and afford sex workers 
protection and equal treatment as ‘rational and fully fledged actors’.704 It was a discursive 
framing used by some feminist groups and the majority of EU institutions that shifted the 
distinction in the 1990s between street prostitution and indoor prostitution to the one in the 
2000s between consensual and forced prostitution, or between prostitution and sex 
trafficking.705 However, attempts at regulation failed because the Czech Republic was a 
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signatory to the 1950 Trafficking Convention that criminalised prostitution and brothel 
licensing.  
Since 2000, there have been four more unsuccessful attempts, namely in 2004, 2008, 
2010, and 2012, to regulate prostitution as sex work, with the underlying aim of collecting tax 
revenue.706 There is good reason for the tax-focus because the almost non-existent sex trade 
has flourished into a USD 100 million moneymaking industry, with more than 860 brothels. 
Feminist lobbyists outside the Czech Republic, however, criticised the Czech government for 
proposing a prostitution policy modelled after the Dutch prostitution model. They also 
observed the lack of protest against the proposed bills to legalise prostitution, especially by 
Czech women’s NGOs. As the best-known anti-trafficking organisation in the Czech Republic, 
namely La Strada, is a member of the Dutch-founded network of anti-trafficking NGOs that 
subsequently ‘speaks in a Dutch voice’.707 Yet, as Fojtová demonstrates, Czech women’s 
organisations and researchers have been vocal about sex work issues and have worked to 
increase sex workers’ rights. The main challenge to establishing women’s representation has 
been apparent resistance to feminism in the post-socialist Czech society. A further challenge 
lies in securing independent funding and projects, which for organisations providing women 
support does not leave much capacity for influencing policy-making and shaping public 
discourse.708  
Romanian prostitution laws also emerge from Communist ideologies on prostitution. 
However, Romania is one of the few states worldwide to criminalise all forms of prostitution. 
This criminalisation follows a model of intervention that views problems of prostitution as 
similar to those caused by other criminal behaviours, rather than as a moral, health, or human 
rights issue. Typically, prostitution-related activities, such as sex trafficking, are defined as 
causing the type of harm that warrants the use of criminal justice sanction and punishment.709 
Prior to its criminalisation in 1957, the Romanian government was partially regulating 
prostitution as a health issue that mandated registration and periodic medical examinations, and 
prohibited habitual prostitution ‘so most of the times when the prostitutes [were] caught on the 
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streets, their deeds [were] considered contraventions and [were] punished by a fine according 
to a special law’.710  
Between 2000 and 2007, there were four separate political attempts to decriminalise 
prostitution and create a legalised sex market but both the public and the Church vehemently 
objected.711 The most recent legislative proposal was fiercely debated by the media, while 
policymakers opposed on health grounds. Prostitution policies in Romania are rooted in 
cultural and religious values that are often described to be very traditionalist and ritualistic. In 
particular, women’s rights are marginalised to the family and in matters of sex women are 
traditionally thought to be passive actors.712 There is consequently a moral condemnation of 
prostitution and a stark distinction between ‘decent women’ who maintain the family and ‘the 
fallen’ in prostitution. Those who have fallen institutionalise prostitution and serve to gratify 
male lust, in particular, such sexual services which men ‘cannot ask at home’.713 The moral 
objection to prostitution further stigmatises prostituted women and this is seen as having a 
knock-on effect on the protection and assistance of sex trafficking victims, who are blamed for 
their criminal behaviour. 
Thus, in the Czech Republic and Romania entrenched values of morality around 
prostitution influence the treatment of both prostitutes and sex trafficking victims and ensure 
that the latter do not receive assistance and support to which they are entitled under domestic 
anti-trafficking law. Thus, the divergence in formal and practical compliance is partly 
maintained by stigmatisation and discrimination of victims of prostitution-related trafficking.  
3.4.5. Preliminary Conclusions 
The national exploration draws three preliminary conclusions. First, Sweden and Finland have 
a strong compliance culture for women’s human rights. Both criminalise the purchase of sexual 
services even though Finland restricts criminalisation to sexual services performed by procured 
prostitutes and trafficking victims. The Swedish prostitution model consequently blurs the 
distinction between sex trafficking and prostitution, which is maintained partially in Finland. 
Second, the Netherlands and Belgium have a strong compliance culture based on an analysis 
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of the costs and benefits of complying with each issue-specific set of norms. However, through 
their analyses of prostitution effects both states end up adopting different approaches to 
discourage the demand for prostitution. The Netherlands distinguishes clearly between sex 
trafficking and prostitution with a view to stringent government controls of the legalised sex 
industry. While Belgium criminalises prostitution at the national level but tolerates it at the 
sub-national level so that there is a higher risk of sexual exploitation for prostitutes working in 
between the de facto and de jure. Third, the Czech Republic and Romania appear to 
demonstrate overall compliance with the law on the books but there are significant practical 
compliance gaps. In particular, the stigma around prostitution in both states and the ethnic 
discrimination of Roma women in the Czech Republic increase the risks of sexual exploitation 
of prostitutes who are deemed necessary to gratify male lust or because prostitution is highly 
profitable, even if morally condoned. 
3.5. Conclusions 
This chapter examined the systemic challenges to implementation of the preeminent 
international and European anti-trafficking instruments and argued that the narrow political 
interests and priorities of individual states pose serious challenges to international regulation 
of trafficking. The institutional settings of these very instruments were considered in turn and 
the national study on prostitution policies provided a useful lens for examining how different 
approaches to prostitution demarking different interests in the demand debate undermine 
harmonised responses to the trafficking problem. 
 Section 3.2.1 explored the elaboration of the UN Trafficking Protocol under the 
auspices of the UN’s legal system and how wide participation and diverging state interests, 
particularly between developing states seeking technical assistance and developed states 
debating more substantive definitional issues, ultimately weakened the content of the Protocol. 
The need to reach consensus between all states resulted in the adoption of a weak instrument. 
In other words, the consent problem had weakened the content of the Protocol. Thus, the 
paramount objective of international cooperation facilitated by the participation of a larger 
number of states within a universal forum for management ultimately decreased the likelihood 
that the Protocol would offer a robust cooperative framework for harmonised action.  
 Section 3.3.1 on the elaboration of the COE Trafficking Convention also observed how 
power asymmetries during the negotiations had significantly weakened the content of the 
Convention until its human rights began to echo existing provisions in the ECHR. Even though 
  137 
 
the Convention was originally conceived to substantially raise the human rights standard of the 
UN Trafficking Protocol. Within the COE context, the role of the ECtHR in bringing 
trafficking within the ambit of article 4 of the ECHR was particularly noted in terms of fleshing 
out the responsibilities of states to establish effective legal and administrative frameworks 
around trafficking. However, it was seen as a major shortcoming of the ECtHR’s judgements 
that it failed to explicate what it meant with ‘effectiveness’ because the ambiguity meant states 
could not be held accountable to precise obligations. Again, this was attributed to the casuistic 
judging style of the ECtHR that tends to afford member states a wide margin of appreciation 
in implementing their international obligations. Even though the establishment of a due 
diligence regime around trafficking effectively pierces the veil of sovereign prerogatives and 
brings within the jurisdiction of the ECtHR domestic criminal law by linking its human rights 
and criminal law approaches.  
  Within the proper international human rights system, section 3.2.2 assessed the 1950 
Trafficking Convention, the CEDAW, and the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines. The 
Trafficking Convention had failed to adequately address the trafficking problem and its 
updating as part of the new transnational organised crime within which the UN Trafficking 
Protocol is now firmly based was not feasible because of its limited scope. Yet, it was an 
important reason behind the limited coverage of sex trafficking in the CEDAW as an 
instrument that more appropriately deals with the trafficking problem by seeking to address the 
root causes of trafficking victim’s vulnerabilities. However, that the CEDAW was heavily 
reserved against undermined its effectiveness. It also pointed to a major systemic limitation of 
international law to stop states from entering reservations that were contrary to the object and 
purpose of the CEDAW or otherwise would undermine its effectiveness in ensuring to women 
adequate human rights in all spheres of life. Similarly, the adoption of soft law instruments, 
such as the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, to circumvent state intervention in the 
elaboration of substantial human rights standards around trafficking bolstered the argument 
that cooperative agreements, such as the UN Trafficking Protocol, could never achieve 
consensus of all involved states and any effort to this end would weaken the content of norms 
and standards. Thus, it demonstrated the added-value of soft law measures in identifying and 
confirming ambiguous obligations, and through the adoption of certain principles in subsequent 
legally binding instruments, such as the COE Trafficking Convention and the EU Trafficking 
Directive that it could effectively work as a way station to harder legalisation. Perhaps, then, 
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the insistence on state consent is exaggerated and more appropriate responses are to be 
achieved outside the formal process of law, but by whom and to what extent? 
 US unilateralism explored in section 3.2.3 remains a controversial example of 
regulation outside the consent-based system of international law, in particular, as there are no 
mechanisms for challenging the unilateral decisions of the US, which can have substantial 
impacts on domestic trafficking situations and the treatment of victims. Perhaps one question 
is the extent to which the US applies the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines as the highest 
standard espoused in the field. In particular, if the aim of US unilateralism is to get states to 
make significant efforts to suppress trafficking and protect victims from exploitative situations. 
It cannot be forgotten that ‘unfriendly’ unilateralism is only acceptable where it seeks to make 
effective again the ineffective international law. Thus, the primary objective of unilateralism 
must extend beyond the narrow self-interests of states. Then, one may be able to look beyond 
the methodological flaws of reporting under the TIP Report or normative imprecisions in the 
TVPA. As these can be rectified with greater ease than international instruments that are 
typically cast in stone upon their adoption because they already rest on a fragile international 
consensus. 
  It is also noted in relation to the final supra-territorial instrument analysed here, namely 
the EU Trafficking Directive, that an overly ambitious framework that seeks to encompass 
within a single instrument the entire complexity and multidimensionality of trafficking, will 
ultimately face major challenges during the implementation process. This was illustrated in 
section 3.3.2 by way of example of the advantages and shortcomings of choosing a directive to 
express the EU response. In particular, as directives leave as much discretion to states in the 
implementation process as transnational cooperation agreements, such as the UN Trafficking 
Protocol. The sheer number of national transposition measures recorded by the case studies 
was reason for concern as it cannot be said that an effective response to trafficking in the Czech 
Republic relies on 67 separate measures as this creates immense problems for victims seeking 
to rely on these measures for protection. If consensus was difficult to form in relation to the 
UN Trafficking Protocol with participation of some 120 country representatives from different 
regions of the world, the situation in the EU with 27 member states, excluding Denmark that 
does not take part in the adoption of Title V measures, is not any different. As the growing 
membership of the EU necessitates greater flexibility in the transposition process for which the 
provisions of the directive need to be sufficiently ambiguous. Thus, consensus formation in the 
wider context of the UN and the limited context of the EU cannot materialise to produce an 
  139 
 
effective response to the trafficking problem because states’ interests are too varied or diverse. 
This point was brought to the fore with the example of different approaches to prostitution 
among the case studies in section 3.4. 
 In considering measures to discourage the demand for prostitution-related exploitation, 
states must consider the possibility of criminalising sex-buying from trafficking victims. 
However, states have chosen through the six main approaches to prostitution to either draw a 
clear link between prostitution and sexual exploitation or to distinguish between both forms of 
prostitution. This, in turn, has serious implications for the treatment of victims, even though it 
is impossible to say which of the six approaches discourages the demand for prostitution most 
effectively. In the examination of the development of national prostitution policies, it has also 
become evident that the issue is more complex than can be adequately depicted in this space. 
Thus, the national exploration teases out some of the more pertinent issues around prostitution 
policies and relates these to the already established compliance behaviours of the case studies 
based on the ‘worlds of compliance’ theory. It follows that Sweden and Finland demonstrate 
an ingrained compliance culture around women’s human rights, which is rooted in a moral 
condemnation of prostitution. Even though Sweden strengthens its general criminalisation of 
sex-buying around the violence against women, and Finland bases its partial criminalisation of 
sex-buying from procured prostitutes and trafficking victims on the need for public order. Both 
models place the onus directly on the sex client to discourage the demand for sexual 
exploitation.  
The Netherlands and Belgium also have a strong compliance culture, in particular, as 
these states have been involved in the fight against trafficking since the very first instruments 
on the white slave traffic. This also makes it easier for these states to analyse the costs and 
benefits of compliance as their prostitution policies are not rooted in moral considerations but 
the Dutch within a labour paradigm and the Belgian within an immigration and border security 
paradigm. The Netherlands currently regulates prostitution through increased police controls 
of the legalised sex industry and possible mandatory registration of sex workers should the 
current bill to regulate prostitution and combat abuses in the sex industry pass. The Netherlands 
distinguishes between consensual and forced prostitution and aims to reduce sexual 
exploitation in the commercial sex market by guaranteeing to sex workers the safeguards of 
labour contracts. Belgium draws no link between prostitution and sexual exploitation, thus, 
maintaining its criminalisation of prostitution at the national level, even though it is tolerated 
at the sub-national level for typically male gratification.  
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The divergence in formal and practical compliance is most visible in the Czech 
Republic and Romania as major origin countries for trafficking that lack the structural 
infrastructure to reduce the vulnerabilities of trafficking victims. Even though stigmatisation 
and discrimination around prostitution are major reasons for the persistence of sexual 
exploitation in these states. Both states focus on a crime approach to prostitution with heavier 
punishments and better law enforcement. This could perhaps explain the high number of 
prosecutions recorded by Romania, while the low number of prosecutions recorded by the 
Czech Republic reinforces that overall compliance on the law on the books does not translate 
into the law in action.  
Thus, it remains to be seen how compliance in the case studies can be improved with 
the assistance of international and regional enforcement mechanisms that attach directly or 
indirectly to the preeminent anti-trafficking instruments under exploration, as well as, through 
the national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms that operate within the domestic context to 
increase knowledge production and improve the compliance behaviours of their respective 
governments.   





4. The Legal Mechanisms of Enforcement of the Legal Framework of Sex Trafficking: A 




States have legal obligations to implement into their domestic legal systems the provisions of 
the international and European anti-trafficking instruments to which they are party, in order to 
realise the minimum standards around prevention, prosecution, and protection that will 
facilitate cooperation. However, states are not best placed to monitor national implementation 
because of their narrow self-interests in complying with their international and European 
obligations as evidenced in chapter 2, by way of example of the case studies. Moreover, it is at 
the stage of implementation that the systemic challenges identified in the previous chapter in 
relation to ambiguous definitions and concepts around the trafficking problem can be remedied. 
It follows that mechanisms of enforcement with the authority to maintain states in the 
implementation process towards compliance can most appropriately assist states in attaining 
those minimum standards. For this, enforcement mechanisms must have a legal mandate to 
monitor and report on national implementation, with clearly defined tools of enforcement to 
allow those mechanisms to collect and analyse the necessary information directly from states 
and other stakeholders. In particular, NGOs that typically come into contact with trafficking 
victims and subsequently have an increased understanding about the practical effects of 
national anti-trafficking policies. Moreover, those mechanisms should be sufficiently 
independent to determine their own working methods. Since increased independence raises the 
credibility of their work and, in turn, the authority and respect that national implementation of 
their recommendations demands.  
However, as this chapter illustrates states intentionally design enforcement mechanisms 
with noncoercive enforcement tools so that they remain in control of what information is 
transmitted to those mechanisms and, in turn, which policy matters around the trafficking 
problem become the subject of international scrutiny. There is an instinctive benefit to 
generating compliance using a high level of intrusiveness on state sovereignty as the most 
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revered principle of the consent-based system of international and European law, since 
mechanisms that are more intrusive are better at generating sovereignty costs for 
noncompliance.714 However, scholars have different understandings about the sovereignty 
costs that effectuate compliance, including where appropriate the obligation of states to report 
on national implementation measures and respond to information requests by enforcement 
mechanisms. Hathaway argues that good international citizenship generates compliance but 
that there are no effective sovereignty costs for noncompliant states that ‘are likely to receive 
an expressive benefit regardless of their actual practices’.715 US unilateralism in the field is an 
instructive example as the US continues to promote double standards, one for itself and another 
for other states, by largely ignoring its international anti-trafficking obligations but expecting 
other state parties to help it solve the global trafficking problem. To this end, a reputation for 
good policy, according to Koh, can provide democratic states with greater soft power to 
influence and persuade other governments.716 While Hafner-Burton bolsters Hathaway’s 
reputation model by arguing that a good reputation for cooperation creates a perception of 
trustworthiness and opens avenues for cooperation in other foreign policy areas, such as trade 
and foreign investment.717 Then, democratic states concerned about their reputation are more 
likely to accept the authority of enforcement mechanisms with intrusive enforcement tools as 
a credible signal of their intent to prevent and combat trafficking.  
It follows that the enforcement mechanisms attaching directly or indirectly to the 
preeminent anti-trafficking instruments identified in chapter 2 can carry out monitoring and 
reporting of national anti-trafficking efforts using enforcement tools of varying intrusiveness. 
Intrusiveness is best understood using Abbott and Snidal’s definition of ‘legalisation’ based on 
the three dimensions of obligation, rule precision, and delegation.718 In the context of 
enforcement mechanisms, this means that legally binding obligations that are precise or can be 
made precise and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law are more 
likely to attract intrusive enforcement. While delegation is seen to monotonically increase from 
state reporting to individual complaints procedures to inquiry procedures to country visits. 
Thus, more extensive state obligations require more expansive enforcement mandates, and 
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noncompliance of more precise rules are more easily detectable. This means that the UN 
Trafficking Protocol with its lower minimum standards for prevention, prosecution, and 
protection will provide its Conference of the Parties (COP) with a narrower mandate than the 
Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (SRTIP), whose 
mandate covers more expansively the human rights protection of trafficking victims under 
international human rights law. The greater delegation of authority to the SRTIP also attracts a 
greater set of enforcement tools that will be more intrusive to more easily detect 
noncompliance, in particular, because rule specificity remains a challenge with the preeminent 
anti-trafficking instruments. 
 The level of intrusiveness of the enforcement mechanisms developed by states to 
monitor and report on national implementation of anti-trafficking norms and standards forms 
the basis of this chapter. Section 4.2 examines four international enforcement mechanisms, 
namely the COP that directly attaches to the UN Trafficking Protocol, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) that directly attaches to 
the CEDAW and its Optional Protocol, the SRTIP that indirectly attaches to both the Protocol 
and the CEDAW, as well as, the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, and the Office to 
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office) that directly attaches to the TVPA. 
The TIP Office is placed within the international examination despite being a purely domestic 
enforcement mechanism because it is often perceived as the de facto treaty-monitoring body 
of the UN Trafficking Protocol. Section 4.3 analyses two European enforcement mechanisms, 
namely the bipartite mechanism composed of the Group of Experts on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) and the Committee of the Parties, which directly attach 
to the COE Trafficking Convention, and the European Commission that directly attaches to the 
EU Trafficking Directive. Even though the Commission is responsible for overall enforcement 
of EU law. Section 4.4 evaluates six national enforcement mechanisms, namely the national 
rapporteur or equivalent mechanism (NREM) in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden. The comparability of those enforcement mechanisms is 
facilitated by four key features, namely the scope of mandate, the degree of independence and 
accountability of office, the availability of adequate resources, and the extent of cooperation 
with NGOs. The scope of mandate reveals the level of intrusiveness. While the degree of 
independence and accountability, the adequacy of resources, and the extent of NGO 
cooperation indicate whether that level of intrusiveness is appropriate for effective 
enforcement. Finally, the core conclusions of this chapter are laid out in section 3.5. 
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4.2. International Responses  
The section begins by comparing the scope of the mandates of the COP, the CEDAW 
Committee, the SRTIP, and the TIP Office, followed in sections 4.2.2 to 4.2.4 by a closer 
examination of the degree of independence and accountability of their offices, the adequacy of 
their resources, and the extent of NGO cooperation respectively. The four preliminary 
conclusions to this core section are laid out in section 4.2.5. 
4.2.1. Mandates of the COP, the CEDAW Committee, the SRTIP, and the TIP 
Office 
In the international examination, only the mandate of the CEDAW Committee deals more 
broadly with women’s human rights issues, including trafficking in women as a form of gender-
based discrimination.719 This means that trafficking can be considered by the Committee in 
relation to other relevant provisions, such as article 5(a) of the CEDAW on the elimination of 
prejudices, customs, and practices that discriminate against women. As the disadvantaged 
position of women in society makes women more susceptible to trafficking. While the 
mandates of the COP,720 the SRTIP,721 and the TIP Office722 focus explicitly on trafficking in 
persons as defined in the UN Trafficking Protocol, or in the specific case of the TIP Office as 
laid down by the TVPA.  
As mentioned already, there are substantial differences in the definitions found in both 
instruments, not least because the TVPA defines as ‘severe forms of trafficking’ only forced 
prostitution, involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, and slavery.723 There is, for 
example, no mention of the removal of organs that is included in the Protocol’s definition as a 
minimum, or the possibility of expanding the TVPA’s definition to include additional forms of 
exploitation. While the TVPA perhaps adequately addresses the domestic trafficking situation 
in the US, its trafficking definition is too narrow for a mechanism that purports to be the de 
facto treaty-monitoring body of the Protocol.724 As the Protocol remains without an effective 
review mechanism and the COP and its supplementary working groups, including the working 
group on the Trafficking Protocol, are not considered adequate for the review purpose.725 In 
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particular, the TVPA’s narrow definition limits the scope of the TIP Office’s mandate. Even 
though more recent TIP Reports mention the criminalisation of forms other than sexual and 
labour exploitation by reviewed states, including organ removal.726 But it remains that their 
compliance assessment by the TIP Office is not affected by the criminalisation of additional 
forms. As assessment revolves around a predefined set of four minimum standards on the 
prohibition of trafficking and the punishment of trafficking offences that are commensurate to 
the gravity of the trafficking act and sufficiently stringent to deter traffickers and reflect the 
heinous nature of trafficking offences.727 Whether governments make ‘serious and sustained 
efforts’ to eliminate severe forms of trafficking is determined against 12 criteria, asking 
whether the government vigorously investigates and prosecutes trafficking, with the 
cooperation of other states and convicts and sentences traffickers, including public officials, or 
extradites traffickers upon request, protects victims and encourages their assistance in 
investigations and prosecutions, prevents trafficking by raising awareness and educating the 
public, and systematically monitors domestic situations, including migration patterns, and 
makes publically available periodic assessments that demonstrate appreciable progress in 
eliminating trafficking.728  
As part of their serious and sustained efforts, the TIP Office assesses whether 
governments have reduced the demand for ‘commercial sex acts’ defined as any sex act for 
which ‘anything of value is given to or received by any person’.729 Thus, drawing an intrinsic 
link between the demand for prostitution and increases in sexual exploitation. This is 
problematic because states determine for themselves the most appropriate measures to 
discourage the demand for sexual services provided by trafficking victims,730 and as seen in 
relation to, for example, the Dutch response demand can be discouraged while maintaining a 
distinction between forced and consensual prostitution based on stringent state regulation of 
the legalised sex industry.  
It is also observed that certain TVPA criteria, such as whether the percentage of foreign 
victims within the territory of the reviewed state is ‘insignificant’ or the state achieves 
‘appreciable progress’ compared to the previous assessment year, are largely subjective and do 
not yield accurate assessments of states’ anti-trafficking efforts.731 Moreover, there is no legal 
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obligation for states to provide the necessary information for accurate assessments and in its 
absence the TVPA dictates that the TIP Office shall presume that those efforts do not meet the 
minimum standards.732 This is also problematic because a negative assessment influences the 
ranking of the uncooperative state as all reviewed states are ranked into one of four ‘tiers’ of 
compliance with the TVPA’s minimum standards.  
By contrast, the formal mechanisms of international enforcement, whether the COP, 
the SRTIP, and the CEDAW Committee, abstain from ranking state compliance with 
international anti-trafficking norms and standards. Instead, these mechanisms rely on 
constructive dialoguing with state parties, since the primary objective of review of national 
implementation is not to condone noncompliance but to assist the state in improving its 
compliance behaviour, such as through the provision of technical assistance.733 It is debatable 
whether state compliance is more effectively ensured through rankings that threaten to name 
and shame noncompliant states and tarnish their international reputations for cooperation, or 
through constructive dialoguing with state parties once the enforcement mechanism has 
reviewed the state report outlining the implementation measures, such as the programmes, 
plans, and practices, as well as, the legislative and administrative measures.734 In the former 
case, the decision power rests with one single state, namely the US, and states have no means 
of challenging their rankings. In the latter case, the decision power remains in the hands of state 
parties that decide how much information to provide to the enforcement mechanism and 
whether to implement the mechanism’s recommendations, with a view to improving 
compliance. In particular, as the latter mechanisms have no coercive enforcement powers. This 
is an important reason behind the use of naming and shaming tools without any form of ranking 
by, for example, the SRTIP.  
As part of the special procedures of the Human Rights Council (HRC), the SRTIP is 
mandated to examine the impact of national, regional, and international anti-trafficking 
measures on the human rights of victims, and in this connection to make recommendations on 
practical solutions.735 The mandate focuses on the human rights dimension of the trafficking 
problem and as the mandate is not directly attached to a specific anti-trafficking instrument, 
the SRTIP can draw on an array of human rights norms, most importantly, those found in the 
Trafficking Principles and Guidelines, the UN Trafficking Protocol, the CEDAW, and the 
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conventions of the International Labour Organization.736 The specific mention of the CEDAW 
in the SRTIP’s mandate links its work to that of the CEDAW Committee where the mandate 
applies specifically to the state parties to the CEDAW.  
While the mandates of the COP and the CEDAW Committee apply only to state parties 
to the UNCTOC and by extension to the UN Trafficking Protocol, as well as, the CEDAW 
respectively, the mandates of the SRTIP apply to all UN member states because it is a UN 
Charter-based mechanism and of the TIP Office to currently 188 states around the globe. This 
means that the SRTIP and the TIP Office can at least examine the impact of anti-trafficking 
efforts of the 20 non-signatories to the UN Trafficking Protocol.737 Five of those states, namely 
Comoros, the Republic of Congo, Iran, Korea (DPRK), and South Sudan, according to the TIP 
Office, are not making serious and sustained efforts to eliminate trafficking and protect 
victims.738 Another four states, including Bangladesh and Pakistan, are currently on the TIP 
Office’s watch list for making significant efforts but failing to provide evidence of increasing 
efforts compared to the previous annual assessment.739  
In 2010, the SRTIP had sent two separate letters of allegation of human rights violations 
to Bangladesh and Pakistan. The letter to Bangladesh concerned the alleged trafficking of 
children for bonded labour in the Indian mining industry,740 while the letter to Pakistan sought 
clarification on the status of compensation claims of former child camel jockeys trafficked to 
the United Arab Emirates.741 However, in both cases the respective governments did not 
respond to the allegations, even though the Bangladeshi government at least acknowledged that 
the communication was forwarded to the concerned authority for inquiry and action.742 In some 
cases, the very fact that the matter is brought to international attention can deter governments 
from taking questionable action.743 It follows that the SRTIP’s mandate in addition to the 
review of national anti-trafficking efforts provides for the request, receipt, and exchange of 
information from inter alia governments, treaty bodies, special procedures, NGOs, and 
trafficking victims or their representatives.744  
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Under the CEDAW’s Optional Protocol, the CEDAW Committee also has capacity to 
receive and consider individual communications of CEDAW violations, as well as, to inquire 
about grave or systematic violations of CEDAW’s provisions by state parties to the Optional 
Protocol.745 However, not every state party to the CEDAW is a party to the Protocol, and 
several major states, such as the US because its ratification of the CEDAW is pending, do not 
grant women the benefits of the individual communications and inquiry procedures. Even 
though the procedures are underutilised. In particular, the individual communications 
procedure is subject to burdensome admissibility requirements, not least the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, concerning a matter not already examined by the CEDAW Committee or 
another international body, sufficiently substantiated, and, most importantly, refers to facts 
occurring after the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the state party concerned.746  
So far, the CEDAW Committee has considered two communications on trafficking, 
both for the sexual exploitation of a Chinese and a Mongolian national, and both against the 
Netherlands for denying their asylum claims. In the first communication, in 2007, the majority 
of the Committee members found that the Chinese applicant had failed to exhaust domestic 
remedies by not applying for residency as a trafficking victim, or raising a violation of article 
6 of the CEDAW before domestic authorities.747 Additionally, the application for judicial 
review of her asylum claim based on special circumstances was pending. However, the 
dissenting opinion of three members observed that asylum and residency proceedings were 
irrelevant to the present communication on trafficking, and that the Netherlands had an 
obligation to exercise due diligence to protect victims with early identification.748 In particular, 
as there were numerous signs of trafficking in the applicant’s interviews and reports. The 
members underlined the particular vulnerability of trafficking victims, and in the specific case 
the applicant’s illiteracy that impeded her ability to precisely report on her situation.749  
In the second communication, in 2012, the CEDAW Committee concluded that the 
Mongolian applicant had failed to sufficiently substantiate the trafficking claims.750 However, 
on the issue of extraterritoriality and the alleged risks to the applicant upon return to Mongolia, 
the Committee clarified that a state party taking a decision relating to a person within its 
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jurisdiction could itself violate the CEDAW if the necessary and foreseeable consequence is 
that that person’s CEDAW rights will be violated in another jurisdiction, although the 
consequence would not occur until later.751 This means that the CEDAW applies to both 
citizens and non-citizens, even if not situated within the territory. 
 Finally, the SRTIP’s mandate additionally allows country visits to explore trafficking 
situations in situ, with the consent of the concerned state.752 Country visits form an important 
part of the SRTIP’s fact-finding mission and the HRC attaches great importance to 
recommendations based on country visits due to their potential to improve governments’ 
policy-making.753 Yet, they are infrequent due to financial restrictions and, thus, tend to focus 
on states with severe trafficking situations based on information in the individual 
communications. For this reason, no country visits have been undertaken in the case studies. 
During her visit to the US, in 2016, the SRTIP observed inter alia how US migration policies 
and the criminalisation of prostitution contributed to the vulnerabilities of trafficking victims 
as the non-prosecution principle for criminal activities committed as part of their trafficking 
was not being implemented systemically.754 According to the SRTIP, a human rights-based 
approach ‘necessarily includes the decriminalization’ of prostitution so that trafficking victims 
can report their situation without fear of arrest, prosecution, or deportation as often happens.755 
The SRTIP, thus, draws an intrinsic link between the identification of sex trafficking victims 
and the decriminalisation of prostitution. 
4.2.2. Independence and Accountability of the COP, the CEDAW Committee, the 
SRTIP, and the TIP Office 
Most UN treaties are self-enforcing and rely on state parties themselves or the international 
community to uphold international cooperation. The process promotes self-reporting and 
ensures that implementation and its review remain in the hands of state parties. The review of 
implementation of the UNCTOC regime, including the UN Trafficking Protocol was a time-
consuming and delicate matter during negotiations, in particular, as the UNCTOC was regarded 
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as the centrepiece of a new global strategy against organised crime in a globalised economy.756 
Several states were wary of international monitoring, in particular, monitoring through 
intrusive practices that could threaten the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
and non-interference in domestic affairs.757 Another concern was the possibility of making state 
reports widely available to the public as this would subject states to greater scrutiny and there 
was a legitimate concern over the sensitivity of certain information in relation to ongoing 
investigations.758 Thus, the COP aims to improve state compliance through political dialogues 
that clarify definitions and obligations, rather than scrutinise noncompliance or incorrect 
compliance with international anti-trafficking norms.  
Even though the CEDAW Committee and the SRTIP are independent by nature their 
review functions entail an element of political dialoguing with states because they depend upon 
state cooperation to improve human rights practices domestically.759 In fact, constructive 
dialogues have become necessary because of the wide margin of discretion granted to states in 
implementing their international obligations, which can lead to different understandings about 
state obligations, in particular, where those are qualified. The constructive dialoguing between 
the concerned state and the enforcement mechanism also provides states with an opportunity 
to clarify gaps in the knowledge base of the mechanism and challenge any of its conclusions 
and recommendations. For example, the CEDAW Committee argues that ‘positive appraisal 
by the Committee gives impetus to further progress, and an adverse assessment provides 
incentive to future action’.760 Since noncompliance typically relates to technical incapacities, 
rather than a sheer unwillingness to adhere to commitments. As Simmons argues, ‘[n]o rational 
government would pay a high “down payment” on a cooperative enterprise if it did not intend 
to abide by the agreement.761  
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A perceived benefit of the composition of the CEDAW Committee is that the vast 
majority of members are women and only five men have served so far.762 As Hodson rightly 
argues, a Committee headed by women decision-makers certainly adds to a perception that 
women are in control of upholding their human rights.763 This is important because it tips the 
typical gender ‘balance’ of international institutions in favour of female members and 
addresses the typical silencing of women’s voices in international law. Moreover, the 
appointment of independent experts with ‘high moral standing and competence in the field’ 
allows the Committee to engage favourably in all spheres of a woman’s life.764 Since 
Committee members have different professions, including lawyers, doctors, politicians, 
psychologists, economists, sociologists, educationalists, and diplomats, while the vast majority 
of members of other human rights enforcement mechanisms are typically lawyers so that 
reporting does not often transcend the limits of formal legalism.765  
States are especially wary of review by human rights enforcement mechanisms with 
independent experts, in particular, by the special procedures where state consent is irrelevant 
for monitoring domestic realities. Since respect for human rights positively affects a state’s 
international reputation, which infers respect for treaty commitments. Thus, any criticism of 
the state’s ability to respect human rights can tarnish its international reputation for 
cooperation. Based on the high expectation on the special procedures to shine the spotlight on 
domestic human rights situations, they have had a formidable task of acting as ‘a human rights 
activist, a rallying point for human rights, an international diplomat, an academic, and a 
government adviser’.766 However, this also makes them the target of stronger concerted 
criticism, compared to treaty-based enforcement mechanisms that monitor fewer states and 
have flexible decision-making.767 It follows that the HRC has adopted a manual of operations768 
and states have developed a code of conduct769 to guarantee independence, impartiality, 
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objectivity, and personal integrity of the special procedures, which, in turn, affords the findings 
of the special procedures greater credibility. Moreover, since 2008, the practices and working 
methods of the special procedures are reviewed through a self-regulatory Internal Advisory 
Procedure that allows different stakeholders, including states, to raise issues around operation 
and conduct before the Coordination Committee.770 Yet, even with these tools in place to 
ensure that the special procedures are acting in good faith and on the basis of information 
received, their work is criticised as selective or political motivated.771 At the same time, the 
special procedures criticise the state-imposed code of conduct as a means of stifling monitoring 
and opposing the creation of any compliance mechanism.772 One can see the possibility of 
partiality when the decision-making power rests solely with one mandate-holder. This is partly 
offset in committees composed of independent experts where their rules of procedure prefer 
that decisions are reached by consensus.773 In this case, the experts can exercise what Alston 
refers to as peer accountability.774 While the second component of peer accountability, namely 
the public, is already engaged through the public accessibility of reports. 
 The independence and accountability concerns of the TIP Office are distinct as it is 
adopted outside the formal process of international law, which already calls into question the 
possibility of unilaterally developed and applied anti-trafficking standards to hold foreign states 
accountable. Scholars and the media have already exposed the political nature of reporting by 
the TIP Office and as regularly happens the possibility of the Interagency Task Force to change 
the rankings determined by the TIP Office for political motivations.775 Thus, there is an 
increased pressure on the Office, at least, to improve the methodology of data collection and 
analysis used for review purposes. In particular, as no sources are cited to support the credibility 
of collected information.776 That states view reporting under the TIP Report and the associated 
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ranking system of the TIP Office as a threat to the principle of non-interference in domestic 
affairs is deduced from the specific mention of non-ranking and non-punitiveness in the 
principles and characteristics that the future enforcement mechanism under the UNCTOC 
should possess.777 A similar sentiment encouraged NGOs to submit a joint statement to the 
COP that any future enforcement mechanism ‘must be non-punitive, non-adversarial, non-
conditional and non-ranking’.778 As Gallagher observes, the NGOs in this statement would 
have been more receptive to the idea of rigorous monitoring had it not been for the negative 
experiences of the US mechanism.779 
4.2.3. Adequate Resources for the COP, the CEDAW Committee, the SRTIP, and 
the TIP Office  
The inadequacy of resources, whether financial or administrative, is a serious impediment to 
the proper functioning of the international enforcement mechanisms. The necessary 
information for review purposes is collected through the secretariats of the COP780 and the 
CEDAW,781 namely the UNODC and the OHCHR respectively. The OHCHR also supports 
the work of the SRTIP, and the Special Procedures Division manages operational and 
administrative tasks, including research and analytical work, as well as, the transmission of 
information requests based on the SRTIP’s questionnaires to key actors in the field.782 
Moreover, the communications and urgent appeals sent by the SRTIP are managed through a 
central database for the special procedures.783 As the SRTIP frequently sends joint 
communications with the Special Rapporteurs on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences,784 on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, including child prostitution, 
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child pornography and other child sexual abuse material,785 and on the human rights of 
migrants.786  
States have a reporting obligation only in relation to the UNCTOC and by extension to 
the UN Trafficking Protocol, as well as, the CEDAW. Under article 32(5) of the UNCTOC, 
state parties report to the COP on ‘programmes, plans and practices, as well as legislative and 
administrative measures’ taken to implement the UNCTOC provisions. Similarly, under article 
18(1) of the CEDAW, state parties report on ‘legislative, judicial, administrative or other 
measures’ adopted to implement the CEDAW. The CEDAW additionally requires information 
on ‘progress made’ and the ‘factors and difficulties’ encountered.787 However, both the 
reporting periodicity and methodology for collecting information by the COP and the CEDAW 
Committee are different. State reports under the CEDAW are submitted once every four 
years,788 and under the UNCTOC as required by the COP.789 In addition to state reports, the 
COP gathers information through tools and resources developed by the UNODC that acts as 
its secretariat. Initially, information was acquired through lengthy questionnaires and states 
that were parties to more than one additional protocol would complain of a reporting fatigue 
because there was a questionnaire for each instrument and the questions were complicated so 
that they could not be completed without the coordinated efforts of national authorities.790 
Thus, in 2008, the questionnaires were upgraded to a user-friendly online platform with shorter 
questions and the possibility for multiple authorities to work simultaneously on different parts 
of the questionnaire, with a view to enhancing coordination.791 Additionally, in 2008, the COP 
established as supplementary review mechanisms six working groups dealing with specific 
areas of the COP’s work, including a working group on the UN Trafficking Protocol,792 which 
forms a permanent component of the COP since 2014.793 As a result of the growing ratification 
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of the Protocol and the increased need for assistance in reviewing implementation, which will 
progress from a less complicated ‘horizontal’ review to a more demanding ‘vertical’ review.  
Review of implementation of the CEDAW is more elaborate than that of the UNCTOC 
framework, with five reporting stages from the preparation of state reports at the national level 
to their consideration at the international level in a public meeting through constructive 
dialogue with the concerned state party.794 States have at least four years to submit to the 
CEDAW Committee a report on the implementation measures. In relation to the case studies, 
only the Czech Republic submits reports on average every four years, while Belgium, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden submit their reports on average every five years.795 
With the exception of the Netherlands, these states have submitted on at least one occasion a 
combined report comprising two overdue reports.796 This provision helps to clear the backlog 
of overdue state party reports, while at the same time maintaining consistency of the periodic 
reporting procedure.797 Yet, in cases of chronic under-reporting and late reporting the CEDAW 
Committee can but include a reference to this effect in its annual report to the General 
Assembly.798 
In fact, late and underreporting are perennial problems to international enforcement 
mechanisms because every UN member state is party to more than one international legal 
instrument. Even states that have technical capacity and political will to enforce their 
international obligations may find the reporting obligations to be burdensome, in particular, if 
a number of reports are due around the same time. Thus, the reasons for late and underreporting 
are manifold, including human, administrative, and technical incapacities, as well as, different 
reporting obligations for each instrument. The revision of the human rights reporting system is 
instructive of the difficulties of state reporting, and the revised system eases reporting to 
multiple human rights instruments through a common core document and a treaty-specific 
document.799 The former provides to enforcement mechanisms a comprehensive account of 
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general and factual information on implementation of international human rights 
instruments.800 The latter reflects the need for specific treatment of the human rights issues 
contained in the relevant instrument, including the domestic situation de jure and de facto, as 
well as, statistical and comparable data, in a concise and structured manner.801 
Another factor contributing to the backlog of state reports under the CEDAW 
Committee was the initially disadvantaged position of the Committee in terms of the length of 
annual sessions during which to consider state reports.802 The length of sessions was only 
increased in 2010 so that the Committee can now hold three annual sessions of three weeks 
each, with a one-week pre-sessional working group for each session, as well as, three annual 
sessions of the Working Group on Communications under the Optional Protocol to the 
CEDAW.803 Yet, the extension of meeting times has not mitigated the backlog of reports.804 
The inadequacy of resources available to the SRTIP and the special procedures, in 
general, seriously impedes on its ability to examine national anti-trafficking efforts. In fact, the 
special procedures receive less than half a percent of the regular UN budget,805 with the 
possibility of additionally receiving external funds.806 The logistics behind the preparation of 
individual communications, particularly when these are jointly sent with other special 
rapporteurs, and the undertaking of country visits cannot be adequately addressed within the 
limited resources allocated to the SRTIP. As a special procedures mechanism, the SRTIP is not 
mandated to the review state reports. Therefore, it relies almost exclusively on individual 
communications and country visits to collect information that is necessary for the preparation 
of thematic and country-specific reports. Thematic reports develop international anti-
trafficking standards and promote awareness of poorly understood or new areas of concern, 
such as regional and sub-regional cooperation in promoting a human rights-based approach to 
trafficking.807 Since the establishment of the mandate, the SRTIP has published nine thematic 
reports based on at least 227 government responses, 35 IGO responses, and 59 NGO 
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responses.808 Country-specific reports provide an opportunity to gather information, expertise, 
and insight about the realities of domestic situations, whereupon the SRTIP can propose 
specific recommendations that have led to changes in migration policies, amendments to 
national laws, and improved cooperation with NGOs.809 Since the establishment of the 
mandate, the SRTIP has undertaken 21 country visits, predominantly to the Western Asian 
region based on the highest number of communications sent regionally.810 The SRTIP has also 
sent in total 99 communications that have garnered 54 full or partial responses from states, 
including communications to the Netherlands and Romania in 2006811 and the Czech Republic 
in 2010.812 
The TIP Office is currently staffed with 74 members who assist in the preparation of 
the TIP Report, in addition to political service officers within local embassies using an 
extensive questionnaire with a typical response deadline of three weeks.813 In the initial years 
following its establishment, the TIP Office had no allocated resources and relied on assistance 
from staff of agencies represented on the Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking on a non-reimbursable basis.814 Since the TIP Report was seen as ‘wasteful, 
mismanaged, and duplicative’ of reporting in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
that already monitored implementation of internationally recognised human rights.815 Thus, it 
was thought more favourable to include within the Country Report a description of domestic 
and foreign trafficking situations, and to develop the capacities of existing offices, rather than 
set up the TIP Office.816 
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4.2.4. Cooperation between NGOs and the COP, the CEDAW Committee, the 
SRTIP, and the TIP Office 
Given the inadequacy of financial and administrative resources to effectively carry out review 
of national anti-trafficking efforts, there is an increased presence of NGOs in the consultation 
processes of the enforcement mechanisms. The CEDAW Committee, for example, has a 
procedure for receiving shadow reports from NGOs,817 and the SRTIP’s mandate explicitly 
mentions cooperation with NGOs as part of gathering information.818 NGOs are also critical to 
the SRTIP’s understanding of the practical implementation of national anti-trafficking policies 
and to this end meets with NGOs during country visits. NGOs can also act as follow-up tools 
on the SRTIP’s concrete recommendations in the country visit report. In particular, as the 
SRTIP’s recommendations are not legally binding on visited states. A similar point can be 
made in relation to the recommendations of the CEDAW Committee in specific individual 
communications. For example, in the 2007 communication concerning the denial of an asylum 
claim by an alleged sex trafficking victim, the Committee members in their dissenting opinion 
recommended that the Netherlands determine whether the applicant was a trafficking victim 
and, therefore, entitled to protection benefits under article 6 of the UN Trafficking Protocol, to 
which it was a party.819 NGOs can have an added-value in ensuring that this recommendation 
is followed-up by the Netherlands to protect the applicant from the risks of re-trafficking.  
In relation to the review of state reports by the CEDAW Committee it is also important 
to note the added-value of shadow reports, particularly when the information provided by the 
state party is of inadequate quality for review purposes or the necessary information is 
unavailable. That the Committee includes in its general recommendations programme 
suggestions addressed to NGOs bolsters the added-value of NGOs in the implementation 
process of the CEDAW provisions. In turn, NGOs benefit through regular cooperation with the 
SRTIP and the CEDAW Committee from the use of appropriate human rights material prepared 
with their input and having international legal weight as part of its arsenal of advocacy tools. 
 The role of NGOs in developing anti-trafficking policies and assessing their practical 
effects is also recognised by states with the COP.820 Through their regular participation in the 
                                                 
817 See UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘Results of the forty-
fourth and forty-fifth sessions of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’ (12 
February 2010) UN Doc E/CN.6/2010/CRP.2 annex VII paras 5-7. 
818 UNGA (2014) (n 735) paras 2(g)-(h). 
819 CEDAW Committee (2009) (n 747) para 9.1(I). 
820 UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
‘Report of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
  159 
 
plenary meetings of the COP, NGOs can influence policy direction and bring to the attention 
of the COP any severe implementation challenges. Even though as observers in the plenary 
meetings, they can only make oral statements on questions relating to their activities.821 
Moreover, there was no initial consensus on the participation of NGOs in the meetings of the 
WGTIP, despite their recognised partner role in preventing and combating trafficking and 
protecting and assisting victims.822 Such restriction reflects, in part, the longstanding battle of 
NGOs for access rights at UN-sponsored forums.823 In fact, the extent of NGO involvement in 
the plenary meetings of the COP was a serious concern for states during the negotiations of the 
COP mechanism as NGO statements are recorded and publically available.824 Thus, negative 
comments could undermine the political process of review under the COP.  
 There is a serious impediment to NGO cooperation in the context of the TIP Office as 
the Office’s Director, who is responsible for all policy, funding and programming decisions 
over victim support funds, including coordination of anti-trafficking programmes of the 
Department of State,825 restricts funding to NGOs that do not ‘promote, support, or advocate 
the legalization or practice of prostitution’, and requires that those make similar statements in 
their grant applications and/or agreements, also known as ‘the anti-prostitution loyalty oath’.826 
As funded NGOs are restricted in the services they may provide to sex trafficking victims, this 
means that they are also less likely to come into contact with those victims for fear of 
repercussions. It is, in fact, observed by NGO workers in the field that the US government 
scrutinises and publicly accuses pro-sex work NGOs of trafficking women and girls, who, in 
turn, become the common target of ‘a locally operated and internationally funded raid and 
rescue industry’.827 Taking into account the SRTIP’s argument in relation to the country visit 
to the US, the decriminalisation of prostitution is important for identifying sex trafficking 
victims so that they can receive protection and assistance, which alleviates the risks of further 
exploitation and/or re-trafficking.828 Moreover, NGOs can be valuable sources of empirical 
research on service needs and the beneficial impact of health programmes offered to sex 
                                                 
on its second session, held in Vienna from 10 to 21 October 2005’ (1 December 2005) UN Doc 
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821 UNGA Draft rules of procedure for the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
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trafficking victims. After all, that NGOs provide information on the practical effects of national 
anti-trafficking policies in relation to the international anti-trafficking instruments is a primary 
reason behind encouraging their involvement in the review processes of international 
enforcement mechanisms. 
4.2.5. Preliminary Conclusions 
The international study draws four preliminary conclusions. First, the mechanisms established 
within the UN’s human rights system, namely the CEDAW Committee and the SRTIP, have 
broader mandates compared to the COP and the TIP Office, which primarily focus on 
monitoring and reporting on national anti-trafficking efforts. This means the four enforcement 
mechanisms are mandated at a minimum to monitor and report on the national implementation 
of international anti-trafficking norms and standards. While the CEDAW Committee and the 
SRTIP also consider individual complaints and inquiries about human rights violations, and 
the SRTIP additionally undertakes country visits. Second, then, an enforcement mechanism 
with a broad mandate is perceived as more independent because it has more enforcement tools, 
such as the individual complaints and inquiry procedures, and country visits, to make informed 
conclusions on national implementation. This also means an independent mechanism should 
be more accountable to provide objective assessments and to promote consistency with other 
independent enforcement mechanisms. Even though accountability measures, such as the state-
imposed code of conduct that applies to the SRTIP, remind that state sovereignty remains the 
cornerstone of international regulation. Third, the inadequacy of financial and human resources 
is a common challenge for the four mechanisms and a determining factor of their effectiveness. 
While the four mechanisms appear to work around the resource challenge by establishing 
supplementary mechanisms, such as the COP’s WGTIP, increasing the length of annual 
sessions, such as in relation to the CEDAW Committee, or cooperating with other mechanisms, 
such as the joint communications sent by the SRTIP and other special rapporteurs. The 
cooperation with NGOs can also mitigate the resource challenge as information shared by 
NGOs contributes to the knowledge base of the enforcement mechanisms and their ability to 
better monitor and report on national implementation. Thus, fourth, the four mechanisms 
cooperate with NGOs to request, receive, or exchange information. Even though NGOs 
providing services to sex workers are less likely to share information on sexual exploitation 
with the TIP Office because of the anti-prostitution loyalty oath. 
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4.3. European Responses 
In light of the four features around mandate, independence and accountability, resources, and 
NGO cooperation, sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.4 respectively compare the bipartite mechanism 
composed of GRETA and the Committee of the Parties, as well as, the European Commission. 
The four preliminary conclusions to this core section are laid out in section 4.3.5.  
4.3.1. Mandates of GRETA and the Committee of the Parties, as well as, the 
European Commission 
The enforcement mechanisms under the COE Trafficking Convention and the EU Trafficking 
Directive are distinct. Above all, enforcement of the Directive is the responsibility of the 
European Commission that oversees overall enforcement of EU law.829 Even though as part of 
the priority-matters of its work, the Commission focuses on timely transposition of EU 
directives, which could otherwise undermine the effectiveness of EU law and allow 
discriminatory practices to exist.830 In connection with timely transposition, the Commission 
is mandated under the Directive to submit two reports by 6 April 2015, namely on the extent 
of state compliance with the Directive’s provisions, and the impact of existing national laws 
that criminalise the intentional buying of services provided by trafficking victims to discourage 
the demand for trafficking-related exploitation.831 Thereafter, the Commission is to report 
biennially on the progress in fighting trafficking.832 Moreover, the Commission is the only 
mechanism considered here with the power to initiate infringement proceedings against 
member states for late transposition or non-communication of transposition measures, which 
triggers the threat of judicially binding sanctions by the CJEU.833 Even though the CJEU has 
not yet been called upon to consider infringements under the Trafficking Directive, since all 
13 proceedings in relation to the Directive were closed by the Commission at an early stage.834 
Like the COP and the CEDAW Committee, the European Commission prefers constructive 
dialoguing with the concerned state as the primary objective is to maintain noncompliant states 
in the transposition process towards compliance.835 
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While enforcement of the Convention is secured through a bipartite mechanism 
composed of the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) 
and the Committee of the Parties. The specific structure of this bipartite mechanism was noted 
by the COP as part of establishing a more effective review mechanism to assist the COP in 
assessing national implementation of the UNCTOC framework, including the UN Trafficking 
Protocol. However, a proper evaluation of the appropriateness of a structure such as the 
bipartite mechanism could not take place as the mechanism had not fully developed to its full 
potential. In fact, there was a high level of overlap between reports generated by GRETA and 
the Committee of the Parties during their first year of operation, in particular, as the task of 
formally evaluating implementation was yet to begin.836 GRETA is primarily responsible for 
review of national implementation of the Convention,837 while the Committee introduces a 
political dimension into GRETA’s dialogue with state parties towards the later stages of 
reporting.838 Additionally, the Committee makes recommendations based on GRETA’s 
country reports on how to improve implementation by the reviewed state.839 Two distinct 
features of monitoring by GRETA are that GRETA sends its draft report containing suggestions 
and proposals for improving implementation to the concerned state for comments that are taken 
into account by GRETA when finalising its report.840 Thus, in this specific case the constructive 
dialogue between the enforcement mechanism and the concerned state takes place as part of 
GRETA’s reporting process, while constructive dialoguing at the international level takes place 
once the enforcement mechanism has considered the report submitted by the concerned state 
as part of the latter’s reporting obligation. The second distinct feature is that, in addition to 
acquiring the necessary information for review purposes through necessary means, such as 
questionnaires, GRETA is mandated to undertake country visits to each state party on the basis 
of which only GRETA prepares its draft report for additional comments from the concerned 
state.841 It is important that GRETA does not need an invitation from the concerned state to 
undertake a visit, by contrast to country visits undertaken by the SRTIP only upon the extension 
of an invitation or standing invitation to the special procedures. This also puts less pressure on 
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GRETA to cooperate with NGOs for information-gathering purposes, even though as part of 
its country visits GRETA regularly engages with local NGOs.842 
4.3.2. Independence and Accountability of GRETA and the Committee of the 
Parties, as well as, the European Commission 
The bipartite structure of GRETA and the Committee of the Parties offers a good balance 
between the independence that is necessary to carry out reporting in an objective and 
transparent way and the political sensitivity that is necessary to accommodate within the 
reporting process the differences among the legal systems of states and their capacities to fully 
implement the provisions of the COE Trafficking Convention. In particular, the qualified 
human rights provisions that contain important measures for ensuring victims’ protection and 
assistance, with a view to preventing their continued exploitation or the risks of re-trafficking. 
As a human rights mechanism developed within the international human rights framework of 
the COE system, GRETA’s independence is akin to that of the CEDAW Committee members 
as GRETA members are independent experts in the field acting in their personal capacity.843 
Moreover, GRETA members can serve for a maximum term of 8 years, and two members 
cannot hold the same nationality to guarantee their impartiality during the reporting process as 
members are selected from amongst nationals of state parties to the Convention.844 There is 
also a proportionate gender-balance among members, which has an added-value when 
considering the particular vulnerabilities of men and women to different forms of exploitation. 
Moreover, members belong to both origin and destination countries, which is important for 
grasping the different approaches of states to the trafficking problem that necessarily depends 
upon context. The vast majority of members have a legal professional background, which is 
largely suggestive of the fact that reporting does not transcend the limits of formal legalism, 
compared to the CEDAW Committee members, whose diverse professions allow them to more 
favourably consider discrimination against women in all spheres of life, taking into account the 
object and spirit of the CEDAW.845  
 There are also certain checks in place to further guarantee the independence of 
Committee members during the reporting process, such as the public accessibility of GRETA’s 
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843 COE Trafficking Convention (n 23) art 36(2)-(3). 
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final country reports, along with the comments of the concerned state. Additionally, the 
meetings of GRETA are held in camera to offer some visibility of decision-making, and the 
list of meeting decisions is also published.846 Even though GRETA members must maintain 
the confidentiality of meeting documents and deliberations. It is important that the Committee 
of the Parties cannot amend GRETA’s final report, which, therefore, ensures independence in 
the reporting process, in particular, no political interference by the Committee of the Parties.847 
At the same time, there is a certain accountability of the enforcement process, since the 
Committee of the Parties, much like representation of the COP explored above, is composed 
of the representatives on the COE’s Committee of Ministers of member state parties to the 
Convention, as well as, representatives of non-member state parties to the Convention, which 
currently includes only Belarus.848 Given the non-binding nature of GRETA’s proposals, which 
are attached to its final country reports, the Committee of the Parties serves an important 
function of both making recommendations to the concerned state and ensuring that its 
recommendations based on GRETA’s report and proposals are fully implemented, when 
necessary by facilitating the concerned state with technical assistance, much like the COP. 
Even the European Commission is increasingly coming under attack for acquiring a 
semi-political role as the general infringement procedure through which it pursues 
noncompliance adapts to the political conditions of managing EU law enforcement, in part, 
necessitated by the growing demand of member states for flexibility in the transposition 
process.849 The early closure of infringement proceedings against 13 member states in relation 
to the EU Trafficking Directive is an instructive example. In this specific case, flexibility was 
necessary to accommodate the arguably ambitious anti-trafficking framework under the 
Directive, which relies on transposition of additional instruments on residence permits for non-
EU citizens and sanctions for employers of illegal migrants in the EU area, as well as, an overall 
higher human rights standard affording greater protection to victims and requiring significant 
improvements to domestic criminal laws, compared to the former EU Trafficking Framework 
Decision.850 It follows from the Commission’s semi-political role that its assessment report on 
the extent of compliance with the EU Trafficking Directive uses a strong political language 
that is encouraging of member states’ anti-trafficking efforts and does not assess in any 
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meaningful way the impact of the transposition measures on domestic trafficking situations.851 
Even though, as Toshkov generally argues, the presence of infringement data in itself indicates 
challenges of practical compliance, which provides at least a glimpse of domestic realities.852 
4.3.3. Adequate Resources for GRETA and the Committee of the Parties, as well 
as, the European Commission and the ATC 
The inadequacy of resources is also a problem at the European level. For example, the number 
of plenary sessions of GRETA had to be reduced from four to three annual meetings, and it can 
be argued that the bipartite mechanism’s secretariat currently composed of 11 staff members 
under the Directorate-General for democracy remains understaffed.853 In particular, as the 
secretariat serves both GRETA and the Committee of the Parties, which following the 
restructuring of the COE’s Secretariat in 2011 has assumed all cooperative functions in respect 
of the COE’s anti-trafficking efforts.854 Even though provision was made in 2012 and 2013 to 
increase the number of staff to its current total.855 At the same time, GRETA’s operational 
budget was increased in 2012 to mark growing ratification of the Convention and the 
subsequent number of country visits to be undertaken in any given year, from 10 to 12 annual 
visits.856 A budget is also allocated to the Committee of the Parties to facilitate implementation 
of its recommendations by states, which apparently compensates for the absence of an 
individual complaints procedure under GRETA akin to the procedure under the CEDAW’s 
Optional Protocol.857 However, the European Commission and its member states opposed any 
proposal to strengthen monitoring under GRETA, and the Parliamentary Assembly, in fact, 
criticised ‘the open attempt’ during the negotiations of the COE Trafficking Convention to 
escape such scrutiny.858 Nonetheless, the bipartite mechanism remains one of the main 
strengths of the COE Trafficking Convention.859 
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 Perhaps a strong indication of the inadequacy of resources for enforcing EU anti-
trafficking policies is the establishment of the Anti-Trafficking Coordinator (ATC) under 
article 20 of the EU Trafficking Directive to coordinate Union strategies against trafficking and 
facilitate the biennial reporting mandate of the European Commission also established 
therewith. According to the Commission, there are more than 128 national authorities involved 
with data collection and so far 52 distinctive offence classification systems have been 
identified.860 This makes the coordination function of the ATC a crucial one in terms of both 
knowledge production and EU regulation in the field. However, the office of the ATC is under-
funded and under-staffed.861 Perhaps for this reason, the Directive also establishes under article 
19 national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms (NREMs) at the national level that will 
produce the necessary information for the Commission’s reporting of state compliance with 
the Directive. The NREMs of the case studies are explored below. Thus, the EU system has 
overcome the resource problem by requiring that its member states establish NREMs and 
transmit the collected information to the ATC for reporting purposes. While the COE system 
has tasked GRETA itself with collecting the necessary information through inter alia country 
visits. However, there are significant advantages to having in place a permanent mechanism at 
the domestic level to collect information, and through their constitution in an informal EU 
network of NREMs to promote systematic data collection and analysis methodologies.862 In 
particular, as the NREMs meet biannually at the EU level to exchange information and best 
practices, compared to GRETA’s reporting of individual states once every four years, with no 
mechanism in place to assess progress in between reporting cycles.863 The delegation of data 
collection to the NREMs also allows the ATC to focus on coordinating anti-trafficking efforts 
at the EU level among the seven EU Justice and Home Affairs agencies involved, namely the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, the European Asylum Support Office, 
the European Institute for Gender Equality, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, 
Eurojust, Eurojust, and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.864 
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4.3.4. Cooperation between NGOs and GRETA and the Committee of the 
Parties, as well as, the European Commission and the ATC 
Whereas NGO involvement is interwoven into the reporting process of GRETA, NGO 
cooperation at the EU level is facilitated by the European Commission through the ATC as part 
of the latter’s coordination mandate. The Commission and the ATC do not directly cooperate 
with NGOs in relation to reporting under the EU Trafficking Directive as the necessary 
information is directly collected from national authorities, typically their NREMs that are 
already required to gather statistics on the results of national anti-trafficking efforts ‘in close 
cooperation with relevant civil society organisations active in this field’.865 Currently, 103 civil 
society organisations active in the EU area, as well as, Albania, Morocco, Turkey, and Ukraine 
are constituted in the EU platform of civil society organisations and service providers that offer 
victim protection and assistance in member states and selected non-EU member states.866 They 
meet biennially, like the NREMs, to exchange information and best practices, and in between 
biennial meetings their cooperation is further facilitated through a restricted online platform 
that ensures the continuity of discussions and removes the physical barriers and obstacles to 
attending meetings, especially for small-scale NGOs.867 The platform is particularly useful for 
raising awareness of new forms of coercion, exploitation, or modi operandi of traffickers, or 
drawing attention to neglected areas of victim support, as well as, for building rapport among 
local NGOs in other states as part of catering to the special needs of victims, particularly in 
cases of foreign victims. That all relevant information can be found in one place, alongside the 
possibility for online interactions with other NGOs also ensures coherence of trafficking data 
and avoids the duplication of efforts. This is important because very little is actually known 
about domestic trafficking situations. Moreover, the restricted access to civil society 
organisations ensures that those can openly scrutinise national anti-trafficking efforts, which is 
important for addressing practical implementation challenges. 
A similar confidentiality is found in the cooperation of NGOs and GRETA as all 
information transmitted to GRETA through questionnaires and specific information requests 
is treated as confidential, unless the NGO requests publication.868 Consequently, there has been 
an increase in the number of NGO responses received by GRETA since the first evaluation 
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round that ended in 2013.869 To better coordinate NGO responses, GRETA sends to only NGOs 
active in field of action, including national coalitions of organisation or national branches of 
international NGOs, the same questionnaire that is sent to state parties.870 The information, 
thus, received from NGOs can corroborate information transmitted by state parties and fill in 
any information gaps, both enhance reporting by GRETA using information of a consequently 
better quality. Provision is also specifically made for transmitting to NGOs reliable sources of 
information for verification purposes.871 GRETA also physically cooperates with NGOs 
through periodic hearings to promote the implementation of the COE Trafficking Convention. 
Five major NGO-partners, namely Amnesty International, Anti-Slavery International, La 
Strada International, ECPAT, and Terre des Hommes, receive special mention on GRETA’s 
website.872  Among them, Anti-Slavery International and La Strada International have been 
responsible for launching a victim compensation project and campaign to implement article 15 
of the Convention on victims’ right to compensation for harm suffered during the trafficking 
process.873 They have also developed a reporting guide for NGOs transmitting information to 
GRETA, organised conferences to raise awareness of data protection and privacy for 
marginalised victim groups, and actively participated in GRETA’s round-table meetings on the 
role of civil society in combating trafficking.874 
4.3.5. Preliminary Conclusions 
The European examination draws four preliminary conclusions. First, monitoring and reporting 
are at the core of the mandates of both enforcement mechanisms, while GRETA as a human 
rights body additionally undertakes country visits to increase its knowledge base about national 
implementation of the COE Trafficking Convention. Second, the bipartite mechanism 
composed of GRETA as a technical body and the Committee of the Parties as a political body 
better ensures independent reporting by GRETA, which, in turn, increases the authority and 
respect that the Committee’s recommendations based on GRETA’s reports demand. By 
contrast, the European Commission increasingly acquires a semi-political role in enforcing EU 
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law as a result of the growing differences among the legal systems of member states and the 
need for flexibility in the transposition stage. This semi-political role influences the perceived 
independence of the Commission’s report on compliance with the EU Trafficking Directive. 
Third, both enforcement mechanisms work under financial and human resource constraints but 
the Commission can delegate the task of gathering information on compliance with the 
Directive to the newly established ATC at the EU level, which works closely with the data 
collection mandate of NREMs at the national level. While GRETA relies on country visits, 
which appear adequately covered by its budget. Fourth, GRETA as an independent body 
readily cooperates with NGOs to request, receive, or exchange information, while the 
Commission facilitates overall NGO involvement in national anti-trafficking efforts through 
biennial meetings and an online platform at the EU level, rather than direct NGO cooperation.  
4.4. National Responses 
By way of example of the different models of the NREM in Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4 respectively appraise 
the scope of their mandates, the degree of independence and accountability of their offices, the 
adequacy of resources, and the extent of cooperation with NGOs. The four preliminary 
conclusions to this core section are laid out in section 4.4.5. 
4.4.1. Mandates of the Belgian, Czech, Dutch, Finnish, Romanian, and Swedish 
NREMs  
Article 19 of the EU Trafficking Directive that establishes NREMs within domestic legal 
systems of member states identifies four primary tasks for such mechanisms, namely assessing 
trafficking trends, measuring the results of anti-trafficking actions, including gathering 
statistics in close cooperation with relevant civil society organisations active in the field, and 
reporting. These tasks take into account the need for a minimum structure, even though the 
mechanism should be established by member states ‘in the way in which they consider 
appropriate according to their internal organisation’.875 Additionally, NREMs are constituted 
in an informal EU network to provide the Union and member states with objective, reliable, 
comparable, and up-to-date strategic information and exchanges of experience and best 
practices in preventing and combating trafficking.876 Thus, their mandates should facilitate 
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knowledge production at the EU level. The setting-up of the NREM signals a positive intention 
of states to tackle trafficking and it is noteworthy that the case studies already had in place a 
NREM before such establishment became a legal obligation under the Directive. Belgium was 
the first country to establish the Interdepartmental Coordination Platform for the Fight against 
the Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings (the Belgian Coordination Platform), in 
1995,877 and the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, in 1993, to 
coordinate anti-trafficking policies, and monitor and report on policy implementation as from 
1995.878 Even though the mandate of the Belgian Rapporteur was formalised only in 2014 to 
encompass a coordination body, namely the Belgian Coordination Platform, and an 
independent and autonomous body, namely Myria.879880 The first mandate of the Rapporteur 
was adopted by Sweden in 1998,881 followed by the Netherlands in 2000.882 Both mandates 
were adopted in response to The Hague Ministerial Declaration on European Guidelines for 
Effective Measure to Prevent and Combat Trafficking in Women for the Purpose of Sexual 
Exploitation, which recommended the setting-up of a national rapporteur for sex trafficking in 
women.883 While the Swedish mandate subsequently focused on sex trafficking in women 
within the policy framework of violence against women, the Dutch mandate covered women, 
men, and children. The National Police had already achieved some success in designing 
programmes and policy documents on violence against women, thus, the National Criminal 
Investigation Department serves as the Swedish Rapporteur. The Dutch National Rapporteur 
on Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual Violence against Children has an independent 
mandate, which is also the most notable feature, since the only other independent mandate was 
established by Finland in 2008, which also makes the Finnish mandate the most recent among 
the case studies.884 In Finland, trafficking is addressed as a discriminatory practice, thus, the 
                                                 
877 Royal Decree 16 June 1995 Koninklijk besluit van 16 juni 1995 tot uitvoering van artikel 11, § 5, van de wet 
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882 Anna G Korvinus, Trafficking in Human Beings: First Report of the Dutch National Rapporteur (BNRM 2002) 
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883 (The Hague, 24-26 April 1997) para III.1.4. 
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Finnish Non-Discrimination Ombudsman885 is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the 
implementation of the Non-Discrimination Act.886 The Analysis and Strategies Unit acts as the 
Czech Rapporteur since 2003 and it is the only mechanism not to have undergone significant 
institutional changes as part of legal developments, such as the criminalisation of additional 
forms of exploitation, which, therefore, need to be brought within the scope of the Rapporteur’s 
mandate, or administrative reforms at the domestic level to facilitate better functioning of the 
mandate.887 As the primary function of the Czech Rapporteur is to gather and analyse crime 
data, and monitor trends and patterns with a view to designing security policies, since 
trafficking in the Czech Republic is primarily a crime and security issue.888 At the same time, 
the Romanian National Agency against Trafficking in Persons that serves as Rapporteur since 
2005 is an instructive example of a stand-alone institution that has been administratively placed 
within different ministries with the subsequent broadening or curtailing of its mandate to the 
detriment of its proper functioning.889 Yet, it is also the most notable in terms of the scope of 
mandate and the size of the institution. 
 The mandates of the case studies include at a minimum the tasks identified in the EU 
Trafficking Directive. There is provision in each of the mandates for strengthening victim 
protection and assistance. Myria coordinates cooperation between the three specialised 
reception centres, namely Pag-Asa, Payoke, and Sürya, which provide support services within 
the framework of the system of residence permits for foreign victims. Similarly, the Czech 
Rapporteur coordinates the Programme on Supporting and Protecting Victims of Trafficking 
in Human Beings, which is provided by the NGO, La Strada.890 The Finnish Rapporteur bridges 
the weak cooperation between local NGOs and the government-run system of victim 
assistance, in particular, as there are few specialised NGOs in Finland, which increases their 
                                                 
885 Law 1325/2014 Yhdenvertaisuuslaki s 19. The Non-Discrimination Ombudsman replaces the Ombudsman for 
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value in referring to the system any detected victims, especially sex trafficking victims who 
are neglected by authorities because of the negative attitudes around prostitution.891 The 
Romanian Rapporteur, however, has the broadest role in promoting victim assistance as it 
manages the national integrated system for monitoring and assessing trafficking victims, and 
through the Agency’s regional centres makes the system accessible to NGOs to strength 
processes of victim referral and assistance.892 The Romanian Rapporteur also directly manages 
and monitors government-funding of NGO anti-trafficking programmes. The Dutch and 
Swedish Rapporteur’s contribute indirectly to victim support. As a result of the focus on 
monitoring anti-trafficking policies and reporting on the nature and scale of trafficking, the 
Dutch Rapporteur’s contribution is primarily research-based. At the same time, the placement 
of the Swedish Rapporteur within the Police has not contributed positively to the development 
of a victim-oriented approach to trafficking, even though the Rapporteur evaluates the capacity 
of the police to investigate trafficking cases, which includes strengthening processes for early 
identification. Raising awareness of discrimination and providing training to authorities is also 
part of the Finnish mandate. Two notable features are the possibility of the Belgian and Finnish 
Rapporteurs to initiate civil proceedings on trafficking or provide legal advice and assistance 
to victims, as well as, the possibility of the Dutch893 and Finnish Rapporteurs894 to report and 
make recommendations to parliament every four years. The Belgian, Czech, and Romanian 
mandates also make provision for the transmission of data and information collected as part of 
their mandates to the ATC at the EU level to facilitate the biennial reporting of the European 
Commission under the EU Trafficking Directive. 
4.4.2. Independence and Accountability of the Belgian, Czech, Dutch, Finnish, 
Romanian, and Swedish NREMs 
The European Commission maintains that independence is not a required feature of the NREM 
under article 19 of the EU Trafficking Directive as ‘neither the Council Conclusions nor the 
[Directive] refer to the concept of independence’.895 However, explicit reference is made to 
independence in the explanatory report of the COE Trafficking Convention by way of example 
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of the independent status of the Dutch Rapporteur.896 Moreover, in the third general report on 
its activities, GRETA reiterates an exchange of views with the European Commission Experts 
Group on Trafficking in Human Beings and the ATC on ‘the important difference’ between 
the independence of the NREM and the coordination authority of the National Coordinator.897 
There also appears to be a common understanding among NREMs, according to the 
conclusions of the consultative meeting between the SRTIP and 17 NREMs from different 
regions, that only in cases of smaller states where the National Coordinator is independent and 
working closely with authorities at the operation level to facilitate information-gathering is it 
acceptable for the coordination and monitoring roles to be assigned to the same institution or 
authority.898 Otherwise, the independence of the monitoring and evaluating functions might be 
jeopardised. Moreover, separate roles are considered to increase the effectiveness of the 
monitoring function. Thus, it is seen in relation to the case studies, in particular, the Belgian 
mechanism that there is a separation between the coordination function of the Belgian 
Coordination Platform and the monitoring and evaluating function of Myria. In fact, the 
coordination function of Myria was removed upon the formalisation of the bipartite structure 
as the Belgian Rapporteur. Moreover, in matters giving rise to a conflict of interest, such as the 
role and organisation of the three specialised reception centres, which it manages, Myria with 
representative status in the Belgian Coordination Platform cannot vote.899 By contrast, the 
Romanian Rapporteur performs the roles of both National Rapporteur and National 
Coordinator. This is problematic, in particular, because it is a stand-alone institution and the 
checks and balances for independence appear to be non-existent. For example, there are only 
traces of self-review of its combined coordination and monitoring functions in the Rapporteur’s 
reports, which are best described as a showcase of positive results, rather than an objective 
evaluation of the impact of anti-trafficking policies.900 The Coordinator responsible for the 
formulation of national strategies and plans of action cannot as the Rapporteur objectively 
assess their impact, since there is always a conflict of interest. In the case of the Finnish 
Rapporteur, the administrative reorganisation of the mandate from the Ministry of the Interior 
to the Ministry of Justice provided a legal separation from executive, operational, or policy 
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coordination performed by the Anti-Trafficking Coordinator under the Ministry of the 
Interior.901 It could also facilitate greater collaboration with the Ombudsman for Equality and 
the Ombudsman for Children already placed under the Ministry of Justice in the detection of 
trafficking victims in a greater number of situations, in particular, as more victims of labour 
trafficking receive assistance from the government-run system than victims of sex 
trafficking.902 Thus, the Rapporteur and the Ombudsman for Equality, for example, could work 
together to strengthen monitoring of sex trafficking as a form of gender-based violence. 
 The Dutch mandate is an instructive example of the checks and balances in place to 
ensure independence, which, in turn, can enhance the accountability of the monitoring 
mechanism, in particular, where the mechanism is an independent institution. First, the 
Rapporteur and the staff of the office of the Rapporteur are directly appointed by the Minister 
of Security and Justice.903 Second, the Rapporteur has a maximum tenure of eight years.904 
Third, the mandate receives contributions from the five Ministries of Security and Justice, of 
Home and Kingdom Affairs, of Foreign Affairs, of Public Health, Welfare and Sport, and of 
Social Affairs and Employment.905 Finally, the formalisation of the mandate, according to the 
Global Slavery Index, has strengthened coordination and accountability of the Dutch 
government’s anti-trafficking efforts.906 
 Even though the EU Trafficking Directive allows member states to establish different 
structures of NREMs according to their internal organization, and the structures of the 
Rapporteurs examined here comply with the Directive’s requirements, it is observed that when 
the mandate is carried out by an office in a government institution, such as the Czech and 
Swedish mandates, there is an overt focus on the crime dimension of the trafficking problem 
to the detriment of victim protection. This will also influence reporting habits. For example, 
the Czech Analysis and Strategies Unit produces crime reports with largely quantitative data 
on the coordination of government initiatives and cooperation among domestic stakeholders.907 
Even the ‘success stories’ of police operations, including international cooperation efforts, and 
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information on the profile of victims aim to strengthen law enforcement through increased 
knowledge production, rather than qualitatively analyse the impact of anti-trafficking policies 
on victims. Initial proposals on the appropriate structure of the Czech Rapporteur considered 
an independent institution akin to the Dutch Rapporteur. However, there was a shortage of staff 
to ensure the proper functioning of such mechanism and previously established independent 
bodies in other policy areas reminded of the unfeasibility of such structure, in particular, as 
those bodies appeared too distanced from the practicalities of policymaking and policy-
coordination, could not adequately react to ‘real’ problems or exert enough influence on 
government ministries for change, and had no access to confidential information.908 The 
Swedish Rapporteur also argues that its structure allows access to confidential information 
precisely because it is placed within the Police. But as a result, its reports provide only an 
analysis of police investigations, prosecutions, and convictions with disaggregated data to 
inform future police investigations and enhance the methodology and skills of authorities in 
early identification. In fact, both the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention and the 
Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings of the Council of the Baltic Sea States are of the 
opinion that the Rapporteur’s placement within the Police compromises its independence and 
is incompatible with international requirements of independence.909 Moreover, the danger of a 
government structure is the reluctance of victim services providers to readily share data that is 
collected as part of the services they provide to victims because of data privacy concerns. 
According to the Dutch Rapporteur, this reluctance is effectively tackled through the perceived 
independence of the monitoring mechanism.910 Thus, a greater degree of independence can 
have a positive effect on objective reporting and genuine policy recommendations, as well as, 
cooperation of civil society organisations, in particular, NGOs providing victim support 
services. 
4.4.3. Adequate Resources for the Belgian, Czech, Dutch, Finnish, Romanian, 
and Swedish NREMs  
The inadequacy of resources is a serious problem for the Rapporteurs in all case studies. Even 
though its effects are more severe in relation to the Belgian and Finnish mandates, rather than 
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the Czech, Dutch, Romanian, and Swedish mandates. The Czech and Swedish Rapporteurs as 
government offices are financed from the regular budget allocated by the respective ministry. 
Even though there is no information on whether a specific budget is set aside for the functioning 
of their mandates. However, any budgetary shortcomings can be mitigated through maximum 
utilisation of existing human, financial, and material resources. This point also applies to the 
Belgian Coordination Platform. Whereas Myria seems to have suffered from the government 
imposed cost-saving measures on federal bodies in 2014. In fact, the government budget 
allocated to Myria was lower than the statutory budget of EUR 1.5 million,911 which Myria 
argues has sent a wrong message about the political will to implement anti-trafficking policies. 
As the budgetary reduction immediately followed the formalisation of the bipartite mechanism 
by Royal Decree in 2014, and placed Myria in a difficult situation in the short-term, since ‘the 
line of budgetary savings will worsen its situation’ in the forthcoming years.912 For example, 
the analysis of statistical and demographic data typically analysed by the Centre for 
Demographic Research at the Université catholique de Louvain had to be delegated to part-
time staff. Moreover, the necessary data had to be voluntarily acquired from different 
stakeholders, including from the national database of the police, the social inspection services, 
and the three specialised victim reception centres.913 Similarly, it is observed that among the 
20 staff of the office of the Finnish Rapporteur, including 11 senior officers, only one senior 
officer is responsible for reporting on trafficking.914 However, already during the first year of 
operation it was evident that managing daily operations and preparing periodic reports 
‘required the work input of more than one [senior officer]’.915 In particular, the budget of EUR 
15,000 for daily operations ‘is already exceeded by the translation and printing costs of the 
statutory annual report’.916 Additionally, the Rapporteur must provide training and disseminate 
information to authorities, provide legal advice and assistance to victims, and cooperate with 
international actors by attending conferences and meetings. Perhaps, then, it is a major feat that 
the Rapporteur managed to publish annual reports between 2012 and 2014 before independent 
reporting was discontinued in 2015 and incorporated into the broader annual report on 
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discrimination prepared by the Finnish Rapporteur as the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman.917 
This means that the Finnish Rapporteur need only produce an extensive report every four years 
for parliament, along with concrete recommendations based on policy monitoring.918 By 
contrast, the 11 dedicated staff of the office of the Dutch Rapporteur, with five researchers 
focusing on trafficking and four researchers on sexual violence against children, have 
successfully prepared reports that are typically some hundred pages in length. For example, the 
seventh periodic report was over 600 pages long and provided a first-ever extensive research 
on sex trafficking in the commercial sex industry based on case-law obtained through the 
Public Prosecution Service. It is also observed that the Dutch Rapporteur uses interns and thesis 
writers to prepare parts of the report as an effective cost-cutting measure. The quantitative data 
that is collected primarily from the National Police, the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service, and Central Fine Collection Agency,919 as well as, the Public Prosecution Service is 
analysed by the Statistical Information Supply and Policy Analysis Department. Additional 
sources of quantitative and qualitative data are directly gathered by the Rapporteur during 
meetings and consultations with stakeholders.920 Thus, the Rapporteur has a strong knowledge 
base for subsequent reporting. The inadequacy of human resources is least relevant to the office 
of the Romanian Rapporteur that currently has 88 staff of a maximum statutory allocation of 
95 staff, including police officers, civil servants, and the staff of its 15 regional centres, one for 
each court of appeal district, which monitor domestic realities and identify victims’ specialised 
needs.921 The centres are an instrumental feature of the Rapporteur’s coordination and 
monitoring functions as they act as intermediaries between law enforcement agencies and 
victim support service providers represented in the National Identification and Referral 
Mechanism for trafficking victims. The mandate also provides for receipt of external funding 
in the form of donations,922 and until the withdrawal of US funding following Romania’s 
accession to the EU and the inception of EU funding through the DAPHNE programme for 
supporting victims of violence, the mandate was arguably adequately funded.923 In particular, 
                                                 
917 See Kirsi Pimiä, Annual Report 2015 of the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman (Non-Discrimination 
Ombudsman 2015). 
918 Eva Biaudet, The Finnish National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings: Report 2011 (Ombudsman 
for Minorities 2011) 14. 
919 See Dettmeijer-Vermeulen (2010) (n 893) 7. 
920 ibid 11. 
921 Government Decision 460/2011 privind organizarea şi funcţionarea Agenţiei Naţionale împotriva Traficului 
de Persoane art 6. 
922 ibid art 8. 
923 Rebecca Surtees and Fabrice de Kerchove, ‘Who Funds Re/integration? Ensuring Sustainable Services for 
Trafficking Victims’ (2014) 3 Anti-Trafficking Review 64, 71-73. 
  178 
 
since the withdrawal of US funding, the subsequent funding of NGOs providing victim support 
has become irregular and as a result a number of NGOs reportedly seized operation without 
any exit plan for victims under their care. Thus, the annual budget of the Rapporteur’s mandate 
was outlined in the 2013 report in the hopes of encouraging the government to allocate 
proportionate funds based on its funding of various government and NGO actions and 
programmes against trafficking.924 
4.4.4. Cooperation between NGOs and the Belgian, Czech, Dutch, Finnish, 
Romanian, and Swedish NREMs 
As part of their mandates, each Rapporteur regularly cooperates with NGOs to enhance data 
collection for reporting purposes, facilitate training of authorities with a view to early 
identification of victims and referral to appropriate support bodies, and develop victim support 
services. In Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Romania, victim support is 
directly provided by NGOs. The most notable involvement is the formalisation of three 
specialised centres, namely Pag-Asa, Payoke, and Sürya, to provide victim protection and 
assistance services within the framework of the system of residence permits for trafficking 
victims for a renewable period of five years.925 This means that all victims brought within the 
care of one of three centres will receive support during the 45-day reflection period. In cases 
of cooperating victims, the reception centre is responsible for lodging applications for a six-
month residence permit on behalf of victims. As a further means of upholding human rights, 
the reception centres are authorised to initiate such proceedings against traffickers in their own 
name or on behalf of victims.926 The three centres operate in three separate Belgian cities, 
namely Brussels, Antwerp, and Liège, thus, offering wide-reaching support, which some 
remark is ‘pioneering’.927 Moreover, as a result of their formalisation, these centres have 
representative status in the annual meetings of the Belgian Coordination Platform.928 As Myria 
argues, it was necessary and normal to include the victim reception centres in the Platform, 
since ‘[t]hey play a decisive role in the implementation of measures relating to victim 
protection’.929 Their formalisation also affords the reception centres greater authority over the 
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assistance that is provided directly or indirectly, since they can conclude agreements with other 
associations for the reception of victims requiring special supervision, such as children.930 
Moreover, government funding offers some financial security and continuity of services. In 
fact, it is generally observed that during the recession in Europe NGO funding became irregular 
or was substantially reduced. The changing policy-priorities, such as immigration, are another 
reason for the irregularity or inadequacy of NGO funding.931 
 The Czech Programme on Supporting and Protecting Victims of Trafficking in Human 
Beings is streamlined through La Strada, which is the initial recipient of all trafficking victims, 
and offers basic crisis assistance, consultancy, and shelter to Czech nationals and documented 
foreign victims during a 60-day reflection period.932 Victims who decide to cooperate with 
authorities are housed by La Strada and after three months foreign victims are transferred to 
the care of Catholic charities.  
 The Coordination Centre Human Trafficking (CoMensha) in the Netherlands is one of 
the longest standing organisations offering victim support services,933 even though its mandate 
has considerably broadened from caring for prostitutes in the 1980s to currently female and 
male victims of trafficking. It is entrusted with ‘the central reporting, placement and national 
records of victims’ and for resource purposes has merged with the national reception 
federation. Thus, all victims, whether detected or identified, should be reported by authorities 
to CoMensha to enhance centralised reporting. Comensha works closely with La Strada to 
coordinate regional NGO networks and strengthen support provisions for victims of 
transnational trafficking. This also provides for greater synergies between local NGOs in the 
Czech Republic and the Netherlands that are constituted in La Strada’s international anti-
trafficking programme. Thus, NGO involvement has not only facilitated domestic victim 
support but also regional cooperation. 
 NGO involvement is an important aspect of the Romanian mandate due to early focus 
on victim assistance of the National Office for the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings 
and Victims Protection Monitoring, which was replaced by the office of the Rapporteur. NGOs 
are, thus, consulted in the drafting and implementation of the national strategy, the collection 
of trafficking data, and the provision of legal advice and assistance in criminal proceedings 
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against their traffickers.934 Their role in policymaking is further strengthened by the possibility 
to attend, upon invitation, the meetings of the Inter-ministerial Working Group on Combating 
Trafficking in Persons, which evaluates implementation of the national plan of action.935 
Currently, 15 NGOs are constituted in the ‘Antitrafic’ network that focuses to different extents 
on prevention measures, victim assistance, or the running of shelters. Even though cooperation 
between NGOs and the Romanian Rapporteur have been sour on account of irregular funding 
by the latter. However, there are increased efforts to conclude cooperation agreements with 
civil society representatives in relation to prevention, as well as, NGOs in relation to victim 
violence.936 Besides irregular funding, an incipient problem is funding of typically short-term 
biannual rehabilitation projects that are insufficiently short as rehabilitation and reintegration 
of victims into society is a slow and labour-intensive service.937 
By contrast, in Finland and Sweden victim support is provided by government 
institutions, which can perhaps explain the general shortage of specialised victim services in 
Finland. Pro Centre and Victim Support are two NGOs that regularly cooperate with the 
Rapporteur. Both NGOs focus on different aspects of trafficking, which makes their 
contribution to increasing the Rapporteur’s knowledge base as part of its monitoring function 
somewhat unique. Pro Centre offers counselling to sex workers in three cities and is partially 
funded by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.938 Its work with sex workers makes it 
easier for the Centre to detect and refer sex trafficking victims to the victim assistance system, 
as well as, provide victim profiles to the Rapporteur. While Victim Support helps all victims 
of crime, which means their service is more general. Yet, it plays an important role as the 
coordinator of the Finnish NGO platform composed of six charitable and religious 
communities.939 Its role in providing practical and legal advice and support also facilitates the 
function of the Rapporteur in providing legal assistance to victims, in particular, as Victim 
Support has access to information on pre-trial investigations and closed criminal cases, which 
can be inaccessible to the Rapporteur.940  
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While in Sweden, the National Board of Health and Welfare is primarily responsible 
for monitoring prostitution-related trafficking. Even though it relies on NGO cooperation 
because most prostitution takes place indoors and, therefore, cannot be effectively monitored 
by the government institution.941 The importance of NGO involvement in reducing the demand 
for prostitution, raising awareness of sex trafficking, and offering victim support services is 
also explicitly mentioned in the national plan of action, and government funding is available to 
develop NGO services.942 As mentioned already, cooperation between NGOs and the Swedish 
Rapporteur, however, is minimal because of the latter’s placement in the Police and the 
subsequent reluctance of NGOs to readily share any information about victims and offered 
services. NGO involvement in the work of the Swedish Rapporteur, thus, reflects the weakest 
form of cooperation among the case studies. Above all, this limits the possible influence of a 
human rights approach in the monitoring and reporting functions of the Swedish Rapporteur. 
4.4.5. Preliminary Conclusions 
The national exploration draws four preliminary conclusions. First, the six NREMs are 
mandated at a minimum to monitor and report on the progress of domestic anti-trafficking 
efforts due to their proximity to government and victims, which means they can better assess 
trafficking trends and measure the practical effects of anti-trafficking policies. This reporting 
complements review by international and European enforcement mechanisms, in particular, by 
the SRTIP and the ATC as NREMs participate in international meetings and are constituted in 
an informal EU network. Second, the Belgian, Dutch, and Finnish Rapporteurs because they 
are sufficiently independent from government can offer victim support, such as the possibility 
of initiating proceedings against traffickers or providing legal advice and assistance to victims 
as part of securing their human rights. A victim-oriented approach is less likely among 
structures of the NREM that are instituted within government, such as the Swedish Rapporteur, 
or have a dual role of coordination and monitoring, such as the Romanian Rapporteur. In 
particular, this duality decreases the perceived independence of the NREM and the subsequent 
credibility of its findings. At the same time, government structures benefit most from existing 
resources, since, third, the inadequacy of financial and/or human resources is an impediment 
to the proper functioning of the six NREMs. Fourth, the six NREMs work with NGOs as part 
of their data collection mandates but independent structures benefit most from this cooperation, 
                                                 
941 Law 2007/08:167 (n 388) pt 2.2. 
942 ibid measures 4, 17. 
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as NGOs are more likely to share information on victims and the practical effects of anti-
trafficking policies with actually independent NREMs that follow a victim-orientated 
approach. 
4.5. Conclusions 
This chapter critically appraised the enforcement mechanisms attaching directly or indirectly 
to the preeminent anti-trafficking instruments identified in chapter 2, taking into account the 
scope of their mandates, the degree of independence and accountability of their offices, the 
adequacy of resources, and the extent of NGO cooperation. The international, European, and 
national mechanisms respectively examined in sections 4.2 to 4.4 are integral to addressing 
some of the systemic challenges to implementation of those preeminent instruments, as will 
become evident from the impact study in the next chapter, because through their monitoring 
and reporting functions they can change the compliance behaviours of state parties, with a view 
to promoting international cooperation by increasing knowledge production and international 
regulation. Also the mechanisms examined here are complementary as their mandates 
explicitly mention their cooperation with other relevant mechanisms, in part, to avoid the 
duplication of efforts. Since the inadequacy of resources remains a primary concern for all 
mechanisms.  
The shortage of resources is a common problem for enforcement mechanisms 
established within the UN’s legal system, in particular, its human rights mechanisms as it 
would appear that more independent structures, such as the CEDAW Committee and the 
SRTIP, receive less attention from states because the more independent the mechanism the 
more credible its work. This presents a danger for states that are generally less accommodating 
of intrusive enforcement tools, such as the individual complaints and inquiry procedures or 
country visits, because they cannot control how much information about the negative effects 
of their anti-trafficking policies becomes a matter of international scrutiny. For this reason, the 
COP that directly attaches to the UN Trafficking Protocol relies on a system of self-reporting 
and the proposed review mechanism to assist the COP envisages a system of peer-review so 
that monitoring remains in the hands of states. Even the European Commission that directly 
attaches to the EU Trafficking Directive prefers constructive dialoguing with noncompliant 
member states as evidenced by the early closure of infringement proceedings against member 
states that had failed to notify the Commission of their transposition measures or to transpose 
the Directive’s provisions by the stipulated deadline. 
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No state willingly submits to international scrutiny because its international reputation 
of compliance will influence existing commitments and future cooperation in other foreign 
policy matters. Thus, the inadequacy of resources can be an indirect attempt to curtail the 
proper functioning of independent mechanisms. For example, the special procedures, including 
the SRTIP, argue that the state-imposed code of conduct because of the way it is used by states 
to hold mandate-holders accountable, in fact, stifles their monitoring function. Even 
independent structures of the NREM at the national level complain about the negative effects 
of reducing allocated budgets on the intent of governments to prevent and combat trafficking 
through increased cooperation. For example, Myria reports that the budget cut immediately 
following the formalisation of the Belgian Rapporteur had sent a wrong message about the 
political will to implement anti-trafficking policies. The appointment of only one staff within 
the office of the Finnish Rapporteur to monitor anti-trafficking policies within an annual budget 
of EUR 15,000, which does not even cover the preparation of annual reports, is another 
example of waning political will for objective assessments and genuine recommendations. 
Even additionally entrusting the Romanian Rapporteur with coordination functions curtails the 
credibility of reporting because the same institution cannot design anti-trafficking policies and 
make genuine recommendations. In fact, the coordination function of the Romanian Rapporteur 
explicates why its reports assessing anti-trafficking policies are primarily a showcase of 
positive results with quantitative data and little qualitative analysis.    
Given the inadequacy of resources, there is increased involvement of NGOs in the 
monitoring processes of enforcement mechanisms. Some mechanisms, such as the CEDAW 
Committee and GRETA, have established guidelines for the submission of information or 
shadow reports by NGOs. Similarly, the CEDAW Committee and the SRTIP allow the 
submission of complaints alleging human rights violations on behalf of trafficking victims by 
NGOs. In Belgium, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands, NGOs can be formally instituted 
into the government system of victim protection and assistance, and such NGOs are 
coordinated by the National Rapporteur, which, therefore, maintains a direct link between the 
work of NGOs and the Rapporteur without infringing on their independent status. In Finland, 
NGOs provide information on the practical effects of anti-trafficking policies, which 
government authorities are obliged to provide but do not because of the Finnish Rapporteur’s 
independent status.  
At the same time, cooperation with NGOs becomes more difficult in the absence of a 
victim-orientated approach, thus, NGOs continue to struggle for access rights in UN forums, 
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including in the meetings of the UN Trafficking Protocol’s COP as observers that can make 
only oral statements. The anti-prostitution loyalty oath also prevents cooperation between the 
TIP Office that directly attaches to the TVPA and NGOs that provide assistance to victims of 
sexual exploitation, with valuable information on the effectiveness of measures to discourage 
the demand for sexual exploitation or to better protect victims. While the placement of the 
Swedish Rapporteur in the National Police is an important reason behind the crime-oriented 
approach of its reports. 
 It follows that the enforcement mechanisms examined here with the primary purpose 
of monitoring and reporting on national anti-trafficking efforts have different enforcement tools 
to measure progress in the field. The mechanisms with independent status have broader 
mandates and subsequently a wider range of enforcement tools. Given their independent status, 
they are also more likely to cooperate with and receive information from NGOs providing 
victim services. However, independent enforcement mechanisms are also less likely to receive 
information on the practical effects of anti-trafficking policies from government authorities. 
Yet, in the case of NREMs there is no obligation of independence according to the EU 
Trafficking Directive. Thus, it remains to be seen whether independence is a determining factor 
in increasing knowledge production and international regulation around the trafficking 
problem.  
There is already a preferred general direction of anti-trafficking responses as observed 
in chapter 2, which is rooted in the UN Trafficking Protocol. There are also systemic challenges 
to implementation of the anti-trafficking framework around the Protocol as observed in chapter 
3. While the enforcement mechanisms attaching directly or indirectly to the preeminent anti-
trafficking instruments operate under different settings as observed here, taking into account 
their mandates, the independence and accountability of their offices, the inadequacy of 
resources, and NGO cooperation. The impact of their work forms the focus on the next chapter, 
in particular, to what extent the mechanisms identified in this chapter are able to contribute to 
knowledge production and international regulation in the field. 
 
  





5. Managing the Main Systemic Challenges to Implementation of the Legal Framework of 




There is increased recognition of the absence of reliable information and statistics in the field, 
which can feed into the development of appropriate responses to the trafficking problem. Such 
information is necessary for assessing meaningful implementation of the substantive content 
of norms and obligations, manifest in the preeminent anti-trafficking instruments examined in 
this thesis, namely the UN Trafficking Protocol, the COE Trafficking Convention, and the EU 
Trafficking Directive. Additional protection of victims’ human rights under the CEDAW and 
the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines reinforce the complexity of the trafficking problem, 
on account of its multidimensional nature. That trafficking in persons now constitutes a 
fundamental violation of human rights under article 4 of the ECHR affirms the importance of 
the integrated, holistic, and human rights-based approach to trafficking under the EU 
Trafficking Directive. There is a preferred general direction of national responses based on the 
minimum standards developed at the international and European levels. Within the possibilities 
of international and European legal systems to appropriately deal with the trafficking problem, 
states have adopted mechanisms of enforcement to reinforce their commitments to the fight 
against trafficking in persons. There is also an innate acknowledgement that states cannot be 
entrusted wholly with the task of monitoring proper implementation of the international anti-
trafficking framework. At the same time, there is a need for expertise to address the ambiguity 
of key norms and obligations, which undermine effective and wide cooperation as the 
paramount objective of international regulation of the trafficking problem. The enforcement 
mechanisms established directly or indirectly under the preeminent instruments have a 
formidable task of remedying this ambiguity to facilitate cooperation around prevention, 
prosecution, and protection. At the same time, those mechanisms must learn to work around 
their own systemic limitations, since their legitimacy and authority derives from or is otherwise 
connected to those ambiguous anti-trafficking instruments. The inherent tension between their 
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independence as a prerequisite for objective reporting and their accountability to states both as 
a means of ensuring the credibility of their work and controlling the monitoring process was 
observed in the previous chapter. The inadequacy of human, financial, and/or administrative 
resources to enhance their ability to effectively carry out their reporting mandates was also 
demonstrated. While the extent of cooperation with NGOs involved in the field of action was 
an instructive example of how those mechanisms could work around their intentionally flawed 
design, as none of those formal mechanisms possess coercive enforcement powers to hold 
states accountable and improve compliance with international norms and obligations. 
 This chapter appraises the impact of the work of the enforcement mechanisms identified 
in the previous chapter. It focuses on their ability to increase knowledge production and 
international regulation through their monitoring and reporting mandates. The ‘tools’ of 
enforcement, thereby, identified, namely thematic and country-specific reports, country visits, 
and the individual communications and inquiry procedures, have all contributed significantly 
to understanding the trafficking problem. However, normative development in the field is 
infeasible without reliable information and statistics. That the vast majority of academic 
research in the field is not based on empirical data was observed early on, and remains true 
even today, as there is a heavy reliance on overviews, commentaries, and anecdotal 
information.943 According to Goździak, some of the challenges involved in conducting 
empirical research on trafficking in persons relate to the biased portrayal of ‘victims’, which, 
therefore, excludes whole groups of trafficked persons and influences how their agency and 
vulnerability are understood. The overlapping between trafficking and smuggling in persons 
and the inadequate definitional guidance in the additional protocols on trafficking and 
smuggling or by the Conference of the Parties to the UNCTOC regime are another obstacle, as 
well as, the difficulty of gaining access to victims for research projects or accurately assessing 
the scope of involvement of criminal networks.944 The national rapporteur or equivalent 
mechanism (NREM) in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and 
Sweden contribute in a meaningful way to the production of knowledge about the scope of 
trafficking and the appropriateness of current policy and practice. Since they are the central 
locus at the national level for data collection and analysis on trafficking trends and the results 
of anti-trafficking efforts. Yet, there have been very few studies on their valuable role. This 
point relates broadly to the enforcement mechanisms examined here, as the academic interest 
                                                 
943 Goździak (2014) (n 33) 613. 
944 ibid 615-626. 
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in the overall impact of the international anti-trafficking framework has not extended to the 
very mechanisms responsible for enforcing its implementation. This is a general problem with 
human rights treaty literature.945  
This chapter, then, contributes to the literature gap in the field in the hopes of yielding 
more insights into the relationship between the design and impact of anti-trafficking 
enforcement mechanisms. It is inspired by a functional comparative analysis that considers 
both the operating institution and the law in action, and follows a similar structure to the 
previous chapter. In order to fully grasp their individual contributions to knowledge and 
regulation in the field, the international and regional enforcement mechanisms are examined 
individually, with appropriate comparisons. The international mechanisms in section 5.2 are 
the Conference of the Parties (COP), with a special focus on the Working Group on Trafficking 
in Persons (WGTIP), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW Committee), the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women 
and Children (SRTIP), and the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP 
Office). The European mechanisms in section 5.3 are the Group of Experts on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) and the Committee of the Parties, with a special focus 
on the former, and the European Commission, with a brief mention of the Anti-Trafficking 
Coordinator (ATC). The national enforcement mechanisms, namely the NREM in Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, are studied 
comparatively in section 5.4 as their role derives from the same source, namely article 19 of 
the EU Trafficking Directive. Finally, the core conclusions of this chapter are laid out in section 
5.5. 
5.2. International Responses 
The section begins by examining the work of the COP mechanism, in particular, that of the 
WGTIP, which is followed by an impact assessment of the work of two human rights 
enforcement mechanisms, namely the CEDAW Committee and the SRTIP, in sections 5.2.2 
and 5.2.3 respectively. Section 5.2.4 studies the work of the TIP Office in terms of increasing 
knowledge production in the field, compared to the above international enforcement 
mechanisms. The four preliminary conclusions to this core section are laid out in section 5.2.5. 
                                                 
945 See Yvonne M Dutton, ‘Commitment to International Human Rights Treaties: The Role of Enforcement 
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5.2.1. The COP: The WGTIP as a Supplementary Review Mechanism, and the 
Proposed Peer-Review Process of State Reporting 
The absence of an effective enforcement mechanism under the UN Trafficking Protocol is 
evident in the voluminous and repetitive reporting of the COP mechanism, with the assistance 
of the WGTIP, which currently reviews the national implementation of the Protocol. Between 
2004 and 2016, the COP held eight sessions to improve the capacity of state parties to the 
UNCTOC regime, including the UN Trafficking Protocol, to combat transnational organised 
crime. There was immediate recognition of trafficking in persons as ‘one of the most complex, 
nefarious and multifaceted forms of transnational organized crime’, which required concerted 
action at the national, regional, and international levels, and above all the political will and 
determination of governments.946 As part of the initial review, the COP endorsed two sets of 
questionnaires on the basic adaptation of national anti-trafficking legislation, the 
criminalisation of trafficking offences, international cooperation, and victim protection and 
assistance.947 Taking into account responses received before and after the closure of the two 
reporting cycles, 47 percent of the state parties to the UN Trafficking Protocol responded to 
the first questionnaire and 35 percent to the second questionnaire.948 Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Romania, and Sweden responded to both questionnaires as state parties, while the Czech 
Republic and Finland responded as signatories. The decision to send questionnaires to 
signatories took into consideration the advantages of gaining a full picture of implementation, 
in particular, as some signatories regularly participated in the meetings of the COP and the 
WGTIP.949 However, the overall response rate for both reporting cycles was low and 
comparably less for the second reporting cycle. There was also discrepancy in the quality of 
responses, with better quality responses from Latin American and Caribbean state parties than 
Eastern European state parties with a very high response rate.950 Moreover, less than half of 
                                                 
946 COP (2005) (n 820) para 54. 
947 UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime ‘Draft 
questionnaire on implementation of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime’ (6 July 2004) UN Doc CTOC/COP/2004/L.1/Add.1; UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime ‘Draft questionnaire on the implementation of the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’ (17 October 2005) UN Doc CTOC/COP/2005/L.8. 
948 COP (2006) (n 757) figures I, II. 
949 See generally the list of participants in the reports of the COP and the WGTIP 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/CTOC-COP.html> 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/working-groups.html#Review_of_Implementation> accessed 
15 October 2017. 
950 COP (2006) (n 757) para 12. 
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the responding states provided further clarification to the COP on their noncompliance with 
certain provisions of the Protocol.951 Even though the UNODC secretariat acknowledged that 
requests for individual clarification were not an effective means of review and could not 
provide the full implementation picture, which was necessary for the COP to formulate 
evidence-based policy.952 Nonetheless, the COP’s decision to approach responding state parties 
individually indicated to the UNODC secretariat an emerging tendency towards a peer-review 
approach, which it argued could augur well for the future.953 In fact, the proposed review 
mechanism to assist the COP’s monitoring function envisages a system of peer-review by two 
other state parties, with the active involvement of the state party under review.954 
 As the primary medium for collecting the necessary information for review purposes, 
subsequent questionnaires were simplified and upgraded to an online platform.955 However, 
due to resource constraints, those questionnaires were available in only three of the six official 
languages of the UN, namely, English, French, and Spanish, and 60 state parties and signatories 
provided new or updated responses within the first two months of their circulation.956 At the 
same time, the WGTIP was established to assist the COP’s monitoring function in identifying 
weaknesses, gaps, and challenges to the implementation of the UN Trafficking Protocol 
through the exchange of information with experts and practitioners.957 In doing so, the WGTIP 
recommends to the COP how state parties can better implement the Protocol’s provisions, as 
well as, how the COP can better coordinate the activities of the UNODC secretariat and with 
other international stakeholders.  
Between 2009 and 2017, the WGTIP held seven sessions, which primarily focused on 
the adequacy of national anti-trafficking legislation and the clarity of key concepts, prevention 
and awareness-raising, non-punishment and non-prosecution of trafficking victims, protection 
and assistance, and cooperation and coordination at the international, regional, national, and 
local levels. Some of the pertinent recommendations include the preparation of issue papers by 
the UNODC secretariat on the definitions of key concepts, such as consent, harbouring, receipt 
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‘Mechanism for the review of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime and the Protocols thereto: draft procedures and rules for the functioning of the mechanism’ (21 February 
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955 COP (2008) (n 791) para 12 
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and transport, abuse of a position of vulnerability, exploitation, and transnationality.958 The 
UNODC secretariat consequently released three issue papers on the concepts of abuse of a 
position of vulnerability, consent, and exploitation. The first paper recognises that the term 
‘abuse of a position of vulnerability’ was unique to the UN Trafficking Protocol and reflected 
a general desire of the drafters to cover more subtle means of coercion without addressing the 
debate on whether to include non-coerced adult migrant prostitution within the Protocol’s 
definition.959 With reference to national anti-trafficking legislation, including the Dutch and 
Belgian trafficking definitions, the issue paper observes how the Dutch Supreme Court in 2009 
held that conditional intent is sufficient so that it is enough that the trafficker was aware of the 
state of affairs that must be assumed to give rise to power or a vulnerable position.960 This 
reading reportedly led to a rise in the number of prosecutions and convictions for labour 
trafficking in the Netherlands, since the judgment concerned employment of irregular migrants 
below the statutory minimum wage with the knowledge that they were desperate for work and 
feared detection by authorities. While the Belgian definition focused on the act and purpose of 
trafficking so that sexual and labour exploitation that was contrary to human dignity would 
amount to trafficking, regardless of the use of any means, including abuse of a position of 
vulnerability.961  
The second issue paper observes that the most expansive determination on the issue of 
consent is found in the UNODC Model Law against Trafficking in Persons,962 which affirms 
that consent is irrelevant when any of the acts and means of the Protocol’s definition are proven 
to be used.963 This means that persons willingly employed in the sex industry can be trafficking 
victims where they were deceived about the conditions of work, even if they knew about the 
nature of work. While the third issue paper acknowledges the definition of ‘exploitation of 
prostitution of others’, again, in the UNODC Model Law, namely ‘the unlawful obtaining of 
financial or other material benefit from the prostitution of another person’.964 Even though it 
observes that the term can be addressed differently, with reference to states, including Sweden 
                                                 
958 UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
‘Report on the meeting of the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons held in Vienna from 27 to 29 January 
2010’ (17 February 2010) UN Doc CTOC/COP/WG.4/2010/6 para 31(b). 
959 UNODC, Issue Paper: Abuse of a Position of Vulnerability and Other ‘Means’ within the Definition of 
Trafficking in Persons (UN 2013) 17-18.  
960 ibid 34. 
961 ibid 43. 
962 UNODC, Model Law against Trafficking in Persons (UN 2009). 
963 UNODC, Issue Paper: The Role of ‘Consent’ in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol (UN 2014) 27-28. 
964 UNODC, Issue Paper: The Concept of ‘Exploitation’ in the Trafficking in Persons Protocol (UN 2015) 29. 
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where the respective term ‘sexual purposes’ is undefined because of the presence of strong 
alternative domestic offences.965 Then, in an important way, the WGTIP’s recommendations 
help to raise awareness among states about the extensive array of existing interpretative and 
implementation guidance developed by the UNODC secretariat to clarify the Protocol’s 
ambiguous provisions.966 
The WGTIP affirms the irrelevance of victim consent where any of the means in the 
Protocol’s definition are employed, since the determination of consent is the all-important link 
between the identification of persons as trafficking victims and their subsequent entitlement to 
protections under the Protocol, which are not available to irregular migrants or illegal 
prostitutes.967 To this end, the WGTIP also clarifies that trafficking in persons can be 
established before the act of exploitation has occurred, since trafficking is a process and there 
can be an overlapping between trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants so that a 
person smuggled one day can be trafficked the next.968 As mentioned already, neither the 
Protocol nor its accompanying travaux préparatoires provide any guidance on this issue. 
Moreover, the WGTIP draws attention to domestic situations, which appear to be on the rise, 
by mentioning that transit or transportation is unnecessary for establishing a trafficking 
offence.969 Finally, it recommends defining the term ‘victim’ for better identification of 
trafficked persons, since front-line law enforcement officials typically lack awareness of the 
different forms of trafficking due to its constantly evolving nature.970 While the explanatory 
note accompanying the COE Trafficking Convention, which already defines ‘victim’ as any 
natural person subjected to trafficking-related exploitation, explains that the definition helps to 
link identification to immediate human rights protection.971  
Besides its value in interpreting some of the key concepts of the Protocol’s definition, 
the WGTIP has played an important role in raising awareness of the importance of 
compensation as part of victims’ human rights protection and fostering debate on the different 
measures to discourage the demand for trafficking-related services. Article 6(6) of the Protocol 
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only requires that state parties provide victims the possibility of obtaining compensation for 
damage suffered. However, as mentioned already, very few victims actually receive 
compensation because they are unaware of such possibility or the state does not make sufficient 
provision for funds by linking it to confiscated assets or special funds for trafficking victims.972 
The WGTIP devoted a specific session to the issue,973 and recommends that states should award 
compensation to all victims, even those with irregular status and those not present in the 
territory of the granting state.974 Moreover, compensation should be awarded independent of a 
criminal case and regardless of whether the trafficker can be identified, sentenced, and 
punished.975 The WGTIP, then, identifies three ways of providing compensation based on 
existing national practices, namely through civil action against the trafficker, civil claims 
against the trafficker within a criminal case, or government compensation schemes.976  
 The WGTIP is also increasingly considering measures to discourage the demand side 
of trafficking, which echoes regional attention to the issue by the European Commission under 
the EU Trafficking Directive.977 It also reaffirms the importance of addressing demand as a 
root cause of trafficking and raising the effectiveness of law enforcement to discourage demand 
as stipulated in the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines.978 Thus, the WGTIP recommends 
research on the root causes, such as the unequal opportunities for women, and the possibility 
of offering disadvantaged persons employment and practical training opportunities, based on a 
multidisciplinary, comprehensive, human rights-based, and targeted approach.979 It follows 
that states should consider measures to enforce labour and human rights standards through 
labour inspections, as well as, regulate, register, license, and monitor private recruitment and 
employment agencies, and prohibit them from directly or indirectly charging workers fees for 
recruitment and placement, which fosters vulnerability.980 
 The pertinent recommendations of the WGTIP provide important guidance on the 
interpretation and implementation of the Protocol’s provisions, which can go beyond the 
minimum requirements of the Protocol. However, those recommendations are not concrete and, 
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therefore, the work of the WGTIP does not amount to an adequate review of the national 
implementation of the Protocol, compared to more rigorous enforcement mechanisms, such as 
GRETA under the COE Trafficking Convention. Gallagher’s review of the work of the COP 
and the WGTIP until mid-2010 confirms that the reporting procedure is ‘a relatively crude 
mechanism for promoting or measuring compliance’ because assessments based on state 
responses to questionnaires can ‘provide, at best, a highly generalized picture of compliance 
patterns and trends’.981 In fact, at the fifth session of the COP, the representative of Israel 
observed how the COP’s sessions ‘had been marred by those who repeatedly chose to politicize 
the forum’ to the detriment of important discussions around the Protocol’s provisions.982  
It remains to be seen whether the proposed review mechanism to assist the COP’s 
monitoring function will produce more rigorous reporting on state compliance. The mechanism 
will promote national implementation, technical assistance, and international cooperation, and 
operate under transparency, non-intrusiveness, non-adversariness, and flexibility.983 Moreover, 
there is consensus among states and even NGOs that the mechanism should be non-ranking 
and non-punitive, which Gallagher argues is a direct reaction to unilateral ranking in the TIP 
Reports.984 The proposed system based on peer-review is akin to the Mechanism for the Review 
of Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (IRM),985 since state 
parties to this Convention and the UNCTOC regime already share their information gathering 
tools as the UNODC serves as the secretariat to both Conventions.986 The main advantage of 
peer review appears to be its inclusiveness and comprehensive nature, in particular, as it allows 
for the participation of a larger number of stakeholders in the review.987 While the main 
disadvantage is that peer review is costly and states would be expected to respond to 
questionnaires, which typically attract low response rates, or information that is incomplete, 
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ambiguous, or of poor quality.988 In the context of the IRM, it is also argued that peer review 
functions as ‘an instrument for formalizing cooperation’ so that it is considered to be a 
cooperative mechanism rather than a strict monitoring mechanism, based on value sharing, 
commitment, mutual trust, and credibility.989 An instinctive problem relates to the transparency 
of monitoring and reporting under the proposed mechanism. Currently, state reports under the 
UNCTOC regime and the UN Corruption Convention are publically inaccessible. This restricts 
the participation of civil society, ‘which adds public pressure to the existing peer pressure’.990 
As explained in the previous chapter, NGOs have valuable insights about the practical effects 
of national anti-trafficking policies because they regularly encounter trafficking victims. Thus, 
the transparency concern decreases the credibility of reporting as a primary objective of peer 
review. 
5.2.2. The CEDAW Committee: State Reports, General Recommendations, 
Concluding Observations, and the Individual Complaints Procedure 
The CEDAW Committee is the first treaty-based enforcement mechanism examined here to 
address trafficking in women in the context of the CEDAW. The international legal instruments 
adopted pre-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the 1950 
Trafficking Convention, did not have specific mechanisms for monitoring national 
implementation.991 Even though in the specific case, the mandates of the Working Group on 
Slavery and the Special Rapporteur on the suppression of the traffic in persons and the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others covered the issue in lieu.992 Both mandates considered 
prostitution as a form of slavery993 but as Nanda and Bassiouni rightly note the international 
control scheme around the 1950 Trafficking Convention was unable to transform the basic 
values, which support or tolerate the social behaviour sought to be altered, compared to the 
abolition of slavery and the slave trade.994 In particular, the Working Group on Slavery 
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observed that state parties to the 1950 Trafficking Convention were not transmitting reports 
regularly or not at all.995 Moreover, the image of trafficking victims in need of protection from 
the ‘evils of prostitution’ under the Convention was ineffective in terms of human rights 
protection, since it disregarded women as ‘independent actors endowed with rights and 
reason’.996 While the trafficking coverage in the CEDAW protects women by providing 
remedies for the human rights violations committed during their trafficking. This coverage 
remains relevant post-UN Trafficking Protocol because of the CEDAW’s Optional Protocol, 
even though the CEDAW Committee considered only two individual communications on 
trafficking violations under article 6 of the CEDAW and both were inadmissible. However, 
those communications, already examined in the previous chapter, reveal the significant 
potential of the individual communications procedure to improve the human rights of trafficked 
women. In particular, the dissenting opinion of the three Committee members affirmed the 
importance of early identification as a prerequisite for protection, as well as, the responsibility 
of states to exercise due diligence to this end to avoid further victimisation.997 The Committee 
also affirmed the responsibility of states when deciding to repatriate victims to their origin 
country where re-trafficking is a necessary and foreseeable consequence.998 This is important 
in relation to states, such as Sweden, which immediately repatriate victims after the expiration 
of the mandatory reflection period, which GRETA argues does not allow sufficient time for a 
proper assessment of the possible risks of re-trafficking.999 
 The CEDAW Committee also played an important role pre-UN Trafficking Protocol in 
interpreting the terms ‘trafficking’ and ‘exploitation of prostitution’ under article 6 of the 
CEDAW, which are undefined in both the CEDAW and the 1950 Trafficking Convention. As 
mentioned already, the General Recommendation 19 on violence against women considers 
trafficking a form of gender-based violence and explicitly identifies as forms of sexual 
exploitation sex tourism, the recruitment of domestic labour from developing countries to work 
in developed countries, and organised marriages between women from developing countries 
and foreign nationals.1000 The Committee also explicitly identifies poverty and unemployment 
                                                 
995 ECOSOC ‘Report of the Working Group on Slavery on its Second Session’ (19 August 1976) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/SUB.2/AC.4/373, 3. 
996 UNCHR ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, on trafficking in women, women’s migration and violence against women’ (29 
February 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/68 para 22. 
997 CEDAW Committee (2007) (n 747) para 8.1. 
998 CEDAW Committee (2014) (n 750) para 8.10. 
999 GRETA (2014) (n 459) para 185. 
1000 General Recommendation 19 (n 193) para 14. 
  196 
 
as the root causes of trafficking in women, which, therefore, requires that states address those 
factors as part of guaranteeing to trafficking victims their human rights under the CEDAW.1001 
In connection with the societal attitudes that maintain vulnerabilities, the Committee confirms 
that the stigmatisation around prostitution creates vulnerability to sexual violence.1002 In the 
General Recommendation 24, the Committee also notes the particular vulnerability of 
prostitutes to sexually transmitted diseases because of the different demands of sex buyers so 
that states should grant prostitutes, including illegal migrant prostitutes, the right to sexual 
health information, education, and services.1003 This means that the criminalisation of 
trafficking under the CEDAW entails a far-reaching obligation to transform the basic societal 
values that maintain vulnerabilities by improving the conditions of disadvantaged women. 
However, it is a serious shortcoming that the Committee does not connect the obligation to 
address the root causes with specific provisions of the CEDAW, which makes its 
recommendations ‘broadly programmatic’.1004 According to Chuang, the programmatic nature 
reflects ‘the deep divides within the international feminist community over prostitution reform’ 
and similar divides appear to exist between the Committee members on how to address 
prostitution.1005 For example, in the General Recommendation 26, the Committee links women 
migrant workers and women migrant workers who become trafficking victims without any 
elaboration of the trafficking issue so that it effectively escapes any determination of whether 
women migrant prostitutes are covered by article 6 of the CEDAW.1006 
 It follows from the General Recommendation 19 that state parties should include in 
their reports information on the extent of the trafficking problem and the effectiveness of anti-
trafficking policies to prevent trafficking through research and awareness-raising and to protect 
victims with effective remedies, including compensation.1007 The case studies are currently in 
different reporting cycles based on their ratification of the CEDAW. The most recent review 
of Belgium and Finland took place in 2014, of the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden in 2016, and of Romania in 2017. The Committee focuses on the issue of trafficking 
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in women for the purpose of prostitution, rather than exploitation of prostitution, and the list of 
issues typically identified by the Committee includes measures to protect women engaged in 
prostitution against sexual exploitation1008 and measures to the address the vulnerability of 
migrant women to trafficking for the purpose of forced prostitution.1009 The subsequent 
recommendations of the Committee in the concluding observations centre on rehabilitation and 
reintegration programmes1010 or alternative income-generating opportunities for women who 
wish to leave prostitution,1011 as well as, adequate assistance for foreign victims who are unable 
or unwilling to cooperate with the prosecutorial authorities.1012 An instinctive conclusion on 
the Committee’s concluding observations is their formalistic nature, except in relation to 
Romania where the observations and recommendations are more concrete. For example, the 
Committee recommends proactive inspections for the identification of victims in recruitment 
agencies and workplaces, such as textile enterprises and domestic households, which addresses 
one of the shortcomings of prevention measures examined in chapter 2, since so far no 
recruitment agency has been sanctioned for facilitating the exploitation of Romanian nationals 
abroad.1013 The absence of sufficient information appears to be a serious challenge to review 
by the Committee as it repeatedly requests states to provide disaggregated data on trafficking 
and the exploitation of prostitution, ‘with a view to fully understanding the impact of legal and 
policy measures aimed at addressing gender-based discrimination in the State party’.1014 For 
this reason, there is significant participation from civil society organisations. 
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 The shadow reports of NGOs have been especially useful in understanding the practical 
effects of anti-trafficking policies, in particular, in states, such as Sweden, where there is no 
involvement of civil society organisations in the design and implementation of those 
policies.1015 Thus, in their combined shadow report on Sweden, the Swedish Federation for 
LGBTQ Rights (RFSL), the Swedish Association for Sexual Education (RFSU), and the 
Swedish Disability Federation (Handikappförbunden) identify the inadequacy of assistance, 
which is currently directed to the three largest cities in Sweden so that particularly vulnerable 
victims in rural areas remain without effective protection.1016 At the same time, the Swedish 
Women’s Lobby underlines the negative results of the criminalisation of sex-buying, which 
the CEDAW Committee itself regards as an innovative approach to discouraging the demand 
for prostitution,1017 namely that the criminalisation has resulted in about 80 percent of Swedish 
nationals buying sex abroad.1018 This means that the reduction of prostitution in Sweden as a 
direct consequence of the criminalisation has actually increased the demand for prostitution in 
other states.1019 Thus, the criminalisation has shifted the problem of exploitation of prostitution 
in Sweden to other states. While the shadow reports on Belgium1020 and Finland1021 highlight 
that those governments do not prioritise the fight against trafficking by adopting national 
strategies and action plans that tackle the root causes and trafficking-related exploitation to 
increase human rights protection of victims. 
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5.2.3. The SRTIP: Thematic and Country-Specific Reports, and 
Communications 
The special procedures are often described as the ‘crown jewel’ of the UN’s human rights 
system because they constitute an essential part of the human rights machinery through their 
periodic monitoring and reporting on human rights violations.1022 Yet, there is a dearth of 
literature on the special procedures as ‘a system of human rights protection’, and mandate-
holders themselves as legal scholars typically assess the special procedures.1023 The 
appointment of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons affirms the prevalence of 
trafficking and, more importantly, the inadequate human rights coverage under the UN 
Trafficking Protocol as its mandate focuses on the human rights aspects of trafficking victims. 
The work of the SRTIP is considered complementary to human rights treaty-based enforcement 
mechanisms, such as the CEDAW Committee, and through its mandate, the SRTIP regularly 
participates in the meetings of the WGTIP under the Protocol.1024 In fact, the WGTIP 
recommends cooperation between its UNODC secretariat and the SRTIP in clarifying the key 
concepts of the Protocol’s definition as a major impediment to the Protocol’s 
implementation.1025  
The SRTIP’s role in interpreting anti-trafficking norms and standards is certainly one 
of the benefits of its mandate, which, in turn, has led to a broader understanding of the 
trafficking problem beyond the principal concerns of states around migration, security, and 
public order.1026 For example, in its first annual report, the SRTIP recommends that human 
rights should be at the centre of all anti-trafficking efforts, which ‘should not adversely affect 
the human rights and dignity of the persons concerned’.1027 Thereby, affirming the primacy of 
human rights as espoused by the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines. The mandate further 
affirms the human rights approach to trafficking in its promotion of an effective and rights-
based response based on protection, prosecution, and prevention in line with the Protocol’s 
focus, as well as, international cooperation, and redress, rehabilitation, and reintegration of 
victims.1028 This victim-orientated response highlights the discriminatory practices and 
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inequalities, which create vulnerabilities and maintain impunity for traffickers, as well as, the 
adverse impact of prevention measures on individual rights and freedoms guaranteed under 
international law.  
An instructive example of the mandate’s influence on normative development in the 
field is the subsequent adoption of the principle of non-punishment of trafficking victims for 
status-related offences, such as illegal entry, illegal stay, or illegal work, in the resolutions of 
the HRC1029 and the UNGA,1030 as well as, the reports of the CEDAW Committee1031 and the 
WGTIP.1032 This principle as originally espoused by the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines 
and affirmed under article 26 of the COE Trafficking Convention is now a well-established 
part of the broader international anti-trafficking framework because of its consistent mention 
in the SRTIP’s thematic and country-specific reports.1033 
Through the thematic and country-specific reports, the SRTIP has uncovered poorly 
understood or new areas of concern, such as the denial of a right to a remedy,1034 prosecution 
for status-related offences,1035 conditionality of assistance on cooperation with authorities,1036 
and forced repatriation of victims in danger of reprisals or re-trafficking.1037 The persistence of 
these practices, according to the SRTIP, underscores the importance of a human rights 
approach to the trafficking problem.1038 Moreover, those studies have encouraged the drafting 
of, for example, basic principles on the right to an effective remedy for trafficked persons.1039 
At the same time, the SRTIP’s approach to prostitution has been less helpful because different 
mandate-holders have interpreted the relationship between prostitution and trafficking 
differently. The first mandate-holder recommended against ‘legalization of prostituted persons’ 
to discourage the demand for trafficking based on observations that most prostitution involved 
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sexual exploitation and, thus, amounted to trafficking.1040 The second mandate-holder also 
found that prostitution was a major site of trafficking-related exploitation but opted for a 
different approach, since international law does not equate prostitution and trafficking.1041 The 
debate has shifted to the obligation of states to tackle the root causes of trafficking because it 
cannot be concluded definitively from the latter’s fact-finding missions that criminalising 
prostitution discourages demand.1042 Chapter 3 concluded similarly in relation to the 
prostitution regimes promulgated by the Netherlands and Sweden, and this more nuanced 
position is preferable because research-based evidence suggests that criminalisation actually 
promotes vulnerability.1043 This position is also more in line with the position of the CEDAW 
Committee that requires states to address poverty and unemployment as root causes of 
prostitution-related trafficking. 
 The SRTIP has not visited any of the case studies in this thesis, since the decision to 
visit a specific country is based on the prevalence of trafficking in that territory and the 
perceived contribution of its fact-finding mission to understanding the trafficking problem. 
Yet, the thematic reports have been used by states, such as Belgium, even in the absence of a 
country visit to elaborate or strengthen anti-trafficking institutions and policies, as reference 
documents for further research, and to raise awareness of the issue covered.1044 There also 
appears to be an increased acknowledgement of the SRTIP’s work in Sweden given its 
participation in a conference on regional cooperation to combat trafficking, which was 
organised by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1045 At the same time, Finland was one 
of few UN member states to respond frequently to information requests by the SRTIP in the 
initial years of its mandate, when thematic reports played an especially important role in 
clarifying the substantive content of relevant rights and obligations.1046 Since the international 
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human rights system’s own contribution was meagre and the UN Trafficking Protocol makes 
only general references to victims’ human rights.1047  
In relation to the case studies, the SRTIP has sent three communications, namely to the 
Netherlands and Romania in 2006 and the Czech Republic in 2010. The first communication 
concerned the trafficking of Somalian children to the Netherlands to facilitate social benefit 
fraud, who were later returned to and abandoned in Somalia.1048 In its response letter, the 
Netherlands distinguished between trafficking and smuggling in children, noting that the 
present case did not constitute trafficking because the children attended school and were fed 
and clothed so that the exploitative element was not immediately clear.1049 Even though 
smuggling from Somalia ‘is entirely a Somali affair’ when both the smuggler and smuggled 
person are Somalian nationals, the Netherlands sent a delegation to Somalia to gather 
information on child smuggling and informed its embassy in Somalia of the issue for early 
identification.1050 
 The second communication involved trafficking in Romanian children for sexual 
exploitation in Italy.1051 In its response letter, Romania informed about the adoption of a 
programme to prevent and counter sexual abuse against minors and a national action plan to 
prevent and counter child trafficking, as well as, its law on the freedom of movement of citizens 
abroad, which prohibited travel of unaccompanied minors.1052 There was also evidence of 
cooperation with Italian authorities, which it argued was ‘satisfactory’, while Romania 
recognised as a serious obstacle that Italian law does not allow authorities to inform diplomatic 
missions in Italy of the situations of foreign minors without their express consent.1053 
Moreover, the failure of the Italian authorities to identify any of the children as trafficking 
victims meant that those were not entitled to protection and assistance.1054 However, there is 
no information on whether the Romania-Italy cooperation framework, which was underway 
actually resulted in fewer situations of child trafficking. To this end, it is a major shortcoming 
that the mandate does not stipulate a follow-up procedure. 
The third communication sought clarification on an amendment to the Criminal Code 
on trafficking in persons, which places a duty on any person to report trafficking offences, if 
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they receive plausible information, and failure to immediately report to the authorities is 
punishable by up to three years of imprisonment.1055 By law, only lawyers in connection with 
their practice of law and a cleric of a registered church exercising a right similar to confession 
are exempt from the duty to report. This means that NGOs and other services providers offering 
support to trafficking victims have a duty to report the trafficking offence, which could hamper 
the relationship of trust and confidence with victims, which is necessary for effective 
assistance.1056 The amendment also serves as a disincentive for third parties, particularly those 
from migrant communities, who typically report trafficking offences to NGOs, because they 
want to avoid contact with the authorities.1057 While the Czech Republic confirmed that social 
workers are presumably exempt from such duty, the SRTIP rightly expressed concern that such 
exemption was not explicitly mentioned in the amendment.1058 The CEDAW Committee also 
considered the issue that same year as part of its review of the implementation of the CEDAW 
and recommended an explicit exemption of social workers assisting trafficking victims under 
the law.1059 However, the Committee did not pursue the issue in its subsequent review. 
5.2.4. The TIP Office: TIP Reports 
The TIP Reports are the cornerstone of the TIP Office’s monitoring and reporting mandate, 
which currently covers 188 countries around the globe, including the US, which consistently 
ranks high along with countries that fully meet the minimum standards on combating 
trafficking under the TVPA.1060 The Office does not assess compliance per se. Instead, it ranks 
states into tiers of compliance with the TVPA’s minimum standards to demonstrate the level 
of progress in fighting trafficking in individual states compared to the previous assessment 
year.1061 Periodic assessments of the results of anti-trafficking efforts are important because of 
the constantly evolving nature of trafficking. Thus, one TVPA criteria explicitly asks whether 
governments are systematically monitoring their efforts and making publically available those 
assessments.1062  
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 There have been a myriad of impact studies on the positive effects of the TIP Report in 
encouraging individual states to combat trafficking and the promotion of a state’s tier-ranking 
is often taken to imply the direct influence of the Report on the domestic trafficking 
situation.1063 For example, Holman argues that the threat of losing aid under the economic 
sanctions regime and the stigma around a low ranking had created the necessary impetus for 
Belize, Cambodia, and Indonesia to actively work to improve their responses to international 
sex trafficking.1064 Hacker also notes that the TIP Report pressured Israel into compliance with 
the TVPA’s minimum standards.1065 While Gallagher observes the strong influence of the TIP 
Report on the anti-trafficking responses of Australia, Malaysia, and Nigeria.1066 However, 
merely looking at the tier-ranking of a state reveals very little about the actual domestic 
realities. Moreover, some of the assessment criteria stipulated by the TVPA are subjective. For 
example, how does one determine whether the percentage of foreign trafficking victims in the 
territory of a state is in fact ‘insignificant’, when neither the TVPA nor the TIP Report provides 
any definitional clarification on the use of subjective terms?1067 There is no possibility to hold 
constructive dialogues with assessed states during which they can challenge the TIP Office’s 
ranking or contribute to its knowledge base as happens with international and regional 
enforcement mechanisms, such as the CEDAW Committee or GRETA. In addition, the TIP 
Office does not undertake country visits that would allow it to collect the necessary 
information, and after ‘reasonable’ information requests the TIP Office will presume that that 
state does not meet the TVPA’s minimum standards.1068 By contrast, international and regional 
reporting recognises that implementation is a gradual process and that noncompliance will be 
remedied eventually. Despite the implications of maintaining vulnerability through 
noncompliance, non-ranking at the international and regional levels, at least, does not promote 
a perception of compliance, which is actually non-existent, especially by using the term 
‘compliance’ in its guide to the tiers in the TIP Report.1069 
 
                                                 
1063 AG Friedrich, AN Meyer and DG Perlman, ‘The Trafficking in Persons Report: Strengthening a Diplomatic 
Tool’ (2006) UCLA School of Public Affairs Project, 10-11 
<https://issuu.com/uclapubaffairs/docs/the_trafficking_in_persons_report> accessed 24 February 2017. 
1064 Holman (n 561) 113-114. 
1065 Hacker (n 557) 13-14. 
1066 Gallagher (2011) (n 93) 388-389. 
1067 TVPRA 2003 (n 47) s 6(d)(3). 
1068 TVPRA 2003 (n 47) ss 6(d)(1)(B), 6(d)(2) 
1069 TIP Office (2017) (n 28) 28. 
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Finland Netherlands Romania Sweden 
2001 1 2 n/a 1 3 2 
2002 1 1 n/a 1 2 1 
2003 1 1 2 1 2 1 
2004 1 1 2 1 2 1 
2005 1 1 2 1 2 1 
2006 1 2 1 1 2 1 
2007 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2008 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2009 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2010 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2011 1 2 1 1 2 1 
2012 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2013 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2014 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2015 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2016 1 1 1 1 2 1 
2017 1 1 1 1 2 1 
 
It follows that the consistently high rankings of the case studies in this thesis, as 
illustrated in the table above, are a poor indication of actual progress in fighting trafficking.1071 
Even though the Czech Republic was demoted in 2006 for inadequate sentences for traffickers 
and concern over forced labour,1072 and in 2011 again for inadequate concern over forced 
labour.1073 Moreover, the Czech Republic, Finland, Romania, and Sweden did not initially fully 
meet the TVPA’s standards,1074 and Romania remains a tier 2 state that does not fully meet the 
TVPA’s standards, including inadequate victim assistance.1075 However, their demotions and 
promotions do not make the TIP Report a definitive factor in increasing national anti-
trafficking responses. As illustrated in chapter 3, different factors determine compliance with 
different groups of states. Moreover, there is a real danger that states with high tier-rankings 
will use the TIP Report to demonstrate that it does enough to fight trafficking, even if the TIP 
                                                 
1070 Data source: Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report: 10th Edition 
(US Department of State 2010); TIP Office (2017) (n 28). 
1071 TIP Office (2017) (n 28) 86, 149, 170, 296, 376. 
1072 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report: June 2006 (US 
Department of State 2006) 103.   
1073 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons Report: June 2011 (US 
Department of State 2011) 142.   
1074 TIP Office (2010) (n 1070) 130, 148, 278, 310. 
1075 TIP Office (2017) (n 28) 334. 
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Office measures progress in relation to the previous assessment year.1076 The political nature 
of the TIP Report is increasingly exposed, since the US uses the TIP Report to promote its 
foreign policies. This means that strategically important states will receive assessments that are 
more favourable. For example, Szep and Spetalnick exposed that the 2015 TIP Report was 
politically marred after the Interagency Task Force had promoted the low rankings, originally 
determined by the TIP Office, of 11 states of political significance to the US.1077 As the 
rankings determined by the Office are subject to approval and change by the Interagency Task 
Force and the Office has no independence in this regard. Even though the Office’s initial 
determination based on available information clearly indicated that those states did not meet 
the TVPA’s standards and were not making significant efforts to fight trafficking, in which 
case they can be liable to unilateral sanctions.1078 The subsequent year, Spetalnick and 
Wroughton observed the promotion of Thailand’s ranking to ‘smooth’ US relations ‘at a time 
when Washington seeks Southeast Asian unity against China in the South China Sea’.1079 
While the 2016 TIP Report explicitly mentions ‘widespread forced labour’ in the Thailand’s 
vital seafood industry.1080  
It is unsurprising, then, that states, especially those with low rankings will outright 
reject any influence of the TIP Report. For example, China openly criticises the TIP Report 
and argues that US monitoring threatens the principle of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of other states.1081 However, unilateral monitoring by the US through the TIP Report 
has not developed in a vacuum. There is a tradition of congressional oversight in relation to 
human rights, religious freedom, and drug trafficking, and the US has been monitoring 
international human rights protection through the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
since 1977 and religious freedom through the International Religious Freedom Report since 
1999. Moreover, the economic sanctions regime under the TVPA resembles sanctioning 
through the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report since 1987. Yet, those reports are 
consistently criticised for their bias and politicisation, as they are also important foreign policy 
                                                 
1076 TVPRA 2003 (n 47) s 6(d)(3). 
1077 Szep and Spetalnick (n 775). 
1078 TVPA (n 47) s 110(a). 
1079 Matt Spetalnick and Lesley Wroughton, ‘U.S. Downgrades Myanmar, Raises Thailand in Human Trafficking 
Report’ (Reuters, 1 July 2016) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-humantrafficking-usa-idUSKCN0ZG1U3> 
accessed 11 November 2016.   
1080 TIP Office (2016) (n 74) 364. 
1081 ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on July 4, 2016’ (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, 4 July 2016) 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1377405.shtml> accessed 11 November 
2016.   
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tools of the US.1082 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the reputation for good policy is an 
effective compliance factor and states use reputation tools to exert ‘soft’ pressure on other 
states.1083 
 Nonetheless, since the first TIP Report in 2001, there has been a dramatic shift in scope, 
methodology, and approaches to increase the perceived credibility of assessments. For 
example, the initial TIP Reports covered only 83 countries of origin, transit, and destination. 
However, increased ratification of the UN Trafficking Protocol necessitated wider coverage of 
states, in particular, because the TIP Office monitors anti-trafficking efforts as the Protocol’s 
de facto treaty-monitoring mechanism. Its current coverage of 188 countries affected by the 
trafficking problem includes non-parties to the Protocol. Thus, there is an increased benefit of 
reporting through the TIP Report because this means that the anti-trafficking efforts of those 
states are still subject to international scrutiny. There is no doubt that the TIP Report contributes 
to knowledge production in the field about different trafficking forms and different national 
responses. Despite their formalistic nature, the country narratives in the TIP Report also limit 
the extent to which individual states can control the flow of information as otherwise ‘even the 
most egregious failure on the part of a state to deal with trafficking-related exploitation would 
likely come at little reputational or other cost’.1084 However, it is surprising that the TIP Report 
does not refer to or cite its information sources, which would lend greater support to its 
assessments, which do not directly involve the assessed states. For this reason, the TIP Report 
is not typically incorporated into international legal research in the field.1085 Even though a 
comparative study on the different assessment methodologies of the TIP Office and GRETA 
found a strong correlation between their ‘compliance’ indices, which gives further credibility 
to their assessments.1086 A final point relates to the more nuanced position of the TIP Report 
on the relationship between prostitution and trafficking since 2010, namely that consensual 
prostitution ‘regardless of whether it is legalized, decriminalized, or criminalized’ is not 
trafficking.1087 This position is in line with international law that does not equate prostitution 
                                                 
1082 Thomas Melito, ‘Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary and the Chairman, Committee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives’ (2006) U.S. Government Accountability Office GAO-06-
8252006, 9 <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06825.pdf> accessed 24 February 2017. 
1083 Koh (n 716) 1500-1501. 
1084 Gallagher (2011) (n 93) 392. 
1085 Feasley (n 776) 8.   
1086 Jan Van Dijk and Fanny Klerx-Van Mierlo, ‘Quantitative Indices for Anti-Human Trafficking Policies: Based 
on Reports of the U.S. State Department and the Council of Europe’ (2014) 61(2) Crime, Law and Social Change 
229, 247. 
1087 TIP Office (2010) (n 1070) 8. 
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and trafficking. Yet, the TIP Office continues to assess whether states, including those with 
legalised sex industries, reduce the demand for prostitution as part of their efforts to combat 
trafficking.1088 While states continue to determine individually measures to discourage the 
demand for trafficking, this assessment criteria would appear to unnecessarily lower some 
states tier-ranking. 
5.2.5. Preliminary Conclusions 
The international study draws four preliminary conclusions. First, the implementation of the 
UN Trafficking Protocol is monitored through a crude enforcement mechanism, even though 
the WGTIP has played some role in interpreting key concepts around the Protocol’s definition. 
Second, article 6 of the CEDAW has been of limited focus to the work of the CEDAW 
Committee, and the general recommendations and the concluding observations are broadly 
programmatic. Third, through the thematic and country-specific reports, the SRTIP has played 
an important role in clarifying the substantive content of anti-trafficking rights and obligations, 
and the communications have helped to highlight the most prevalent trafficking risks. Even 
though the tangible results of its work depend upon long-term human rights protection by 
states. Fourth, the tension between the use of the TIP Report to encourage other states to combat 
trafficking and further other US foreign policy reduces the credibility of reporting by the TIP 
Office. Yet, the TIP Report remains the most influential document in the field in terms of 
knowledge production. 
5.3. European Responses 
This section focuses on the added-value of the work of GRETA, in section 5.3.1, and of the 
European Commission, in section 5.3.2, in terms of increasing knowledge production and 
international regulation in the field. The two preliminary conclusions to this core section are 
laid out in section 5.3.3. 
5.3.1. GRETA: Country Reports based on Country Visits 
A number of features that make for an effective enforcement mechanism are present in the 
structure of the bipartite mechanism composed of GRETA and the Committee of the Parties, 
even though the work of the latter becomes relevant only after the completion of GRETA’s 
                                                 
1088 TVPRA 2008 (n 47) s 106(2)(D). 
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reporting of implementation of the COE Trafficking Convention. For example, GRETA has 
independence to determine the rules of procedure for evaluating implementation of the 
Convention so that it can select the specific provisions of the Convention on which each 
evaluation, which is divided into rounds, shall be based.1089 This also means that GRETA has 
sufficient time to consider implementation of the specific provisions of the Convention, much 
like the COP that establishes a programme of work that it reviews at regular intervals to cover 
different subject areas of the UNCTOC and its additional Protocols.1090 By contrast, the 
CEDAW Committee, which is more akin to GRETA as both are human rights enforcement 
mechanisms composed of independent experts, reviews overall implementation of the 
CEDAW at its sessions and the length of such sessions is predetermined under the CEDAW. 
Consequently, there is a backlog of state reports to the Committee.1091 Even though the 
Committee’s work applies to four times the number of state parties to the COE Trafficking 
Convention and resources for effective review are comparably inadequate. While there were 
initial doubts about the feasibility of GRETA’s evaluation procedure because of the limited 
resources, the COE does increase the operational budget for country visits to accommodate 
evaluation of new state parties.1092 Country visits are another added-value of monitoring by 
GRETA, compared to the CEDAW Committee that cannot effectively undertake visits to each 
state party on account of the sheer number of ratifications to the CEDAW and the already 
inadequate resources. The country visits serve a two-fold purpose of corroborating information, 
which is collected from states through questionnaires to initiate the evaluation round,1093 and 
increase its knowledge base about the Convention’s implementation by the visited state. More 
importantly, GRETA does not require an invitation of visit from state parties, which as a 
necessary component of visits undertaken by the SRTIP hampers its work on studying the 
prevalent trafficking risks because a number of states repeatedly postpone issuing an invitation, 
and others refuse to do so.1094 To this end, it is also favourable that the delegation of GRETA 
members decides on the programme of the country visit to reduce the possible control of the 
government over the flow of information that becomes readily available to GRETA during its 
                                                 
1089 GRETA ‘Rules of procedure for evaluating implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings by the parties’ THB-GRETA(2014)52 (GRETA Evaluating Rules of 
Procedure) rules 1, 4. 
1090 COP (2004) (n 556) para 38. 
1091 Hodson (n 522) 563. 
1092 GRETA (2012) (n 856) para 26. 
1093 GRETA Evaluating Rules of Procedure (n 1089) rule 3. 
1094 Gallagher and Ezeilo (n 41) 921.  
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visit.1095 It follows that the COP had considered the feasibility of establishing a supplementary 
review mechanism resembling the ‘advantageous’ structure of GRETA, which encouraged 
‘more active government ownership of the review process and outcomes’ on account of its 
independent composition and involvement of government in response to the draft country 
report.1096 Even though a detailed evaluation was not possible at the time as GRETA had just 
marked its first anniversary and it had yet to begin formally evaluating implementation of the 
COE Trafficking Convention. In the lead-up to finalising the proposed mechanism under the 
UNCTOC regime based on peer-review, GRETA’s structure was considered anew but states 
ultimately decided on a peer-review model in which governments are most likely to have an 
active involvement in the review process and its outcomes.1097  
 



































































 GRETA is currently in its second evaluation round, which began in 2014 and lasts four 
years. As of October 2017, only Belgium and Romania have completed both evaluation rounds, 
as illustrated in the table above. The Czech Republic as the most recent state to ratify the COE 
                                                 
1095 GRETA Evaluating Rules of Procedure (n 1089) rule 9. 
1096 UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
‘Possible mechanisms to review implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto’ (26 August 2008) UN Doc CTOC/COP/2008/3 para 25.  
1097 UN Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
‘Compilation of comments and views received from States on all options regarding an appropriate and effective 
review mechanism for the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols 
thereto’ (5 August 2015) UN Doc CTOC/COP/WG.8/2015/2 para 97(d). 
1098 Data source: GRETA (2012) (n 451) 8 (Romania); GRETA (2013) (n 427) 9 (Belgium); GRETA (2014) (n 
459) 9-10 (Sweden); GRETA (2014) (n 457) 10-11 (the Netherlands); GRETA (2015) (n 430) 9-10 (Finland); 
GRETA ‘Provisional timetable for the Second evaluation round’ GRETA(2014)14rev2. 
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Trafficking Convention will begin its first evaluation round by addressing GRETA’s 
questionnaire at the latest two years following the entry into force of the Convention, namely 
by July 2019.1099 The first evaluation round focused on the Convention’s provisions that would 
provide GRETA with an overview of national implementation, namely key concepts and 
definitions, and specific measures on prevention, prosecution, and protection.1100 While the 
second evaluation round centres on the impact of legislative, policy, and practical measures on 
prevention, prosecution, and protection.1101 However, only GRETA’s final evaluation report 
on Romania is currently publically available. That GRETA does not make publically available 
its draft evaluation reports reduces the transparency of reporting and prevents early NGO 
involvement in the reporting process, as well as, public discussion at the national level. 
Planitzer argues that the public availability of GRETA’s draft reports would ensure more 
focused shadow reports by NGOs and more focused discussions with GRETA during country 
visits.1102 By contrast, the CEDAW Committee reviews state reports and enters into 
constructive dialogues with states in a public setting.  
There is a strong correlation between the concluding observations of the CEDAW 
Committee and GRETA in relation to the case studies. For example, both mechanisms 
recommend that Romania intensify its efforts to train labour inspectors to identify labour 
trafficking victims, including in domestic households, through proactive and unannounced 
inspections.1103 There is also concerted recognition of bilateral and multilateral cooperation by 
Sweden and the support it provides to anti-trafficking efforts in other states.1104 This correlation 
reinforces the importance of the recommendations made by both mechanisms to improve 
human rights protection of victims, and helps to identify the priority areas of a human rights-
based and victim-oriented approach. However, GRETA’s reports are comparably more 
detailed, which lends support to concrete recommendations. For example, GRETA 
recommends that the Netherlands should involve more stakeholders in the identification 
process, such as NGOs that regularly encounter victims, because identification currently rests 
                                                 
1099 GRETA Evaluating Rules of Procedure (n 1089) rule 3. 
1100 GRETA ‘Questionnaire for the evaluation of the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by the Parties: First evaluation round’ GRETA(2010)1 rev4. 
1101 GRETA ‘Questionnaire for the evaluation of the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by the parties: Second evaluation round’ GRETA(2014)13. 
1102 Julia Planitzer, ‘GRETA’s First Years of Work: Review of the Monitoring of Implementation of the Council 
of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings’ (2012) 1 Anti-Trafficking Review 31, 36. 
1103 GRETA ‘Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings by Romania: Second evaluation round’ (8 July 2016) GRETA(2016)20 para 56; 
CEDAW Committee (2017) (n 1011) para 21(c). 
1104 GRETA (2014) (n 459) para 221; CEDAW Committee (2017) (n 1011) para 29. 
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with law enforcement agencies ‘giving it a criminal-law bias that may be prejudicial to the 
situation of victims’.1105 Another example is the importance, which GRETA attaches to the 
involvement of NGOs, trade unions, and other civil society actors in the planning and 
implementation of anti-trafficking policies in Sweden for effective human rights protection.1106  
The human rights-based and victim-orientated approach allows GRETA to affirm the 
substantive content of human rights norms and obligations, such as early identification of 
victims by training all professionals who may encounter trafficking victims.1107 Moreover, it 
clarifies that the identification obligation includes identifying as victims of trafficking such 
persons whenever there are reasonable grounds to do so, and to provide immediate and 
effective access to protection and assistance, including a reflection period, a residence permit, 
and compensation.1108 GRETA also reaffirms in relation to Belgium,1109 Finland,1110 the 
Netherlands,1111 Sweden,1112 and Romania1113 that access to those protection and assistance 
entitlements should not depend upon the potential of investigations and prosecutions, or their 
continuation.  
At the same time, in Romania’s second evaluation report, GRETA repeats its 
recommendation on providing victims with effective access to their protection and assistance 
entitlements.1114 This implies a problem in the proper implementation of GRETA’s 
recommendations by states. Even though the Committee of the Parties promotes cooperation 
with the concerned state for the proper implementation of measures recommended by it and 
based on GRETA’s report.1115 However, in the specific case, the Committee had endorsed 
wholly GRETA’s original recommendations, thereby, recommending inter alia that all 
assistance measures provided for in law are guaranteed in practice.1116 There is a high overlap 
between the reports of GRETA and the Committee, which implies that the latter has yet to 
develop a clear identity separate to GRETA. Gallagher makes a similar remark in relation to 
                                                 
1105 GRETA (2014) (n 457) para 240. 
1106 GRETA (2014) (n 459) para 225. 
1107 ibid para 226. 
1108 GRETA (2016) (n 1103) paras 103, 119. 
1109 GRETA (2013) (n 427) para 237. See also CEDAW Committee (2014) (n 1011) para 25(d). 
1110 GRETA (2015) (n 430) para 228. See also CEDAW Committee (2014) (n 1011) para 21(c). 
1111 GRETA (2014) (n 457) para 241. 
1112 GRETA (2014) (n 459) para 223. See also CEDAW Committee (2016) (n 1011) para 29. 
1113 GRETA (2012) (n 451) para 207. See also CEDAW Committee (2017) (n 1011) para 21(d). 
1114 GRETA (2016) (n 1103) para 119. 
1115 Committee of the Parties Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 
‘Rules of procedure of the Committee of the Parties’ THB-CP(2008)2 rule 1(b). 
1116 Committee of the Parties to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 
Recommendation CP(2012)7 on the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against 
Trafficking in Human Beings by Romania para 1 
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the overlap of reports during their first year of operation.1117 Nonetheless, non-implementation 
of a specific recommendation does not necessarily reduce the Committee’s potential to promote 
proper implementation of the COE Trafficking Convention, since the divergence in human 
rights protection is not always the result of a lack of political will. According to Gallagher and 
the SRTIP, the complexity of the trafficking problem, the uncertainty of aspects of the solution, 
and that states are rarely directly complicit in the trafficking all complicate the task of securing 
proper implementation of norms and obligations.1118  
GRETA possesses certain features to emerge as a key player in terms of developing, 
articulating, and applying international law to the trafficking problem.1119 In particular, its 
reporting covers a significant number of countries of origin, transit, and destination within the 
Eurasian context, and through the significant possibility for non-COE member states to become 
party to the COE Trafficking Convention, GRETA additionally monitors implementation by 
Belarus. Moreover, its work in clarifying international norms and obligations partly offsets 
weak monitoring by the WGTIP, and, more importantly, complements more robust monitoring 
by other human rights enforcement mechanisms, such as the CEDAW Committee, which 
benefits from a vital but underutilised individual complaints procedure to increase human rights 
protection. The jurisdiction of the ECtHR over trafficking offences under article 4 of the ECHR 
compensates for the absence of this procedure under GRETA. Even though the PACE had 
proposed the right of international and national NGOs with consultative status with the COE 
to submit to GRETA complaints of ‘unsatisfactory application’ of the COE Trafficking 
Convention by state parties, since NGOs cannot submit collective complaints to the ECtHR on 
behalf of individuals.1120 As Scarpa rightly observes, this inclusion would have transformed 
the Convention into a model convention.1121 
5.3.2. The European Commission: Biennial Progress and Assessment Reports, 
and the Infringement Procedure 
It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the work of the European Commission under 
article 20 of the EU Trafficking Directive. So far, it has prepared just one biennial report on 
the progress made in the fight against trafficking, based on information on trafficking trends, 
the results of anti-trafficking efforts, and statistics submitted by NREMs, civil society 
                                                 
1117 Gallagher (2010) (n 40) 476. 
1118 Gallagher and Ezeilo (n 41) 932. 
1119 Gallagher (2010) (n 40) 476. 
1120 PACE Opinion 253 (n 857) para 14(xxiii). 
1121 Scarpa (n 239) 159. 
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organisations, and EU agencies.1122 The report also considers GRETA’s reports to ensure the 
complementarity of reporting with its regional counterpart, thus, there is a high overlap 
between the conclusions of GRETA and the European Commission.1123 The ATC, which 
collects and coordinates the flow of information at the EU level and between the Commission 
and member states, has worked proactively in the preparation of this report. Even though the 
ATC’s voice does not surface in the report, and there is only brief mention in the accompanying 
Commission staff working document of the ATC’s work with NREMs in creating a template 
for reporting under the Directive and with EU agencies for information exchanges.1124 The 
progress report together with the accompanying document, which were published on 19 May 
2016, provide detailed and comprehensive factual information on action taken by member 
states, as well as, by the Commission and other stakeholders under the EU anti-trafficking 
strategy, which expired in 2016.1125 Thus, the report also serves to feed into the development 
of a new strategy post-2016. But a post-2016 strategy has not yet been presented, even though 
it was one of the main topics discussed during the April 2017 plenary session of the European 
Parliament.1126 The report highlights a number of key challenges, including addressing all 
forms of trafficking-related exploitation, increasing the number of investigations and 
prosecutions, improving data collection, early identification of victims, offering protection and 
assistance to all victims, and cooperating meaningfully with civil society.1127 The report also 
notes the importance of regular participation of NREMs in the informal EU network in which 
they are constituted ‘to work at an operational, strategic, and monitoring level’.1128 
In addition to the biennial progress report, the European Commission is mandated to 
prepare two assessment reports on the extent of transposition of the EU Trafficking Directive 
in applicable member states and the impact of existing national laws, which criminalise the use 
of services provided by trafficking victims, with a view to preventing trafficking.1129 Those 
reports were examined in chapters 2 and 3 in relation to the national responses of the case 
                                                 
1122 Commission Report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings (2016) as required 
under Article 20 of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting 
its victims COM(2016)267 final. 
1123 ibid 8. 
1124 Commission Staff Working Document (n 68) 6, 7. 
1125 Commission Communication The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-
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1128 ibid 15. 
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studies in this thesis. The first report concludes that there is significant room for improvement 
in realising complete and correct transposition of the Directive followed by its meaningful 
implementation in the domestic context, in particular, with regard to victim and witness 
protection before and during criminal proceedings, unconditional access to assistance, 
compensation, non-punishment of victims for status-related crimes, and prevention.1130 The 
second report demonstrates a diverse legal landscape on the demand side of the trafficking 
problem, ‘which fails to effectively contribute to discouraging demand for [trafficking] 
services’, since the complete absence of or inadequate criminalisation of the use of such 
services creates legal uncertainty and fosters a culture of impunity.1131 However, both reports 
are rather formalistic in nature. An instinctive conclusion based on the late release of both 
reports is that data collection is an incipient problem of monitoring by the Commission. Since 
a proper assessment of the transposition measures of member states depends upon the timely 
transmission of the text of such measures to the Commission by the stipulated deadline. This 
could also explicate the added-value of considering GRETA’s reports in relation to the biennial 
progress report. Member states were required to bring their laws into compliance with the 
Directive by 6 April 2013, and to notify the Commission that they had done so by transmitting 
to it the texts of updated or new laws. The Commission would then have two years to assess 
formal legal compliance with the Directive and to submit its report to this end by 6 April 2015. 
The second report on existing measures to discourage the demand for trafficking services was 
due the following year by 6 April 2016.  
However, half of the member states failed to transpose the Directive by the stipulated 
deadline or to notify the Commission that they had done so. The infringement proceedings, 
which were subsequently initiated against those states for noncompliance with their 
transposition obligation under the Directive, were indicative of the Commission’s ability to 
monitor member state compliance with the Directive, and the effectiveness of the infringement 
procedure to induce subsequent compliance. The two assessment reports by the Commission, 
which were finally released on 5 December 2016, do not cover the transposition measures of 
Germany, which transposed the Directive late because the parliamentary term was coming to 
end and new measures could not be adopted in the remaining timeframe.1132 At the same time, 
late notification of the transposition measures by infringing states had forced the Commission 
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to postpone the publication of both reports, since effective monitoring of overall transposition 
of the Directive requires the necessary information to be readily available. Germany’s response 
would have been especially useful when assessing measures to discourage the demand for 
prostitution as part of the second assessment report. Since Germany has legalised prostitution 
and the trafficking inflow to Germany is reportedly very high.1133 
 As mentioned already, noncompliance with anti-trafficking norms and obligations is 
rarely the result of a lack of political will, especially with democratic states that value 
international reputation for good policy. This also explicates the importance afforded by the 
Commission to constructive dialoguing with noncompliant states over their sanctioning for 
noncompliance under the infringement procedure.1134 While some note the benefits of a threat 
of coercion as a deterrent to noncompliance with EU law, others point out that consistent 
infringement by some states reduces the perceived weight of a threat of coercion.1135 For 
example, König and Mäder observe that there is a compliance deficit based on their study of 
the extent of transposition of 21 different EU directives, and that the Commission has been 
especially unsuccessful in its attempts to prevent noncompliance by Portugal, Luxembourg, 
and Ireland.1136 This, the authors argue, rests on the ability of member states as cooperating 
actors to anticipate the ability and willingness of the Commission as a monitoring actor to 
sanction noncompliance.1137 Then, compliance for purposive member states is a complex 
strategic compliance game. However, the Commission insists on constructive dialoguing to 
maintain the noncompliant state in the enforcement process towards compliance and uphold 
the instrument’s legitimacy. Moreover, the Commission recognises the need for flexibility in 
assessing the transposition efforts of member states with different legal systems, on account of 
the EU’s growing membership. The different political, social, economic, and cultural 
backgrounds, in particular, between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ member states requires that monitoring 
by the Commission is sufficiently flexible to accommodate difference. The Commission makes 
a similar remark in relation to the characteristics and guiding principles of any review 
                                                 
1133 Jakobsson and Kotsadam (n 102) 103-104. 
1134 TFEU (n 72) arts 258, 260. 
1135 See Jonas Tallberg, ‘Explaining the Institutional Foundations of European Union Negotiations’ (2010) 17(5) 
Journal of European Public Policy 633, 641-642. 
1136 Thomas König and Lars Mäder, ‘Compliance in the European Union: A Strategic Analysis of the Interaction 
between Member States and the Commission in the Implementation Process of Directives’ (PEIO conference, 
Mannheim, January 2012) 14. 
1137 ibid 3. 
  217 
 
mechanism under the UN Trafficking Protocol, which means that the review process should be 
considered as a ‘helping mechanism’ for states.1138 
 The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has streamlined the infringement procedure 
so that the Commission can directly apply to the CJEU to sanction noncompliance, thereby, 
circumventing the ‘obstacles’ of formal notice and reasoned opinion. However, those remain 
necessary in cases of unintentional noncompliance arising from misinterpretation or legal 
uncertainty with ambiguous instruments. Pre-Lisbon Treaty, the early closure of infringement 
proceedings for noncompliance was taken to imply that the Commission’s enforcement of EU 
law was highly successful.1139 However, as Andersen notes, this high success rate was linked 
to the fact that the Commission typically only initiated infringement proceedings, which it was 
most likely to win, because there would be support among member states to condone 
noncompliance of that specific matter.1140 This also meant that serious infringements, if they 
were widespread and member states were subsequently less likely to support the Commission’s 
decision, would foster, thus, undermining that instrument’s legitimacy. The failure of the 
Commission to sanction member states for noncompliance with the Maastricht criteria for a 
common currency because Germany and France refused to enforce the criteria in 2004 is an 
instructive example.1141 The selectivity, thus, exercised by the Commission in deciding which 
enforcement matters to flag-up undermined the overall legitimacy of the infringement 
procedure. As Smith observes, the procedure traditionally operated as a ‘discretionary, 
secretive and diplomatic process of negotiation between the Commission and Member States’, 
which became infeasible as EU membership grew and there was increased acknowledgment of 
the need for transparency in the Commission’s enforcement process.1142 This concern relates 
fundamentally to the democratic deficit in EU governance, on account of the growing number 
of subject matters, which now fall within the competence of the EU system, and the perceived 
illegitimacy on grounds of democracy and loss of state sovereignty.1143 That the EU legislator 
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had provided no guidance on the objectives or methodology of enforcing EU law further 
promoted the Commission’s selectivity of infringement cases. Smith notes that until 2002 the 
Commission had refused to publish any guidance on the criteria it used to determine the 
infringements it would pursue.1144 Thus, the streamlining of the infringement procedure and 
subsequent improvements to the data management system provide less scope for discretionary, 
secretive, and diplomatic negotiations between the Commission and noncompliant states 
because detection and pursuit of non-communication of transposition measures are almost 
automatic now.1145 Toshkov observes that the streamlining, infact, has contributed to the low 
level of compliance deficits.1146 
 Nonetheless, the degree of flexibility, which the Commission is able to grant to its 
enforcement process, is advantageous to transposition of the EU Trafficking Directive as an 
ambitious anti-trafficking framework. As mentioned already, the successful transposition of 
the Directive encompasses transposition of specific measures on residence permits for non-EU 
citizens and sanctioning employers who employ illegal migrants under two separate EU 
directives, in addition to the measures directly under the Directive.1147 Additional measures on 
settling conflict of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, the European arrest warrant, 
confiscation of crime-related assets, the rights of EU citizens and their families to free 
movement within the EU area, and the rights of victims of crime all form part of this ambitious 
anti-trafficking framework, according to the preamble of the Directive. Those measures, which 
are manifest in different EU instruments, make for the integrated, holistic, and human rights-
based approach to fighting trafficking under the Directive.1148 The vast majority of member 
states will already have transposed those measures as part of their transposition obligations 
under the relevant instruments, or will do so as part of their transposition obligation under the 
Directive. But states are most likely to encounter difficulties in the practical implementation of 
this ambitious EU anti-trafficking framework, which the European Commission has yet to 
assess for its quality and practical impact. An assessment of the impact of the transposition 
measures notified to the Commission under Directive will hopefully take place in the next 
biennial progress report on fighting trafficking, which is due mid-2018.  
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5.3.3. Preliminary Conclusions 
The European examination draws two preliminary conclusions. First, GRETA has a real 
potential to emerge as a key player in terms of developing, articulating, and applying 
international law to the trafficking problem, on account of the number of different countries of 
origin, transit, and destination, which it can monitor, as well as, its reporting process as an 
independent human rights enforcement mechanism with significant state involvement. Second, 
the examination of the first biennial progress report and the two assessment reports prepared 
by the Commission do not provide a definitive conclusion on the effectiveness of monitoring 
under the EU Trafficking Directive. Even though those reports imply that the Commission’s 
enforcement process will be largely formalistic. 
5.4. National Responses 
This section examines collectively the impact of the work of the NREMs of Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, with a preliminary conclusion in 
section 5.4.2. 
5.4.1. The NREMs of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Romania, and Sweden: Research, Report, Review, and Recommend 
The reporting by national rapporteurs and equivalent mechanisms serves a two-fold purpose of 
gathering information on the scope of the trafficking problem in individual states and of self-
assessment of existing national responses. According to Goździak, the vast investments in the 
field of action are unparalleled to empirical research on trafficking in persons so that responses 
have developed ‘without a clear idea of the extent of the problem or a uniform methodology 
for determining the scope of the issue’.1149 The limited knowledge, in fact, impedes victim 
identification, obstructs provision of culturally appropriate and effective services, limits 
prevention of repeat victimisation, and reduces the possibility of successfully prosecuting 
traffickers.1150 The reporting mandates of the National Rapporteurs examined here, therefore, 
play a vital role in increasing knowledge about domestic realities and provide the foundational 
knowledge base for implementing the integrated, holistic, and human rights-based approach 
most recently espoused by the EU system. The obligation under article 19 of the EU Trafficking 
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Directive to establish the NREM within states’ domestic legal systems to assess trafficking 
trends and the results of anti-trafficking efforts, and gather statistics affirms the need for 
evidence-based policies. Yet, the essential reporting mandates of the National Rapporteurs 
have not received adequate academic attention. Mattar provided the first comprehensive study 
on the reporting mandates of National Rapporteurs almost a decade ago.1151 The study 
advocated establishing an independent and competent national rapporteur or equivalent 
mechanism to assess government actions to combat the problem and recommend changes that 
should be implemented to reform existing policies. Similarly, Paterson and Vermeulen in their 
2010 EU-funded research project to address the fragmented and often partial and incomplete 
nature of existing trafficking data recommended assuming an independent national rapporteur 
with a mandate ‘to identify a central place at national level where information from different 
sources is brought together and analysed’.1152 The NREMs examined here fulfil similar 
functions of research, report, review, and recommend. The main differences relate to the kind 
of research, the range of sources, and the discretion to make actionable recommendations to 
government and parliament, which are specific and amenable to implementation.  
  Belgium prepares two separate annual reports given the bipartite structure of the 
National Rapporteur. The Criminal Policy Department on behalf of the Belgian Coordination 
Platform prepares the biennial government report on trafficking and smuggling in persons, 
which provides a general assessment of all initiatives on trafficking and smuggling in persons 
taken by the ministerial departments represented on the Platform. The French, Dutch, and 
English versions of those reports since 2002 are available on its website.1153 The information 
is collected directly from the ministerial departments every two years and additionally from 
the magistrates and police officers involved also every two years during an information 
exchange workshop on trafficking and smuggling in persons. Myria publishes a separate annual 
report on trafficking and smuggling in persons, and the French and Dutch versions since 1999 
and the English version since 2005 are all available on its website.1154 The website includes 
reports by the former reporting mechanism, namely the Centre for Equal Opportunities and 
Opposition to Racism. Those reports provide a short analytical commentary on information 
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voluntarily provided by the police, the social inspection services, the College of Public 
Prosecutors, the Immigration Office, the three specialised victim reception centres, and the 
Criminal Policy Services.1155  
The Czech Republic publishes annual ‘status reports’ on trafficking since 2008 and both 
the Czech and English versions are available on the Ministry of the Interior’s website.1156 Those 
reports provide ‘detailed information on the situation in the area of trafficking in human beings 
in the Czech Republic’ and appropriate information on foreign cases and situations connected 
to the Czech Republic.1157 The information is collected from the ministerial departments 
represented on the Inter-Ministerial Coordination Group for Combating Trafficking in Human 
Beings, as well as, specialised NGOs and IGOs, and Czech consulates and embassies. Those 
reports also make recommendations on the primary areas of attention for the Inter-ministerial 
Coordination Group when implementing the national anti-trafficking strategy. Trafficking as a 
fundamental issue of internal security is additionally covered in the annual ‘reports on public 
order and internal security in the Czech Republic’, which provide ‘an overview of the 
development, structure, and dynamics of crime, its perpetrators and victims’.1158 
In Finland, trafficking as a discriminatory practice is covered by the annual reports of 
the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman, and the Finnish, Swedish, and English versions can be 
found on its website.1159 The website includes reports since 2009 by the former reporting 
mechanism, namely the Ombudsman for Minorities. Between 2012 and 2014, three annual 
reports on trafficking were released under the mandate of the National Rapporteur but those 
reports had to be discontinued due to meagre personnel resources. The current annual reports 
submitted to government are less comprehensive, typically covering the trafficking problem 
within a few pages. A comprehensive report under the mandate of the National Rapporteur is 
prepared once every four years with actionable recommendations for parliament. The 
information is gathered from authorities, the judiciary, and civil society organisations under a 
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legal right to obtain free information as necessary from authorities.1160 However, the National 
Rapporteur often notes the non-responsiveness of authorities to information requests. As part 
of the mandate of the Non-Discrimination Ombudsman to assist victims of discrimination in 
legal proceedings, information is directly collected from trafficking victims whom the 
Ombudsman assists. 
The Netherlands submits annual reports on trafficking in persons since 2002 and both 
the Dutch and English versions are available on the website of the independent National 
Rapporteur.1161 Those reports contain information on the scope of the trafficking problem in 
Finland and the results of anti-trafficking efforts. In addition to those reports, the National 
Rapporteur prepares comprehensive studies to improve the knowledge base in terms of 
quantitative data1162 and trafficking cases.1163 With regard to the latter study of case-law on 
exploitation in the sex industry, the National Rapporteur observes its direct impact on growing 
attention to this area in the judiciary.1164 De Vries and the National Rapporteur argue that such 
studies aim to ‘lay the foundation for guiding measures to counter trafficking’, in particular, by 
informing policy, exposing bottlenecks, and identifying areas for further research.1165 The 
information is primarily collected from the National Police, the Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service, the Central Fine Collection Agency, and the Public Prosecution Service.1166 Those 
reports are prepared taking into consideration their potential to facilitate cross-country 
comparisons and to help other states to identify more easily trafficking inflows from and to the 
Netherlands. 
Romania produces ‘annual development reports’ on trafficking and reports published 
since 2011, when the National Agency against Trafficking in Persons was administratively 
reinstalled under the Minister of Administration and the Interior, are available on its website, 
however, only in the Romanian language.1167 It is the only reporting mechanism examined here 
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that does not translate its annual reports, even though the office of the National Rapporteur is 
the largest in terms of personnel and organisational structure, with a dedicated department, 
namely the Research and Public Awareness Centre, to carry out assessments of the scope of 
trafficking. Since Romania is the primary origin country for sex trafficking within the EU area, 
translations of those reports would be beneficial for cross-country comparisons and improving 
the knowledge base of other states that experience a trafficking inflow of Romanian 
nationals.1168 Moreover, it should consider making readily available on its website the pre-2011 
annual reports, in the interest of comprehensive reporting. Nonetheless, since 2007, the 
National Rapporteur benefits from direct access to information ‘on the socio-demographic 
population of victims of trafficking; on the history of trafficking; the purpose of exploitation; 
and on all elements of the repatriation process, coordination or assistance in criminal 
proceedings’, as it is responsible for managing the national integrated system for monitoring 
and assessing trafficking victims.1169  
Finally, Sweden reports on the scope of trafficking and the Swedish and English 
versions of the annual ‘situation reports’ between 2010 and 2015 are available on the website 
of the National Police.1170 Those reports primarily aim to raise awareness among the police, 
which, therefore, analyses police investigations, prosecutions, and convictions, and provides 
disaggregated data on the profile of trafficking victims. Like the Czech status reports, the 
situation reports include ‘success stories’, which Mattar argues can have a powerful influence 
on government action.1171 One example concerns the deportation decision of the county police 
of a Romanian national on grounds that her status as a prostitute threatened public order and 
security in Sweden.1172 In accepting her appeal, the Swedish Migration Board affirmed that 
only sex-buying was illegal in Sweden and that her deportation, when prostitution is legal and 
does not represent a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat to society on account of 
any criminal conduct, violated her right as an EU citizen to free movement within the EU 
area.1173 The information necessary for the preparation of the situation reports is gathered from 
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its source at the seven regional Criminal Intelligence Units and the National Operations 
Department, which coordinate and monitor action taken by the authorities involved.1174 
Over the course of their mandates, the National Rapporteurs examined here have made 
some notable recommendations to create a stronger foundation for designing and amending 
anti-trafficking policy but as the Dutch National Rapporteur rightly notes in the third report 
‘what is important is the way in which policymakers actually use this information’.1175 The 
Dutch National Rapporteur, therewith, recommends the adoption of a national action plan to 
‘give real substance to all the good intentions’ expressed by government in response to its first 
report.1176 With the subsequent adoption of the national action plan for trafficking in human 
beings, the government wholly implements the recommendations made in the first and third 
reports.1177 The Dutch example is notable because of the sheer number of recommendations 
made, which by 2010 had amounted to 200 recommendations on different areas of policy 
concern.1178 The vast majority of recommendations were implemented and those that remained 
were repeated in subsequent reports or abandoned because they became irrelevant.1179 The 
follow-up of recommendations made is essential for their effective implementation. The 
establishment of the national integrated system for monitoring and assessing trafficking 
victims,1180 which is now the primary source of information for the reports of the Romanian 
National Rapporteur, is another example of the value of making actionable 
recommendations.1181 At the same time, recommendations of a more fundamental nature can 
contribute to the development of a vision. For example, the need for ‘sufficient realistic 
capacity’ for relevant organisations as proposed by the Dutch National Rapporteur is not a goal 
in itself but it requires governments to consider whether the policy objectives formulated are 
achievable within the resources available.1182 The crippling of adequate resources for the work 
of the National Rapporteurs or of NGOs as service providers and the negative impacts of victim 
rehabilitation were noted in the previous chapter. 
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In their recommendations, the National Rapporteurs also refer to international norms 
and obligations in assessing the effectiveness of national policies. The Czech National 
Rapporteur refers to the EU directive on residence permits for non-EU citizens when evaluating 
the immigration status of trafficking victims who cooperate with national authorities.1183 This 
is notable because at the time the Czech Republic was neither party to the UN Trafficking 
Protocol nor the COE Trafficking Convention, which address the conditionality of assistance 
on victim cooperation. The Czech National Rapporteur recommended that foreign victims must 
always be informed about the possibility of obtaining the residence permit, of at least six 
months, and that they must be granted adequate time for reflection, during which they are 
entitled to assistance.1184 In connection therewith, the National Rapporteur also highlighted that 
the absence of codification of criminal liability of legal persons was a serious obstacle to 
accession to those international instruments and that government should consider codifying 
criminal liability of legal persons to enable the state to fully meet obligations stemming 
therefrom.1185 Even though codification took place only in 2012. At the same time, the 
recommendation of the Finnish National Rapporteur to remove the overlapping of penal 
provisions on trafficking in persons and pandering, as well as, to strengthen the legal status of 
persons subjected to pandering as an injured party in the criminal procedure ‘motivated’ the 
setting-up of a working group to amend the Criminal Code.1186 The Finnish National 
Rapporteur underlined with reference to the COE Trafficking Convention and the Trafficking 
Principles and Guidelines that criminal procedures and court hearings were also important for 
securing victims’ human rights, including the right to compensation.1187 So that from the 
victim’s perspective, correct identification as a trafficked person, rather than procured 
prostitute was, in fact, relevant.1188 The National Rapporteur’s recommendation had helped not 
only to clarify the law but also to highlight the more subtle forms of coercion under the terms 
‘abuse of power’ and ‘position of vulnerability’, which the UN Trafficking Protocol does not 
define.  
An important element of their reporting is political and social mobilisation to influence 
policy outcomes. This means raising awareness of trafficking until it causes political and social 
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mobilisation to proactively fight the trafficking problem. The theory of mobilisation is 
advanced most notably by Simmons in the context of a domestic politics theory of treaty 
compliance.1189 In relation to hard enforcement and the role of the courts in inducing treaty 
compliance, Simmons argues that ‘litigation’s power resides not so much in its ability to 
provide every victim with a decisive win in court. Litigation is also a political strategy … to 
mobilise political movements’.1190 The publicity of cases, particularly where the injustice is 
great, can cause social mobilisation that forces governments as political actors and 
representatives of the people to show greater concern for what groups in society ‘want’. 
Political actors are accountable to citizens and must therefore balance the costs of 
noncompliance against the support of citizens ‘who benefit from the particular treaty or from 
the state’s compliance with international law more broadly’.1191 But courts currently do not 
possess the expertise to deal effectively with trafficking cases and the training of the judiciary 
is often recommended in the reports of the CEDAW Committee and GRETA. At the same 
time, the ability of Myria to provide legal assistance to victims can encourage a similar effect 
of mobilisation, further reinforced through its annual reports. However, for this to happen 
recommendations must be specific and amenable to implementation. 
One point of contention is that most of the reports of the National Rapporteurs do not 
cover action taken or proposed by NGOs, even though they remain an important information 
source for the reports prepared by the National Rapporteurs. This suggests an information gap 
on NGOs as service providers. Nonetheless, they are included in appropriate recommendations. 
For example, the Swedish National Rapporteur proposes increased collaboration between the 
judicial system and NGOs to improve understanding of victims’ situations and to reinforce the 
judicial system’s handling of trafficking cases.1192 There is, therefore, an implicit recognition 
of their relevance in improving human rights protection. The obvious exception to this 
contention is Myria’s reports, since Myria additionally coordinates the three specialised 
reception centres assisting victims. In light of the emphasis on human rights protection in the 
current national anti-trafficking action plan, Myria proposes to maintain and stabilise the 
structural financing of those centres ‘whose expertise and efficiency has been proved’ but has 
not been adequately dealt with despite efforts to find a temporary solution.1193  
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5.4.2. Preliminary Conclusion 
The national exploration draws the preliminary conclusion that the harmonisation of national 
responses as a prerequisite for effective and wide cooperation is best guaranteed through 
domestic monitoring of the implementation of the preeminent anti-trafficking instruments by 
domestically-grown mechanisms of enforcement that are sufficiently close to government to 
pressure reform, as well as, to victims and their representatives to study the practical effects of 
anti-trafficking policies. As Kotiswaran rightly notes, domestic anti-trafficking law is a critical 
site for conceptualising solutions and domestic law is more easily amended to cater for more 
creative developments in the field, such as the setting-up of national rapporteurs and equivalent 
mechanisms.1194 
5.5. Conclusions  
This chapter studied the impact of the work of the enforcement mechanisms directly or 
indirectly attaching to the UN Trafficking Protocol, the CEDAW, the Trafficking Principles 
and Guidelines, the COE Trafficking Convention, and the EU Trafficking Directive. It 
additionally covered within the international study the TVPA given its extraterritorial scope 
and the significant influence of its enforcement mechanism, namely the TIP Office, in raising 
international awareness of the trafficking problem and holding states accountable to anti-
trafficking norms and obligations around prevention, prosecution, and protection through their 
ranking in the TIP Report. The work of the TIP Office examined in section 5.2.4, in particular, 
has raised some important questions about the appropriateness of international regulation and 
the responses developed and adopted by states within the formal processes of international and 
European law. However, the impact study on the work of the TIP Office does not provide a 
definitive conclusion on the effectiveness or appropriateness of more coercive enforcement in 
terms of the Office’s sanctioning power over governments it deems not to have made serious 
and sustained efforts to fight trafficking, in particular, whether such efforts demonstrate 
‘appreciable progress’ as one of its main assessment criteria. The subjectivity of some 
assessment terms, including the ‘insignificant’ percentage of foreign victims in the territory a 
state, and the failure of the TVPA and the TIP Report to specify how those terms are 
determined, appears to undermine the objectivity of reporting by the TIP Office. At the same 
time, that the tier-rankings determined by the Office are subject to approval and change by the 
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Interagency Task Force, which has been exposed for undermining the credibility of the Office’s 
work and using the TIP Report to promote US foreign policy non-related to the fight against 
trafficking, has demonstrated the negative effects of US unilateralism not only on respect for 
the international principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference but 
also on the need for cooperation. In particular, it questions to what the extent US unilateralism 
in the field actually promotes the paramount objective of cooperation, and whether states can 
really be expected to cooperate with the US that chooses to act unilaterally. US scrutiny of 
government efforts using purely domestic standards, which deviate in substantial ways from 
those expressed at the international level are also indicative of US exceptionalism. The context-
specific nature of the trafficking problem and its scope in individual states creates problems in 
terms of US understanding of ‘compliance’. In particular, when ‘appreciable’ progress appears 
to be more critical of the efforts of less powerful and strategically unimportant states. The 
unilateral sanctions regime employed by the US to encourage foreign adherence to the TVPA’s 
minimum standards also raises concerns over the actual impact on victims’ human rights 
protection. Are states applying US standards only for continued receipt of foreign aid, or is 
there an actual intention to protect and assist trafficking victims, with a view to preventing 
further exploitation and re-trafficking? The answer will directly influence anti-trafficking 
policy and practice, most likely to the detriment of victims’ human rights. States will fight 
trafficking regardless of foreign aid and foreign rankings, if the problem threatens to thwart the 
rule of law, which trafficking in persons clearly does, as explained in chapter 1.  
 The constructive dialoguing, which takes places at the international and European 
levels, between the enforcement mechanisms and states provides an important opportunity for 
monitored states to raise implementation challenges and for mechanisms to clarify the 
substantive content of anti-trafficking norms and obligations. There is no means of challenging 
the tier-rankings of the TIP Office through a similar process, thus, states will most likely refuse 
to accept US interference in their domestic affairs. Yet, there is come credibility to reporting 
by the TIP Office, and its conclusions and recommendations are similar to those made by the 
other enforcement mechanisms examined here, such as GRETA. A comparative study on the 
assessments made by the TIP Office and GRETA corroborates a complementarity in their 
reporting. 
However, the explicit human rights-based approach of the CEDAW Committee, the 
SRTIP, and GRETA, observed in sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3, and 5.3.1 respectively, have been 
instrumental in recognising and holding states accountable to the highest standard of human 
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rights protection in the field, manifest in the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines. This 
instrument is legally non-binding and there is little evidence of states applying or referring to 
its principles when designing and amending policies. Yet, two examples of national reference 
to specific principles under this instrument were highlighted in section 5.4 in relation to the 
recommendations of the Czech and Finnish National Rapporteurs on the immigration status of 
non-EU trafficking victims and the overlapping of trafficking and pandering offences. In the 
latter example, the removal of this overlapping by the Finnish government was an express 
recognition of the importance of human rights protection, since the legal reform was motivated, 
in particular, by the Finnish National Rapporteur’s recommendation. The Finnish National 
Rapporteur had also recognised in this context the typical focus of pre-trial investigation 
authorities and courts on crime-fighting so that the status of the victim as a trafficked person 
or pandered prostitute was irrelevant. The Finnish National Rapporteur had, therefore, with 
reference to international standards both increased knowledge about the vulnerability of 
victims within the criminal justice response and promoted international regulation. The many 
examples identified throughout this chapter highlight the positive impact of human rights 
enforcement mechanisms on trafficking. The notable exception is the work of the European 
Commission under the EU Trafficking Directive, examined in section 5.3.2, but as explained 
therein it is too early to assess its impact as the Commission has released only one biennial 
progress report, while the two assessment reports provide a rather formalistic evaluation of 
transposition measures of member states. It is expected that subsequent reports will provide a 
more meaningful analysis of state progress in the fight against trafficking at the EU level, and 
that the work of the ATC in terms of coordinating information flow at the EU level will become 
more evident. 
 A major challenge to the exercise of the mandates of all mechanisms identified here is 
the absence of information that is necessary for making concrete recommendations. The 
unavailability, or inaccessibility in the specific case of the TIP Office, of information on the 
scope of trafficking has seriously hampered the ability of those mechanisms to adequately 
assess the extent of compliance with international anti-trafficking norms and obligations. The 
CEDAW Committee repeatedly requests state parties to include in their reports disaggregated 
data so that it has a better understanding of the practical effects of current responses. This is 
also important in relation to its general recommendations, which contain proposals of a more 
fundamental nature, such as the obligation of states to address the root causes of trafficking 
that maintain vulnerability and foster gender-based violence. The country visits undertaken by 
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the SRTIP and GRETA help to provide a glimpse of domestic realities and the conclusions 
drawn therefrom can feed into the development of more appropriate responses. However, the 
SRTIP visits only a limited number of states with prevalent trafficking forms, and GRETA’s 
visits are discretionary upon the need to complement information already received from states 
in their responses to GRETA’s questionnaire. Moreover, monitoring by the international and 
regional mechanisms is less frequent than required to grasp the constantly-evolving nature of 
trafficking. The backlog of state reports in the specific case of the CEDAW Committee, the 
absence of a follow-up procedure to the recommendations of the SRTIP, and the Eurasian-
focus of monitoring by GRETA all augment the need for regular monitoring of government 
efforts. The absence of an effective review mechanism under the UN Trafficking Protocol as 
acknowledged by current efforts to establish a peer-reviewed mechanism also excludes the 
possibility that the main enforcement mechanism of the international anti-trafficking 
framework can provide a better outcome at the international level. Even though it is argued that 
there is a significant potential for GRETA to emerge as a key player in the field given its 
international context, despite its current focus on a specific number of Eurasian states. 
 For these reasons, the focus needs to shift to the domestic level and the national 
rapporteurs and equivalent mechanisms identified in this thesis need to be strengthened to 
provide a strong foundation for the design and implementation of evidence-based anti-
trafficking policies. The Dutch National Rapporteur has been especially successful in 
increasing understanding of the trafficking problem as witnessed by its growing international 
recognition and explicit reference in the explanatory note accompanying the COE Trafficking 
Convention in relation to possible NREM models. Independent mechanisms, such as Myria 
and the Finnish and Dutch National Rapporteurs, are more likely to provide an objective 
assessment of domestic situations than government mechanisms, such as the Czech and 
Swedish National Rapporteurs, because of their increased willingness to address shortcomings 
and internal weaknesses. The recommendations by the Finnish National Rapporteur directed at 
the judicial system are an instructive example. Another example is the sheer number of 
recommendations made by the Dutch National Rapporteur, even though government has not 
acted upon all recommendations. Independent mechanisms are also more likely to adopt a 
human rights-based approach to the trafficking problem because there is less pressure to 
increase the number of investigations, prosecutions, and convictions through a crime-fighting 
focus. This pressure is a direct consequence of the absence of reliable information in the field 
so that governments naturally focus on those numbers as the only tangible results in the field. 
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However, those numbers are at a stagnating low level precisely because there is little 
understanding of the trafficking problem. There is, therefore, a valid reason for strengthening 
the roles of existing NREMs to better monitor and report on domestic realities, and their 
findings can feed into normative development at the international level, thereby, promoting 
international regulation. An appropriate framework for strengthening existing NREM models 
is laid out in the next chapter as part of developing more appropriate responses. Through their 
strengthening and increasing international presence, there will hopefully be more academic 
attention to their work. 
 
  









Trafficking in persons, particularly women, for sexual exploitation, is one of the most 
egregious violations of human rights that the international community now battles. It is a global 
challenge that requires a global response, manifest in the UN Trafficking Protocol, within a 
framework of transnational organised crimes. Today, 172 states from different regions of the 
world tackle human rights, crime, corruption, and trafficking in persons. Cooperatively, they 
address this global challenge at the international and regional levels by adopting multilateral 
legal instruments. Individually, they have legal obligations to implement the provisions of these 
instruments, in relation to prevention, investigation, and prosecution, whether transnational or 
national, whether or not connected with organised crime, as well as, protection of victims. The 
first step of a global response, then, is the harmonisation of national anti-trafficking legislation 
based on the Protocol’s minimum standards, to have a real impact on the ability of international 
criminals to operate successfully and help citizens everywhere. Due to the clandestine nature 
of trafficking and the absence of reliable information, legal harmonisation is also the first 
indicator of progress in the field. Thus, this thesis set out to explore progress in the fight against 
trafficking, by way of example of six European states, namely Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, to illustrate the current challenges to 
international regulation and the general direction of the most appropriate national responses. 
6.2. Central Findings 
It is almost two decades since the adoption of the UN Trafficking Protocol as the cornerstone 
of international regulation. Significant progress has been made in understanding the global 
challenge of trafficking in persons, particularly for sexual exploitation. There has been a flurry 
of legislative action at the international, regional, and national levels, with a growing body of 
mechanisms and tools of enforcement to ensure continued commitment of states in 
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harmonising their national legislations, policies, and practices because of their inability to 
individually tackle the transnational dimension of trafficking. International and regional legal 
instruments on trafficking, thus, serve to fortify international cooperation by elaborating 
minimum standards around the prevention of trafficking, the prosecution of traffickers, and the 
protection of victims. While key provisions do not dictate the manner in which states should 
operationalise the objective of international cooperation. These legal instruments cast a wide 
margin of discretion because many of the issues around trafficking are complex and contested. 
There is not even international consensus on whether the concept of sexual exploitation 
includes consensual prostitution. If the concept of sex trafficking is the cornerstone of any 
international cooperation, then, differing concepts impede this objective. Instead, it appears 
that short-term national interests around prostitution dictate the manner in which states should 
operationalise the objective of international cooperation, much to the detriment of long-term 
cooperation. Since trafficking affects states differently as countries of origin, transit, and/or 
destination. For example, the Czech Republic and Romania as origin countries should pay 
particular attention to preventive measures, while Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden as transit and/or destination countries focus on prosecutorial and protective measures. 
The relative divergence between formal and practical compliance with international and 
regional obligations is instructive of the inherent challenges to realising effective and wider 
cooperation through a transnational cooperative framework. Such framework allows the 
narrow self-interests of state parties to coexist and foster because the effectiveness of the 
institutions managing cooperation depend upon the fragile foundations of state consent. Yet, it 
is most unlikely that the self-interests of states will be equally met by the respective institutions 
because power in international negotiations is asymmetric. The interests of more powerful 
states will trump those of weaker states, which depend most on international cooperation 
because they lack technical capacity. The negotiations of the UN Trafficking Protocol and the 
COE Trafficking Convention are instructive examples. Viewed in this light, it is most unlikely 
that states can realise long-term cooperation based on a transnational cooperative framework. 
Even if a state implements the framework fully and correctly, it can do little to prevent other 
states from deciding what constitutes ‘trafficking’ within their own national jurisdiction. But 
without a common crime there cannot be international cooperation, particularly in relation to 
issues of extradition, such as the double criminality principle and the application of extra-
territorial jurisdiction.  
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The power asymmetry in international negotiations is also an important reason behind 
the adoption of soft law instruments that dispense with certain formalities around the output, 
the process, or the actors involved, traditionally linked to international law-making. Soft 
instruments, such as the Trafficking Principles and Guidelines can aspire to a higher standard 
of human rights protection, a goal unsatisfactorily realised in the transnational cooperative 
framework around trafficking, because, in this specific case, the narrow self-interests of states 
were overlooked. As understanding of trafficking increased, certain provisions of these very 
soft instruments found their way into hard law instruments, such as the COE Trafficking 
Convention. In this way, soft law can minimise impediments to international cooperation. Even 
though there is no guarantee that states will consult soft law when implementing their 
obligations and designing new policies. The emphasis of law enforcement and migration to the 
detriment of human rights protection in the preeminent legal instruments, even the COE 
Trafficking Convention that was forced to lower its human rights standard to match a largely 
migratory approach under EU anti-trafficking law, not only does little to promote the objective 
of victim protection and assistance but also necessitates soft law instruments in the field. 
 The inherent challenges to realising effective and wider cooperation are also visible in 
the mechanisms and tools of enforcement managed by those very institutions, which operate 
without any form of coercion to hold noncompliant states accountable. States have deliberately 
chosen less intrusive mechanisms to enforce compliance, which at least gives an impression 
that states are internationally accountable. This paradox has encouraged unilateral enforcement 
of international norms and standards by none other than the US. The hegemonic positioning of 
individual states in international regulation is not uncommon. However, in this specific case, 
US unilateralism serves a narrow self-interest of redefining the fight against sex trafficking to 
explicitly include consensual prostitution, following unsuccessful attempts at the negotiations 
of the UN Trafficking Protocol. Thus, US unilateralism does not serve international solidarity 
as a key value of the international community, when unilateralism is tolerated because the 
formal processes for enforcing international law are weak or absent. It is, then, a limitation of 
the same formal processes that they cannot restrain individual states from whimsically 
redirecting normative development around trafficking using the threat of low compliance 
rankings that would tarnish the international reputations of states in terms of human rights 
protection and of unilateral sanctions that reduce noncompliance to a lack of political will. 
Even though there is talk of waning political commitment on account of the low number of 
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prosecutions and identified victims, noncompliance can result from inadequate planning, 
agreement ambiguities, capacity limitations, and significant changes over time.  
The formal enforcement of international and regional obligations using less intrusive 
practices that respect state sovereignty, however, has not been entirely ineffective. The 
transnational cooperative framework, which almost two decades ago was weak and ambiguous, 
is in much better shape now, as a result of the efforts of formal enforcement mechanisms to 
clarify any definitional, conceptual, and practical ambiguities, with the aim of enhancing 
international cooperation. Significantly, states are becoming much more adept at delivering the 
minimum of what is required under international and European anti-trafficking laws. Even 
though there are few indications of the impact of national responses on the nature or scale of 
trafficking. The EU Trafficking Directive addresses the lack of reliable information in the field 
by requiring that states appoint national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms (NREMs) to 
measure the results of domestic anti-trafficking actions, which necessarily includes evaluating 
compliance with international and regional obligations. NREMs have a significant potential to 
mobilise domestic stakeholders and exert internal pressure on their governments. The Dutch 
NREM is an instructive example. Thus, these mechanisms can compensate for the procedural 
deficiency in international law-making and help make the law effective again. 
6.3. The Way Forward: A Framework to Strengthen Existing NREMs 
There is now international consensus on the general direction of appropriate responses to 
trafficking. Building on the norms and standards espoused by the UN Trafficking Protocol, the 
COE Trafficking Convention and the more recently adopted EU Trafficking Directive envisage 
an integrated, holistic, and human rights approach that aims to ensure that each form of 
exploitation of trafficking is tackled by the means of the most efficient measures. In the context 
of sex trafficking, the European Commission is currently assessing, with reference to existing 
laws, whether establishing as a criminal offence the use of services which are the objects of 
sexual exploitation of trafficking reduces the demand that fosters trafficking-related 
exploitation. Their proposals will have significant implications for regulation, not only in 
relation to its member states but also third countries with reported trafficking flows into and 
from the European Union (EU). Even within the EU, there is a relative divergence in responses 
to sex trafficking because of their linkage to policies on consensual prostitution that may be 
based on one or more of the issues of morality, public health and order, labour, immigration, 
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and crime. However, each of these issues necessarily dictates a different outcome of trafficking 
responses. 
 At the same time, the international community is preparing for the establishment of a 
review mechanism to assist the Conference of the Parties of the UNCTOC (COP) in the 
evaluation of implementation of the UNCTOC regime, including the UN Trafficking Protocol. 
However, in all likelihood, the review mechanism will be tainted by the same procedural 
deficiencies that make for a weak enforcement mechanism, since states have ensured that the 
process remains in their hands through peer-review. Yet, it will most likely challenge the role 
of the US in the international anti-trafficking discourse as it will struggle to maintain and extend 
its influence over how individual states and the international community respond to sex 
trafficking. One possible future for the annual reports as the cornerstone of the US enforcement 
mechanism’s work is as ‘a diagnostic tool’ that is neither a condemnation nor a reprieve.1195 
The US government already refers to the annual reports as its ‘principal diplomatic tool to 
engage foreign governments on human trafficking’.1196 Then, building on its past experience 
and taking into account the principal of diplomacy, the US enforcement mechanism can emerge 
‘as a support and inspiration for genuinely global governance’.1197 
 Meanwhile, states will continue to implement their international and regional 
obligations with the aim of enhancing international cooperation in cases of transnational 
trafficking. An important obligation to this end is the appointment of NREMs that are 
strategically placed at the domestic level to improve the compliance behaviour of governments. 
It is not enough to merely call for concerted action. Instead, more practical efforts are required 
to foster international cooperation.  
The national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms (NREMs) are gems of national 
responses. Their setting-up and strengthening is necessitated by the inadequacy of 
implementation of international, regional, and national anti-trafficking measures, the nature 
and extent of trafficking, the lack of reliable data and information, and the insufficiency of 
funding for anti-trafficking actions. Thus, they are appointed to assess trafficking trends, gather 
statistics, measure the results of anti-trafficking actions, and report regularly. They are 
constituted in an informal network at the EU level because they can act as a cornerstone of any 
EU wide strategy for data collection and analysis. There is even discussion at the global level 
                                                 
1195 COP (2016) (n 777) para 34. 
1196 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, ‘Annual TIP Report’ (US Department of State, 2017) 
<https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/index.htm> accessed 8 September 2017. 
1197 Gallagher and Chuang (n 220) 343. 
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on how to foster cooperation among NREMs around the world, as well as, partnerships with 
international and regional organisations and mechanisms, such as the Special Rapporteur on 
trafficking in persons (SRTIP).1198 Cooperation among NREMs can facilitate the exchange of 
expertise and good practices among countries of origin, transit, and/or destination, which, in 
turn, can raise the effectiveness of anti-trafficking actions. While cooperation between NREMs 
and the SRTIP, for example, can bolster coordination of an anti-trafficking response that is 
both multilateral and sufficiently close to domestic realities and specificities within a certain 
region.1199 Partnerships of this nature are necessitated by the weak nature of cooperation among 
countries of origin, transit, and/or destination, since partnerships are a prerequisite to effective 
and wider cooperation. 
 In response to calls of international bodies, such as the United Nations General 
Assembly and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, states around the globe 
have established NREMs ‘to encourage the exchange of information and to report on data, root 
causes, factors and trends in trafficking in persons, especially women and girls, and to include 
data on victims of trafficking disaggregated by sex and age’,1200 as well as, ‘to monitor the 
human rights impact of anti-trafficking laws, policies, programmes and interventions’.1201 
NREMs exist in Africa, such as the Nigerian National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in 
Persons and Other Related Matters, and the Ugandan National Anti-trafficking Task Force; in 
Asia, such as the Myanmar Anti-Trafficking in Persons Division, and the Israeli Government 
Coordinator of the Battle against Trafficking in Persons in the Ministry of Justice; in the Middle 
East, such as the Emirati National Committee to Combat Trafficking in Persons; and in Latin 
America, such as the Argentinian Inter-Ministerial Group on Anti-trafficking, and the Brazilian 
Coordinator of the National Policy for Combating Trafficking in Persons.1202 Additionally, 
NREMs exist in Europe and chapter 4 evaluated those mechanisms in Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden. However, their evaluation revealed 
different structures. The international recommendations on setting-up NREMs do not mention 
                                                 
1198 See UNCHR (2014) (n 898); UNHRC ‘Report on the twenty-first annual meeting of special 
rapporteurs/representatives, independent experts and working groups of the special procedures of the Human 
Rights Council, including updated information on the special procedures’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/41. 
1199 UNHRC (2015) (n 1198) para 6. 
1200 UNGA (2013) (n 1030) para 21. See also UNGA Res 65/190 (11 March 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/190 para 
18; UNGA Res 63/156 (30 January 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/156 para 13; UNGA Res 61/144 (1 February 2007) 
UN Doc A/RES/61/144 para 11; UNGA Res 59/166 (10 February 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/166 para 10. 
1201 Trafficking Principles and Guidelines (n 52) guideline 1(7). See also COE Trafficking Convention (n 23) art 
29(4). 
1202 See generally UNCHR (2014) (n 898); UNHRC (2015) (n 1198). 
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a uniform structure. In the European context, the EU Trafficking Directive requires member 
states to establish NREMs ‘in the way in which they consider appropriate according to their 
internal organisation’.1203 While it recognises the need for a minimum structure around the four 
identified tasks of assessing trends, gathering statistics, measuring the results of anti-trafficking 
action, and regular reporting.1204 
 NREMs around the globe are often found to take one of four structures, namely inter-
agency coordinating structures, stand-alone institutions, offices within government institutions, 
and institutions that are integrated into a broad-based human rights institution.1205 The Belgian 
bipartite mechanism represents an inter-agency coordinating structure and a stand-alone 
institution. The Romanian mechanism embodies a stand-alone institution. The Czech and 
Swedish mechanisms are an office within government institutions. The Dutch and Finnish 
mechanisms are an independent institution that is integrated into a broad-based human rights 
institution. The advantages and shortcomings of each structure depend upon the size of the 
state, its geographical location, the extent of the domestic situation, and the availability of 
resources. The Belgian mechanism benefits from maximised utilisation of existing human, 
financial, and material resources because its response involves various stakeholders. But a 
ministerial lead can influence the choice of the most appropriate approach to trafficking as one 
of law enforcement or migration. Moreover, coordination among the various stakeholders may 
prove difficult and coordinating members will most likely need to deal with competing 
priorities within their government institutions. A stand-alone institution as in Romania or as 
supporting the Belgian inter-agency has a clear mandate to focus anti-trafficking actions in 
favour of the protection of the most vulnerable and excluded groups but at the expense of a 
comprehensive approach. The government offices of the Czech and Swedish mechanisms 
benefit from the relative flexibility granted to respond to the evolving nature of trafficking, 
although coordination among various stakeholders can be an impediment. The distinguishing 
feature of the Dutch and Finnish mechanisms is independence and the ability to build on the 
interdependence and indivisibility of human rights, and to mainstream the issue across all 
trafficking situations. The autonomy of staff ensures objectivity in evaluating the 
implementation of national responses and making comprehensive recommendations, which, in 
turn, increases the credibility of their work. However, a comprehensive approach based on 
                                                 
1203 EU Trafficking Directive (n 24) preamble para 27. 
1204 ibid. 
1205 UNHRC (2015) (n 1198) para 19. 
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cooperation with government institutions, civil society organisations, and victims depends 
upon the willingness of these stakeholders. 
 In the absence of a unified structure and drawing on the advantages and shortcomings 
of different structures of NREMs, this thesis proposes a uniform framework for NREMs to 
work together in cases of transnational trafficking and to complement international and 
regional mechanisms of enforcement. Such framework takes into account the four identified 
features of enforcement mechanisms in chapter 4, namely scope of mandate, degree of 
independence and accountability of office, availability of adequate resources, and extent of 
cooperation with NGOs. The primary objective of the framework is to build on the capacities 
of NREMs to offer greater coherence, reliability, comparability, and comprehensiveness of 
data collection and analysis, monitoring, evaluating, and reporting. The framework is most 
appropriately adopted at the regional level to contextualise the uniqueness of trafficking within 
a certain region. For example, the removal of internal borders facilitates trafficking of EU 
citizens within the EU area. 
First, NREMs should have a clear legally-defined mandate that covers all forms and 
effects of trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation and the removal of organs, in both 
transnational and domestic situations, whether or not these involve organised crime. Situations 
of forced marriage, forced labour, and the removal of organs are still underexposed1206 as are 
less visible situations of sexual exploitation outside the legalised sex industry, such as in hotels 
and private homes.1207 In countries, such as Belgium and Finland, that register labour 
exploitation more than sexual exploitation research should be an integral part of the NREM’s 
mandate.1208 NREMs should report on both compliance with the preeminent legal instruments 
and the effectiveness of national legislation, policy, and practice, since international 
cooperation in cases of transnational trafficking necessitates legal harmonisation of 
international and regional obligations. Beyond reporting, the role of NREMs should include 
capacity building and the exchange of expertise. Based on the Belgian and Finnish mandates, 
NREMs may be granted legal powers to act in individual cases. 
Second, the work of NREMs should be objective and independent. Thus, they should 
stand apart from all operational and policy coordination activity. Smaller states, which lack the 
capacity to establish a national coordinating mechanism for operational and policy coordination 
                                                 
1206 UNCHR (2014) (n 898) para 30. 
1207 Commission Staff Working Document (2016) (n 68) 14.   
1208 UNHRC (2015) (n 1198) para 13. 
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and a national rapporteur for reporting on such coordination, may have coordination and 
reporting performed by the same body but in such cases the body must be independent. The 
work of a body that is involved in the design and evaluation of national policies will have little 
perceived credibility. The organisational location of NREMs is an important consideration, 
even though different structures within and outside government institutions were described 
earlier. Their location should allow for open access to information and enhance the possibilities 
of influencing policy direction and practice. For example, the Swedish NREM has access to 
primary sources of information because it is organisationally placed within the police. At the 
same time, a legal right to obtain important information free of charge and notwithstanding the 
privacy of data grants the Finnish NREM access to primary sources of information held by 
government institutions. Meanwhile, the Dutch and Finnish NREMs can influence policy 
direction and practice because there is a clear legally-defined link with parliament, in relation 
to the submission of annual reports with recommendations by these NREMs. Thus, NREMs 
should report to both the government and parliament, which should determine the appropriate 
body for ensuring that the recommendations contained in such reports are implemented. The 
reports and recommendations of NREMs should be made accessible to the public because of 
their potential to stimulate public debate, which may provide the necessary impetus for political 
support. 
Third, NREMs should conduct both quantitative and qualitative analysis of data and 
information on root causes, the nature, extent and type of trafficking, and emerging trends. For 
this purpose, information sources should include legal, criminal justice, law enforcement 
statistics, and information from NGOs. Their analysis and their work more generally should 
adopt both a human rights and legal perspective, since the human rights protection of victims 
is often a neglected area of analysis. Alongside a wide range of sources, there should be 
independence to decide on the kind of research to be undertaken to expose underexposed or 
neglected trafficking situations.  
Fourth, there should be greater cooperation between NREMs and NGOs at all stages of 
the former’s work. Besides the police, NGOs involved in victim rehabilitation and reintegration 
have access to primary sources of information. They can consequently ensure that NREMs 
work from both a human rights and legal perspective. NGO involvement in data collection and 
analysis may also minimise budgetary constraints that restrict the work of NREMs. As the 
mandate of NREMs should include capacity building and the exchange of expertise, they can 
depend upon NGO assistance in awareness-raising among the public and training stakeholders, 
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such as law enforcement, the judiciary, and service providers. An important consideration are 
the different forms of cooperation with NGOs, such as through a coalition, establishing more 
formal cooperation agreements, collaborating and providing state funding, setting-up 
discussion forums on trafficking-related matters to validate information and increase 
knowledge base, and involving NGOs in the victim assistance and identification efforts of 
government institutions.1209 For example, in Romania, there is a coalition of NGOs known as 
‘Antitrafic’ that raises awareness of domestic situations and assists victims but cooperation 
with the Romanian NREM is lacking because of irregular state funding. In Belgium, three 
specialised reception centres are formally instituted in the state-run assistance programme. 
While in Finland, NGOs regularly cooperate with the Finnish NREM to provide training and 
information events. 
 A number of factors determine the effectiveness of the work of NREMs. For example, 
when a recommendation by the NREM is not implemented the failure to implement can relate 
more broadly to the ineffectiveness of other government institutions. The effectiveness of the 
NREM is limited to the spheres of influence and activities as mandated. The domestic 
trafficking situation can be improved only when the behaviour of other institutions in their own 
spheres of influence and responsibility is also effective.1210 NREMs can help to address many 
of the behavioural failures of other government institutions through independent reporting, 
with the assistance of NGOs. In the same way, they can help to address many of the challenges 
of the international and regional systems in ensuring objectivity and non-selectivity in the 
consideration of human rights issues and in eliminating double standards and politicisation that 
endanger the international and regional enforcement mechanisms.1211 Above all, a uniform 
framework with standard operating procedures can ensure coordination and cooperation among 
NREMs in countries of origin, transit, and/or destination. 
6.4. Call for Further Impact Studies  
The international regulation of sex trafficking in women has reached a crossroads. Current 
responses manifest in the UN Trafficking Protocol, the COE Trafficking Convention, and the 
                                                 
1209 UNCHR (2014) (n 898) para 36. 
1210 Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram, ‘Introduction: National Human Rights Institutions, State Conformity, 
and Social Change’ in Ryan Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social 
Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions (CUP 2012) 15. 
1211 Chris Sidoti, ‘National Human Rights Institutions and the International Human Rights System’ in Ryan 
Goodman and Thomas Pegram (eds), Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National 
Human Rights Institutions (CUP 2012) 99. 
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EU Trafficking Directive have failed to enhance international cooperation in the prevention of 
trafficking, the prosecution of traffickers, and the protection of victims. The mechanisms of 
enforcement attaching directly or indirectly to these instruments operate within the very 
limitations of the consent-based legal systems that allow the narrow self-interests of states to 
coexist and foster within the broader international legal framework around trafficking. Perhaps 
the proposed review mechanism under the UN Trafficking Protocol will give new expression 
to the fight against trafficking. Or, a revamped annual report on trafficking in persons as a 
diagnostic tool of the US enforcement mechanism can address the current challenges of US 
unilateralism to knowledge production and regulation in the field. However, as this thesis 
argues, the way forward is to strengthen existing domestic enforcement mechanisms, 
particularly NREMs, to assess trafficking trends, gather statistics, measure the results of anti-
trafficking actions, and report regularly. Their proximity to the government and victims can 
bring about serious and necessary change in the domestic realities of trafficking. 
The task of measuring progress in the fight against sex trafficking in women, 
particularly in individual states, is a difficult one. As a first measure of progress, this thesis has 
explored whether and to what extent individual states, namely Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Romania, and Sweden, have implemented the provisions of the 
preeminent legal instruments, namely the UN Trafficking Protocol, the COE Trafficking 
Convention, and the EU Trafficking Directive, into their domestic legal systems, as well as, 
whether and to what extent the enforcement mechanisms that attach directly or indirectly to 
these instruments have assisted individual states in their implementation processes. Correct and 
full implementation is a prerequisite to international cooperation among countries of origin, 
transit, and/or destination in cases of transnational trafficking. Thus, this thesis has concerned 
itself with legal developments in the field and linked these developments to the work of 
enforcement mechanisms, in relation to the case studies. However, this thesis has been unable 
to fully grasp the impact of anti-trafficking actions on the legal and political landscapes in these 
states because many of the issues around trafficking are complex and contested and, therefore, 
not amenable to an indicator-based measurement.1212 In particular, key definitions and concepts 
are subject to multiple interpretations and the data required to accurately measure responses 
and impact is often unavailable or inaccessible. There is an urgent need for impact studies in 
the field, particularly in relation to the work of the enforcement mechanisms identified in this 
                                                 
1212 Gallagher and Chuang (n 220) 342.   
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thesis, such as the quality and value of their reports. While individual states are often in the 
best position to carry out such studies because they have access to primary sources of 
information, they cannot be trusted to provide honest insights. Thus, existing NREMs should 
be strengthened to report independently on international and regional compliance and the 
effectiveness of national legislation, policy, and practice. To this end, a global baseline study 
should be commissioned to provide guidance to NREMs and to help them build on their 
capacities.1213  
                                                 
1213 UNHRC (2015) (n 1198) para 45(c). 
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Appendix 
I. ECHR Case Law on Trafficking in Persons under Article 4 
i. Inadmissible Applications 
FA v the United Kingdom App no 20658/11 (ECHR, 10 September 2013) 
VF v France App no 7196/10 (ECHR, 29 November 2011) 
Idemugia v France App no 4125/11 (ECHR, 27 March 2012) 
SE v Spain App no 4982/12 (ECHR, 29 September 2015) 
LO v France App no 4455/14 (ECHR, 18 June 2015) 
ii. Applications Struck Out 
Kawago v the United Kingdom App no 56921/09 (ECHR, 3 September 2013) 
YK v the United Kingdom App no 21413/11 (ECHR, 4 March 2014) 
LR v the United Kingdom App no 49113/09 (ECHR, 14 June 2011) 
DH v Finland App no 30815/09 (ECHR, 28 June 2011) 
OGO v the United Kingdom App no 13950/12 (ECHR, 18 February 2014) 
iii. Article 4 Violation 
Siliadin v France App no 73316/01 (ECHR, 26 July 2005) 
Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (ECHR, 7 January 2010)  
CN and V v France App no 67724/09 (ECHR, 11 October 2012)  
CN v the United Kingdom App no 4239/08 (ECHR, 13 November 2012)  
LE v Greece App no 71545/12 (ECHR, 21 January 2016)  
iv. No Article 4 Violation 
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Tas v Belgium App no 44614/06 (ECHR, 12 May 2009)  
M and Others v Italy and Bulgaria App no 40020/03 (ECHR, 31 July 2012) 
v. Pending Applications 
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